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Smart Card devices are commonly used on many secure applications where there is a need 
to identify the card holder in order to provide a personalised service. The value of access to 
locked data and services makes Smart Cards a desirable attack target for hackers of all sorts. 
The range of attacks a Smart Card and its environment can be subjected to ranges from 
social engineering to exploiting hardware and software bugs and features. 
 
This research has focused on several hardware related attacks and potential threats. Namely, 
power glitch attack, power analysis, laser attack, the potential effect on security of memory 
power consumption reduction techniques and using a re-configurable instruction set as 
method to harden opcode interpretation. 
 
A semi-automated simulation environment to test designs against glitch attacks and power 
analysis has been developed. This simulation environment can be easily integrated within 
Atmel’s design flow to bring assurance of their designs’ behaviour and permeability to such 
attacks at an early development stage. Previous power analysis simulation work focused on 
testing the implementation of part of the cryptographic algorithm. This work focuses on 
targeting the whole algorithm, allowing the test of a wider range of countermeasures. 
 
A common glitch detection approach is monitoring the power supply for abnormal voltage 
values and fluctuations. This approach can fail to detect some fast glitches. The alternative 
approach used in this research monitors the effects of a glitch on a mono-stable circuit 
sensitive to fault injection by glitch attacks. This work has resulted in a patented glitch 
detector that improves the overall glitch detection range. 
 
The use of radiation countermeasures as laser countermeasures and potential sensors 
has been investigated too. Radiation and laser attacks have similar effects on silicon devices. 
Whilst several countermeasures against radiation have been developed over the years, 
almost no explicit mention of laser countermeasures was found. This research has 
demonstrated the suitability of using some radiation countermeasures as laser 
countermeasures. 
 
Memory partitioning is a static and dynamic power consumption reduction technique 
successfully used in various devices. The nature of Smart Card devices restricts the 
applicability of some aspects of this power reduction technique. This research line has 
resulted in the proposal of a memory partitioning approach suitable to Smart Cards. 
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1 Introduction to Smart Cards and portfolio structure 
 
Smart Cards have their origin in the plastic cards commonly used for the last few decades to 
identify customers and provide them with personalised services. A few examples of these 
cards include national insurance cards, library membership cards or video club cards. Initially, 
these cards might have included just the customer name and identification number, and, 
hence, were easy to duplicate and to commit fraud. 
 
Certain services required some security features that would make card duplication more 
difficult and authenticate the rightful owner of the card. This was achieved with the addition of 
a magnetic stripe, which, among other data, stored the card identification number and the 
card’s expiry date. These cards were also accompanied with a personal identification number 
(PIN), the purpose of which was to authenticate the user. A common example of the plastic 
card with a magnetic stripe is a credit or debit card. 
 
Despite the added security feature, these cards could still be duplicated. In fact, financial 
institutions lost £505 million in 2004 due to fraud [1]. These figures demonstrate that the 
security measures in place were hardly a deterrent for those committing fraud. Furthermore, 
the use of the PIN number already included in the magnetic stripe was unevenly adopted or 
enforced across different countries or services. For example in the UK, the PIN number of a 
debit card was required only when using it in an automated teller machine (ATM). When using 
a debit card in a shop, the customer would identify or authenticate himself with a hand written 
signature on the receipt, which should match to the one on the reverse of the card. 
 
On the other hand, Spain had a different approach to authenticating a card owner in a shop. 
The shop tender was required by law to request the card holder provide a valid proof of 
identification, such as the national identity card. Furthermore, when using debit cards, the 
customer should also enter the PIN number in order to complete a purchase transaction. 
Credit cards did not need the PIN number entered to complete the transaction. 
 
Smart Cards are the next step in the evolution from the original plastic cards, and they add yet 
another degree of security. Smart Cards are plastic cards with an embedded integrated circuit 
(IC) and are used in a wider range of applications, such as e-money cards (e.g. for transport), 
subscriber identification module (SIM) cards, e-banking (e.g. credit cards) or government (e.g. 
identity cards). 
 
Smart Cards can be classified into two different categories depending on the components or 
intellectual properties (IP) they are made of. These are memory Smart Card and 
microcontroller Smart Card. A memory Smart Card is based on a non-volatile memory (NVM) 
 EngD portfolio – Volume I, A. Goikoetxea Yanci 2 
which is externally accessed to store and/or read information. These Smart Cards are usually 
accessed to through a Finite State Machine (FSM), just as shown in the block diagram in 
Figure 1-1. A microcontroller Smart Card, on the other hand, is a System on Chip (SoC) 
device with a microcontroller, program and data memories, and a series of other IPs. A block 
diagram of microcontroller Smart Cards is shown in Figure 1-2. Smart Cards are shipped to 















Figure 1-2 Block diagram of the typical microcontroller card 
 
The key benefit of Smart Cards goes beyond the pure user authentication feature of magnetic 
stripes. Firstly, the security features embedded into the IC make it harder to be duplicated 
and, hence, to achieve fraud [1]. Secondly, Smart Cards can also store data and restrict the 
access to this data. One common, everyday use example is the phonebook function 
embedded into SIM cards. The size of these phonebooks is limited by the available NVM 
within the Smart Card. The access to this phonebook is granted after entering the right PIN 
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number after powering up the SIM card. This is, unless the user has disabled the PIN number 
feature. 
 
Another example where data is stored into a Smart Card is the satellite or cable TV receiver 
decoder or set-top-box. Here, the Smart Card holds information on which TV channels the 
customer has subscribed to and is allowed to watch. In this case, however, the access to this 
information is restricted to just the service provider and the set-top-box. The end customer 
does not have rightful means or needs of gaining access to this information. 
 
Most of the environments and applications where microcontroller Smart Cards are used, 
involve the need for secure and/or secretive data transactions. For this purpose, Smart Cards 
are designed with built-in security measures that range from hardware to software. With an 
increasing number of applications using Smart Cards, however, there is also an increased 
desire to break the security brought by these devices, as it could grant access to otherwise 
restricted services. In turn, this has resulted in a continuous need to improve the security of 
the whole environment and application. 
 
This portfolio does not intend to be a hacker’s manual, hence, it will not discuss how the 
security might be broken nor reference any place or report where this is discussed or 
explained. However, just a sample of the motivation behind could help the reader understand 
the drive of hackers to break the security measures, and the need of the Smart Card industry 
to enhance the security level. Consider the set-top-box case above, where the end user has 
no access to the information. If the end user manages to gain access to the information stored 
in the Smart Card or manages to fool the set-top-box, they could potentially watch more TV 
channels than originally subscribed to. 
 
Focusing on the Smart Card and its environment, it can be subjected to threats and attacks of 
different natures. The main attacks and threats can target: 
• the end user, through social engineering, behaviour analysis or even personal threats; 
• the communication channels between the Smart Card device and Smart Card reader 
(commonly known as reader terminal), by eavesdropping, behavioural analysis and 
fault injection; 
• software or OS, by exploiting any bug or faults; and 
• the Smart Card itself, with fault injections such as power glitch attacks, laser attacks 
or side-channel attacks such as power analysis. 
 
Atmel, as one of the leading Smart Card manufacturer companies, has a great interest in 
keeping its product portfolio secure against current and forthcoming threats. The core 
business of the Atmel Smart Card division centres on designing and developing 
microcontroller Smart Card devices. Therefore, this research focuses on security issues, 
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threats and attacks that target the microcontroller Smart Card IC or its internal hardware. 
Attacks related to their internal software and their environment are out of the scope of this 
research. For the rest of the research, microcontroller Smart Card devices will be referred to 
as Smart Card devices. The next section provides an overview of the structure of this portfolio, 
the work carried out in this research and the main achievements. 
 
 
1.1 Portfolio structure 
 
This portfolio is divided into two volumes. This document, Volume I, covers the various 
research carried out in relation to Smart Card security. The contents of this volume are 
discussed next. 
 
Chapter 2 of this volume sets the context of this research by giving an introduction to the 
Smart Card device and the manufacturing industry. This chapter also links all the different 
research topics carried out in this work under the ‘Smart Card Security’ umbrella, and lists the 
resulting contributions. Due to the distinctive nature of the different research areas covered in 
this work, Chapters 3 to 5, the literature review of each research area is covered individually 
within the chapter related to each research topic. 
 
Chapter 3 Fault Tolerant Design covers three research lines focused on improving the Smart 
Card’s fault tolerance to the three main attack techniques. These are power glitch attack, 
power analysis attack and laser attack. Power glitch and laser attacks are active attacks that 
can be used to inject faults into the Smart Card or alter the program execution flow, which 
might provide valuable behavioural information to an experienced hacker. Power analysis 
attack, on the other hand, is a passive attack technique used gain knowledge on the 
processed data by analysing the Smart Card’s power consumption waveforms. 
 
The research carried out in Chapter 3 has resulted in a glitch attack and power analysis 
simulation environment to enable testing designs against these two common attack 
techniques at an early development stage. The second research line has produced a new 
glitch detector capable of detecting fast glitches that are missed by current detectors. The 
third and final research line on fault tolerance has focused on investigating the applicability of 
radiation hardening techniques to Smart Cards. 
 
Chapter 4 Low Power Design for Smart Cards looks at the applicability of several SRAM 
leakage reduction techniques on a Smart Card device. The introduction of new technologies 
and the adoption of new design techniques can potentially impact on the security level of a 
Smart Card device. One of the two main research lines covered in this chapter is aimed at 
determining the impact on SRAM robustness a few SRAM leakage reduction design 
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techniques might have when the SRAM is subjected to glitch attacks. The second main 
research line covered in this chapter proposes a memory partitioning approach focused on the 
needs of a Smart Card. For this technique to be applicable to Smart Cards and minimising the 
impact on security, the memory scrambler will need to be adapted to the chosen memory 
partitioning approach. 
 
Chapter 5 Re-Configurable Instruction Set CPU for Smart Cards covers a re-configurable 
CPU proposal where the CPU’s instruction set (IS) can be partially modified on-the-fly. As 
previously stated, power analysis attack can be used to discover the processed data. It can 
also be used to find out instructions being executed. Furthermore, using a CPU with a publicly 
known IS has a higher risk of program opcode interpretation should it be made public. This 
chapter discusses several approaches, advantages and disadvantages of de-standardising 
the IS to harden the power analysis and opcode interpretation. 
 
Chapter 6 finishes this volume, Volume I, discussing general conclusions on Smart Card 
security from a higher level perspective than the research covered in this work. Regarding 
future work, this chapter summarises the main lines of action proposed in chapters 3 to 5. 
 
Volume II of this portfolio includes technical reports, papers and patents presented as a result 
of the research carried out and information on the work carried out to support this research. 
For more information on its contents, please refer to the Volume II document. 
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2 Smart Card Industry, device background and 
Portfolio contribution 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the Smart Card industry, the device and its threats. It 
also presents the contributions of this research towards the Smart Card Security field. 
 
 
2.1 Smart Card Industry 
 
From its design to its usage, there are five main parties involved with Smart Cards: a) 
manufacturers; b) evaluators; c) vendors; d) customers (e.g. banks); and, e) the end user (i.e. 
the people that use a given service). Manufacturing companies, where we can find 
semiconductor companies like Atmel, focus on designing and developing hardware devices 
according to the requirements of the Smart Cards’ target applications. These requirements 
include not only feature specifications but also security requirements, which are defined by the 
Common Criteria (CC) framework, international standard organisation (ISO) 15408. 
 
Each new product is evaluated by an external evaluator, such as the German Federal Office 
for Information Security or the French Secretariat General for National Defence (French 
Network and Information Security Agency), to determine if they actually meet the application’s 
security requirements. Meeting these requirements does not mean the device is unbreakable, 
instead it provides a degree of certainty that the device has been designed, tested and 
documented following a certain methodology. These evaluations are very costly in terms of 
time and money, and any issue highlighted at this stage, will have a big impact on the cost and 
delivery dates of the device. Hence, manufacturer companies need a means of testing their 
products during and after production by themselves in order to maximise the chances of 
passing the evaluation process. 
 
The Smart Card vendors, such as Gemalto, Giesecke & Devrient and Oberthur Technologies, 
focus on developing the software side of the Smart Cards (OS and applications) and the 
packaging according to their customers’ requirements. These customers use Smart Card 
devices to identify their customers (the end user) and provide unique and personalised 
services, e.g pay per view TV. More often than not, these same customers offer Smart Card 
devices to the end user free of charge, which impacts the manufacturers’ selling prices. 
 
Unlike other industries, where a company might protect its IP against industrial theft, the 
Smart Card industry protects itself further by dividing the knowledge into the different parties 
involved. In other words, no one party involved knows everything about a given Smart Card 
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product. In fact, due to their high dependency on security, this knowledge division often 
happens even at company level. 
 
As a result, the Smart Card industry is very secretive and little information is published by the 
manufacturers themselves regarding their research on threats and or countermeasures, as 
otherwise it could be potentially used by attackers to target their own devices. Hence, most of 
the publications related to Smart Card security have been published by third party research 
institutions. 
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2.2 The Device 
 
Smart Cards are regulated by the ISO-7816 standard, which defines their physical, electrical, 
communication protocols and many more aspects. There are, however, some internal aspects 
not regulated by this standard, such as the actual design, what kind of CPU to use or what 
kind of countermeasure should be instantiated for a given threat. These are left to the 
manufacturer company to choose from and could mean the difference between gaining or 
losing potential customers and impact their competitive advantage. 
 
Smart Cards communicate with the external world via Smart Card readers (a.k.a. reader 
terminals), which also have the function of powering the Smart Card. Two approaches have 
been standardised to power and communicate with a Smart Card: contact and contact-less. 
Contact Smart Cards are powered and communicate via physical connectors. These Smart 
Cards are packaged with pins and physically connected to the reader terminal to power the 
Smart Card, drive control signals (such as clock and reset), and perform data transactions. 
Figure 2-1 shows the contact Smart Card module’s pin-out. Contact-less Smart Cards, on the 




















Figure 2-1 Smart Card module pinout 
 
In contact Smart Cards, the power is supplied between the Vcc and GND pins. The ISO 7816 
part 3 determines the allowed external supply voltage levels, which currently are 5V, 3V and 
1.8V. However, the technology node Smart Cards are developed to operate at lower voltage 
levels, hence, they require a built-in DC/DC voltage converter. The input of this DC/DC 
converter is fed with the external supply voltage, Vcc, and its output provides the Smart Card’s 
internal supply voltage, Vdd. For the rest of this portfolio, Vcc refers to the supply voltage 
provided externally to the Smart Card, that is, the DC/DC converter’s input pin. On the other 
hand, Vdd refers to the Smart Card’s internal supply voltage, which is provided by the DC/DC 
converter’s output; in other words, the voltage used by the Smart Card to operate internally. 
Also, for the rest of this portfolio, the DC/DC voltage converter will be referred to as a voltage 
regulator. Figure 2-2 shows a diagram of how the voltage regulator links the power rails. 
 









Figure 2-2 Voltage regulator in a Smart Card device 
 
The Reset pin in Figure 2-1 is used to apply a hard reset to the Smart Card device. The Clock 
pin is used to provide the Smart Card with a clock signal. Although originally this signal was 
used to clock both the communication channel and the internal system, modern devices have 
an internal clock generator, so that the system and communication channel use independent 
clock signals. This is a security enhancement as any attack on the external clock pin may 
affect the communication but not necessarily the internal system. 
 
The I/O pin (also known as I/O 0) is a bi-directional half-duplex communication port used to 
send and receive data to and from the Smart Card reader and is synchronised with the Clock 
signal. Optionally, devices could have an additional I/O (usually referred to as I/O 1). More 
modern devices also include a serial peripheral interface (SPI) and USB ports. These 
additional ports can only be accessible by using a package different to that shown in Figure 
2-1. 
 
Regarding the device internals, the bare minimum IPs embedded into a Smart Card include: a 
voltage regulator (covered above); a CPU; program memory; data memory; an I/O interface 
(covered above) and some security sensors. In addition to these IPs, a Smart Card can also 
include: a hardware instantiation of cryptographic algorithms and or cryptographic 
accelerators; more sensors; firewalls that control the memory access. 
 
CPUs used in Smart Cards have traditionally been 8- or 16-bit ones, although more recently 
32-bit ones are being used too. The CPUs are either secure versions of commercially 
available ones (e.g, AVR, C51 or ARM) or custom designed ones. The main benefits of using 
versions of commercially available CPUs are that: a) software developers can have prior 
knowledge of the CPU’s assembly language; and b) third party tools might be already 
available to develop code for that particular CPU even before the physical device exist. In 
short, its impact on the time-to-market (TTM) is minimised. However, these devices might be 
more sensitive to code leakage (i.e. someone getting access to the code), as it would be 
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easier to understand it. Custom CPUs, on the other hand, can be safer against code leakage, 
however, the closed nature of its Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) would reduce the software 
developers’ exposure to it and limit the amount of available development tools, having a 
potentially greater impact on the TTM and overall cost. 
 
The program memory space is usually occupied with a ROM and an NVM such as EEPROM 
or Flash. The ROM memory might hold functions (libraries) provided by the Smart Card 
vendor together with the manufacturer’s code. The NVM on the other hand usually holds the 
Smart Card’s OS and any application developed by the vendor. 
 
The data memory is occupied with both SRAM and NVM memories, where SRAM is used to 
store any temporal data related to Smart Card operations, such as buffers for data 
transactions and temporal storage for encryption algorithms. NVM is used to store application 
and personalisation data, such as the personal identification number (PIN) number, bio-metric 
data or a phone book. 
 
Some Smart Cards also include hardware instantiations of cryptographic algorithms and or 
cryptographic hardware accelerators. There are two kinds of cryptographic algorithms, 
symmetric and asymmetric. Symmetric algorithms use the same key to encrypt and decrypt a 
message, this is, the sender (encrypting device) and receiver (decrypting device) share the 
same key. For the communication to be secure with such algorithms, the key must be kept 
secret, as leaking it can result in an observer gaining access to the encrypted message. The 
Data Encryption Standard (DES) and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) are the typical 
symmetric cryptographic algorithms used in Smart Cards. These algorithms can be fully 
instantiated either in hardware or in software. 
 
Asymmetric algorithms use different keys to encrypt and decrypt a message, where the 
encryption key can be public and the decryption key is private. In this scheme, both devices, 
i.e. Smart Card and reader terminal, only share their public keys. To communicate, the sender 
encrypts the message with the receiver’s public key. Upon receiving the encrypted message, 
the receiver decrypts it with its private key. For the communication to be secure with such 
algorithms, all four keys should be kept secret. The private key only known by the device that 
owns it (i.e. either the Smart Card or the reader) and the public key shared only between the 
devices that take part in the communication. Asymmetric algorithms, such as Rivest, Shamir & 
Adleman (RSA), can also be fully instantiated in hardware or in software. Hardware 
accelerators may also be instantiated to speed up the software implementations. 
 
An attacker gaining access to a public key does not compromise the integrity of any encrypted 
message, as the public key cannot be used to decrypt a message. The attacker could, 
however, use the public key to inject corrupt messages in the communication channel, even if 
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it only can target the device owning that public key. In other words, the attacker could encrypt 
messages in one direction. Such attacks could be used to perform behavioural analysis. 
 
An attacker gaining access to a private key, on the other hand, compromises the messages 
being sent to that private key owner device (either the Smart Card or the reader terminal), as 
the attacker could decrypt those messages. Hence, leaking a private key has worse 
implications than leaking a public one. However, in some applications, different Smart Cards 
could have different private keys, meaning that gaining access to the private key of one Smart 
Card device does not necessarily affect other devices nor it necessarily compromises the 
application. 
 
Other features embedded into Smart Cards are attack countermeasures and sensors. 
Sensors are used to monitor the Smart Card’s environment parameters for alterations that 
could affect the device’s performance and raise an alarm if any of these parameters are out of 
the specification values. Typical sensors monitor for variables such as temperature, clock 
frequency and glitch and voltage variations on the power rails. Sensors are also used to detect 
light (such as laser beams) applied to the Smart Card die in order to inject faults into the 
device. Typical countermeasures include: adding a metal mesh on the die’s top layer to avoid 
micro-probing the device; and design techniques that improve cryptographic algorithm 
implementations against power analysis (more about this in section 2.3.2). 
 
In addition to all these hardware features, Smart Cards also include the software they need to 
operate, which, as previously stated, includes functions or libraries provided by the Smart 
Card manufacturer and the OS and applications provided by the vendors. In fact, the Smart 
Card OS can be developed by the vendor or a third party company. For single application 
devices, the vendor usually has its own OS. For the case of multi-application Smart Cards, 
using the OS developed by third party companies such as JavaCard, MULTOS or STARCOS 
is more common. 
 
Single application devices tend to be built around 8-bit or 16-bit CPUs, whereas multi 
application devices can make a better use of 32-bit CPUs. Both OS need to be secure, where 
the application and OS memory spaces are kept separated. In the case of a multi application 
OS, however, this memory space differentiation expands to applications, where an application 
cannot access other applications’ data, as otherwise, an application developed by a hacker 
could potentially access other applications’ data or even the OS data. In some cases, as with 
multi-application Smart Cards, applications can be added or removed even after the device 
has been deployed and while it is being used by the end user. 
 




Despite all the security measures embedded into a Smart Card device, they are still targeted 
with a range of attack techniques to get valuable data. This section explains those threats 
directly related to the work carried out in this research. 
 
 
2.3.1 Glitch Attacks 
 
Electronic devices are designed to be powered at a certain, constant voltage level that is 
characterised by the technology node at which the device is built. By powering the device 
outside its specification values, the device could fail to operate as expected or suffer 
permanent damaged. This is especially true when the device is subject to abnormal voltage 
levels for a prolonged period of time. 
 
Electrical noise, such as glitches, are sudden temporary changes of the voltage level in the 
power rails of a device. Due to the short and temporary nature of this phenomenon, electronic 
devices can withstand a certain level of electrical noise; a typical specification is +/- 10% of 
Vcc. However, electrical noise or glitches above certain level can inject errors, temporary 
malfunctions or damage a device permanently. 
 
Glitch attack is a technique used by attackers to disrupt a device’s normal operation in order 
to analyse the device’s behaviour or gain access to otherwise secret data. These attacks are 
applied on the target device’s power rails, Vcc and/or GND in the case of Smart Cards. An 
alternative use could be targeting the device’s I/O or clock signal. A typical outcome of a 
successful glitch attack could be skipping the execution of an instruction. 
 
Despite the ISO standard defining the valid supply voltage levels, Smart Card manufacturers 
have no control over the environment where their devices are used or how they are powered. 
In other words, Smart Cards are exposed to the environment and potential abuse from an 
attacker which, does not need to follow the ISO standard nor the device’s powering 
specifications. Hence, they need to make their devices robust against such attacks by design. 
 
As already mentioned, Smart Cards include a voltage regulator that converts the standard 
supply voltage level into that supported by the technology node it is built in. In addition to that, 
the built-in voltage regulator also provides an inherent protection against certain glitches and 
electrical noise levels, as it filters out some of the undesired fluctuations present at its input, 
providing a cleaner supply voltage at its output. This filtering feature, as it will be shown in 
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section 3.2.3.3 Test-chip Test and Results, is highly design dependant. Despite this 
protection, some glitches are still capable of injecting faults into the Smart Card device. Figure 
2-3 shows the typical impact pattern of positive glitches1 applied to the Vcc of a Smart Card. 
 
 
Figure 2-3 A Smart Card's typical response to glitch attacks 
 
As a countermeasure to this threat, Smart Cards include glitch detection circuits located at the 
input and output of the voltage regulator. The aim of these glitch detectors is to detect voltage 
levels and glitches that violate the supply specifications and that can pose a threat to the 
Smart Cards' correct operation whilst avoiding the detection of permissible noise. 
 
The detection range of a typical detector should not only focus on the region that affects the 
device, but it should also overlap it with the region that does not affect the device. In other 
words, a detector should aim at detecting those glitches that affect the device and those that 
are close to affecting it. Figure 2-4 shows a typical detection range of glitch detectors to 
positive glitches on the Vcc of a Smart Card device. 
 
Two research lines of this work have focused on glitch attacks. Firstly, a simulation 
environment has been developed to test devices or parts of them against glitch attacks, 
                                                          
1
 Several kind of glitches can be applied. These are explained further in the Section 3.1.2.2 of 
this Volume. 
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section 3.1. Secondly, a glitch detector capable of detecting certain fast glitches has been 
developed and patented, section 3.2. 
 
 
Figure 2-4 Typical aimed detection range 
 
 
2.3.2 Power Analysis 
 
As previously stated, DES and AES are encryption algorithms commonly used in Smart 
Cards. The mathematical models of these standards are strong and unbreakable, that is 
unless brute force is used. The DES algorithm, with its 56-bit key length (256 or over 72 
quadrillion key combinations), is generally seen as a weak cipher, as it is relatively easy to 
break by a brute force attack [2]. A very common DES enhancement is triple-DES (3DES), 
where encryption is achieved by a consecutive chain of encryption-decryption-encryption, 
using different keys for each operation, as shown in Figure 2-5. As a result, the 3DES has an 
effective key length of 168 bits. The 3DES is regarded as safe against brute force attacks. In 
the case of AES, no successful brute force attack has been published to date for any of its 
three possible key lengths, 128, 192 or 256 bits. 
 
However, whilst the mathematical model of these algorithms might be secure and robust, its 
hardware and software implementations (which ultimately depend on hardware) can introduce 
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a degree of weakness. Complementary Metal-Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) devices 
consume static and dynamic power. Static power is produced by the leakage current present 
when a device is powered. This leakage current depends on the technology and the number 
of transistors in the design, where the device activity has little or no impact. Dynamic power, 
on the other hand, is produced by the dynamic current consumed by the device. Dynamic 
current occurs when the device is active and is produced as a result of transistor switching in 
the device, more switching meaning higher currents. Since the switching of transistors in a 
design (e.g. a combinational block) depends on its current status and the data being 
processed, it can be said that there is a link between the consumed dynamic power and the 























3DES Key = Key1.Key2.Key3 (3x56 bits)
 
Figure 2-5 3DES encryption and decryption processes 
 
Power analysis techniques such as simple power analysis (SPA) and differential power 
analysis (DPA) exploit this link between data and current consumption to guess or estimate 
the operation being performed by a device or even the data it is manipulating. SPA 
techniques, which directly monitor and analyse the power consumption of a device, can be 
used to identify the instruction executed by a CPU [3] or even the operand of an operation [4]. 
DPA techniques, which perform a statistical analysis on a series of power traces, have been 
used to successfully guess the secret key of cryptographic algorithms such as DES and AES 
[5, 6]. 
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Several countermeasures have been proposed against SPA and DPA. One research line of 
this work focused on designing a re-configurable instruction decoder block (RIDB) to protect 
the CPU from SPA and code leakage, Chapter 5. Another research line has focused on 
developing a simulation environment to test DES modules against DPA, Section 3.1. This 
simulation environment has been integrated with the glitch attack simulation environment. 
 
 
2.3.3 Laser Attacks 
 
Lasers are used in the aerospace industry to test electronic devices at terrestrial level for fault 
injection events that they might face at high altitudes and/or outer space due to radiation [7]. 
Despite the fact that a laser beam cannot inject the full range of faults that radiation particles 
can, its capability to inject faults known as single-event upset (SEU) is of great use to an 
attacker, and using it correctly could result in obtaining valuable information. 
 
The cost of the setup to inject faults with a laser, can vary as much as the range of laser 
devices that can be used for this purpose. At the lower end of the scale, a photoflash was 
successfully used to flip the value of an SRAM bit on a PIC microcontroller [8]. This attack was 
carried out by focusing the light spot on the SRAM bit-cell it was targeting. This attack could 
be used to change the value of a register indicating the state of an operation, an FSM or a 
loop counter. In theory, this same attack can be applied to Smart Cards, however, and due to 
the address and bit scrambling of the memories that takes place in a Smart Card device, the 
effect of a similar attack could be unpredictable and also hard to repeat. 
 
An alternative use of the laser is to scan the whole die to identify the location of specific 
functions such as the arithmetic logic unit (ALU) of the CPU, the CPU registers, the 
cryptographic block or memories. After that, an attacker could focus on the area of interest to 
attack it. 
 
The main drawback of the laser is the laser beam’s penetration level. Laser beams are only 
capable of injecting faults on exposed areas of silicon, as the laser beam can be stopped by 
physical obstacles such as packaging and metal layers. So, in order to be able to carry a laser 
attack, the target device needs to be de-packaged first and no metal tracks or layers should 
cover the target area. 
 
The designs’ complexity level and the amount of layers used on modern Smart Cards makes 
it difficult to achieve successful front-side attacks (through the metal layers), as metal tracks 
often hide the silicon below. This task is made even more difficult if the metal mesh on the top 
layer to stop from micro-probing is taken into account. However, these difficulties can be 
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overcome with back-side attacks, where the laser is applied to the substrate, which could 
have been previously milled. Hence, the threat imposed by the laser is still present. 
 
This research line focused on the design of countermeasures to harden devices against light 
attacks. This research was cut short due to a shift of interest by the sponsor company. 
However, a test-chip with some countermeasures was produced and tested. More about this 
research topic can be found in Section 3.3 of this Volume and, at a deeper level in the 
Technical report LaserTech1 of Volume 2. 
 
2.3.4 Program code leakage 
 
Smart Cards typically use commercial CPUs or secured versions of commercially available 
CPUs. Since commercial CPUs are better known than specific or non-commercial ones, 
developers might already be familiar with them and more development tools might be 
available. This could help with the code development. However, this also makes them 
sensitive to program code leakage, as an attacker gaining access to the opcode or assembler 
could easily understand it. Furthermore, different devices with the same CPU might have 
similar instruction power signatures, which make the Smart Card more sensitive to SPA like 
the ones used in [3] and [4]. Again, RIDB and other CPU de-standardisation techniques 
focused on minimising the impact of this threat. 
 
 
2.3.5 Security challenges introduced by new technology nodes 
 
Newer technology nodes result in higher static power drain due to an increase of leakage 
current. Memories are the single highest source of leakage current on Smart Card devices 
due to their high transistor density. Several leakage reduction techniques have been 
developed to reduce this leakage current, which mainly focus on reducing the SRAM’s supply 
voltage [9-11]. A lower supply voltage means a lower static noise margin (SNM), which can 
impact on the memory’s robustness and sensitivity to soft errors [12]. 
 
Smart Card devices are products designed for secure applications; reducing the power 
consumption could not be done at the expense of security. This research line’s focus was on 
investigating the security impact of different low power techniques, some of which were 
developed by Atmel’s Memory Group based in Rousset (France), Chapter 4. 
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2.3.6 General comments on security and attacks 
 
The above mentioned attacks and threads can be more or less effective on their own 
depending on the countermeasures instantiated into the Smart Card devices. However, 
combining the above attacks or threads, [3, 13], can provide a hacker with new and more 
complex tools to circumvent security measures and/or inject faults into the Smart Card. 
 
A common corollary in the computing industry says that ‘the most secure device is the one 
that cannot be accessed’. In reality, however, such device would be of little, if any, use, as real 
world devices are designed to be used and, hence, accessed. From the minute a device can 
be accessed, implementation faults, side leaks or human errors could result in exposing such 
a device to attackers or unintended use of the device.  
 
Security companies can and do invest millions of pounds securing their products and systems. 
However it does not mean that those security measures are unbreakable. In some cases, the 
security can be broken with a heavy financial investment and/or with time and dedication, but 
on other occasions, thinking out of the box can provide surprising results too and bypass 
secure technology with a small investment [14]. 
 
In the Smart Card Industry context, a device is considered secure when it meets the Common 
Criteria rules related to its target application. Although this does not guarantee absolute 
security, it does provide a degree of assurance that a certain methodology has been followed 
during the device’s development and that the device meets the security requirements for the 
target application. Also, devices are often considered secure when the security measures 
cannot be (are not expected to be) broken within the device’s life time, or the cost of doing so 
outweighs the benefits obtained by breaking the security measures. 
 
With regards to attacks, one could think that the aim of an attack is to obtain some tangible 
data. For example, that as a result of a glitch attack, the attacked device would provide the 
attacker with the value of a given register, or hand the attacker full access to the device or 
dumping its code. Although possible, this is often not the case. 
 
A more common effect of an attack can be interrupting a process or transaction being 
performed by the card, and the handling of this interruption might be providing valuable 
information to the attacker. Hence, detected attacks should not abort the process, but only 
provide a wrong result, that should be handled by an error handling protocol put in place for 
that purpose. 
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2.4 Portfolio contribution 
 
Smart Cards can be challenged in several ways and therefore device security needs to be 
tackled from several fronts. The change of focus by the sponsor company during this EngD 
has resulted in a portfolio of different research areas targeted at improving the security of 
Smart Card devices. These research areas have resulted in the following contributions: 
• Development of a simulation tool to test designs against glitch attacks and power 
analysis attack during a design’s development. This tool could easily be integrated 
within Atmel’s design flow to bring assurance of their designs’ behaviour and 
permeability to such attacks. Power analysis attack can be either simulated or tested 
in a physical device. While physical analysis was out of the scope of this work, no 
simulation environment reported being able to perform different attacks. 
• A new glitch detector. By changing the detection approach, the design proposed 
here achieved detecting glitches that current detectors do not. 
• The use of radiation countermeasures as laser countermeasures and potential 
sensors. Radiation and laser attacks have similar effects on silicon devices. Whilst 
several countermeasures against radiation have been developed over the years, 
almost no explicit mention of laser countermeasures was found. This research has 
demonstrated the suitability of using some radiation countermeasures as laser 
countermeasures. 
• Memory partitioning applied to Smart Cards. Many techniques to reduce leakage 
have been proposed during the last few years. However, no work was found on how 
these techniques can be used on Smart Cards, where security is priority number one. 
This research line has resulted in an implementation proposal of memory partitioning 
focused towards Smart Cards. 
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3 Fault Tolerant Design 
 
This chapter covers the work carried out in relation to fault tolerant design. Three fronts or 
research lines were covered in this topic: a) the development of a glitch attack and power 
analysis simulation environment (GAPASE); b) the design of a glitch detector; and c) the test 
of radiation countermeasures when targeted with laser. 
 
Since these three research lines are highly independent from each other, the work carried out 
on each research line will be covered independently in three different, self-contained, sections. 
These sections include: an introduction to the research; the literature review related to that 
specific research line; an explanation of the work carried out and the results; the conclusions 
drawn in relation to that particular research; and future lines of actions. 
 
 
3.1 Simulation Environment 
 
Devices are designed according to specifications that define their behaviour and operational 
range. A device must meet the behavioural specifications for as long as it is within its 
operational range. When a device is subjected to operation conditions outside its 
specifications, however, its behaviour is no longer guaranteed and might result in temporary 
fault injections or even in permanent damage. 
 
Electronic Design Automation (EDA) tool vendors provide tools that allow developers to 
simulate different aspects of their designs at different stages in the development process. 
These simulations can verify the design’s correct behaviour and check for timing violations, 
power consumption and area. All these simulations provide developers with a degree of 
confidence that their design will work in silicon as expected. However, for the most cases, 
these simulations are performed within the device’s operational range. 
 
Smart Cards can be attacked by forcing them to work out of their operational range for a short 
period of time: a) by raising the supply voltage over the absolute maximum; b) by over 
clocking the design; c) by subjecting it to extreme temperatures; d) by subjecting it to a source 
of radiation; or by applying glitches in the power source and/or signals [3, 15]. White paper 
[15] is included in the Appendix A. 
 
Devices can be tested after their fabrication for these operation conditions. In fact, they are 
tested by external evaluators when certifying their security grade. The issue with this 
approach, however, is that these tests occur too late in the design flow, as fixing any security 
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flaws detected at this stage will incur in high costs, as new lithography masks might be 
needed. In other words, it is not cost effective. 
 
Hence, Smart Card manufacturers and security product manufacturers in general need tools 
capable of simulating a device’s behaviour under abnormal operation scenarios. The 
simulation environment developed in this research line has focused on glitch attacks and 
power analysis. 
 
By integrating GAPASE within the Atmel’s design flow, designers are enabled to test their 
designs and to know how they perform when attacked. The following sections cover the 
literature review; the simulation environment developed in this research line; a discussion on 
its usability and the conclusions of this research line. Finally, some possible future 
developments are proposed. 
 
Volume II includes the following reports related to and supporting this research line: 
• SimEnvTech1 (Glitch Attack and Power Analysis Simulation Environment); 
• SimEnvTech2 (Counter Simulation Results); 
• LaserTech1(Tartalo test-chip 01OKA); 
• GlitchTech1(Glitch Detector Report) 
 
 
3.1.1 Literature Review for Fault injection and side-channel 
 
There are several factors and features that need to be taken into account and decided when 
designing a simulation environment. Some of these factors include the simulation level, the 
simulation model, the kind of injected faults and the amount of circuitry to simulate. 
 
In relation to the simulation level, the typical debate is high level simulations vs. low level 
simulations, where the usual trade off is speed vs. accuracy. High level approach was taken in 
the glitch attack simulation environment in [16]. Developed around SystemC, this simulation 
environment allows simulating the propagation of a fault injected by a glitch attack. Since this 
simulation environment runs high level simulations (i.e. behavioural level), it is capable of both 
simulating complex circuits and faster than with lower level simulation tools. 
 
Simulating a glitch attack in SystemC has, however, other kind of limitations, such as the need 
for a behaviour model of a glitch attack and or presuming where the fault is injected. However, 
the recent publication of the analog and mixed-signal (AMS) extension of SystemC (SystemC 
AMS) [17] could help modelling a circuit’s behaviour when subjected to glitch attacks and, 
hence, ease or minimise these drawbacks and or limitations. 
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Low level simulation tools such as Simulation Program with Integration Circuit Emphasis 
(SPICE) or Nanosim, on the other hand, might be slower to simulate, but they are more 
adequate to simulate analog circuits and, hence, the response of a circuit to glitch attacks. As 
a result, these simulation tools could indicate more accurately where a fault is injected after a 
glitch attack and how the circuit under test responds to such fault. Ultimately, this information 
could be used to enhance the security of the affected region. 
 
Equally, the power analysis simulation environment could be subjected to the same debate, 
high level simulation vs. low level. Since power consumption is the key to guess the encryption 
key of DES and AES cryptographic modules, the natural assumption could be to use a 
simulation tool that provides an estimated power consumption waveform, be it simulated at 
gate level or transistor level. 
 
Work [18], however, demonstrated the feasibility of register transfer level (RTL) simulations to 
carry out a successful power analysis to AES cryptographic modules. The key to their success 
was the definition of the power consumption model. This was the hamming weight of the 
target substitution box’s (SBOX) output, which is the building block of DES and AES 
cryptographic algorithm. Such power consumption model produces a single value instead of a 
waveform per encryption. 
 
This simulation level and approach has an immediate impact on power analysis speed as, on 
one hand, RTL level simulation will always be faster than lower level ones. On the other hand, 
producing a single value instead of a waveform reduces the amount of time the simulation tool 
spends in writing to output files. Furthermore, and as a direct result of having a small power 
trace data, the power analysis script will run faster than if the output was a waveform. 
 
The simulation environment in [18] needed just 400 plaintexts to guess the key of one SBOX 
of an AES instantiation without countermeasures. Despite this number might be above the 
theoretical minimum (256), the time required to encrypt the additional plaintexts could be 
assumed to be short enough to justify this simulation environment. 
 
The main drawback of this simulation environment, however, is the potential limitation to test 
various countermeasures. These are the reasons: a) high level simulation ignores layout and 
parasitic information; and b) this simulation environment only simulates the required minimum 
part of a cryptographic module for DPA simulations [18, 19]. 
 
By simulating the required minimum logic, this simulation environment focuses on one SBOX 
at a time and can only test countermeasures related to the simulated logic. Testing other 
countermeasures, such as dummy cycles, could still be possible with this simulation 
environment by emulating these cycles in the stimulus generation step. However, this 
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simulation approach excludes itself from testing certain countermeasures such as those that 
aim at protecting the algorithm. 
 
This high level simulation environment could also fail to be of any use to test so called 
constant power consumption countermeasures such as dual-rail [20] and wave dynamic 
differential logic (WDDL) [21] unless new power consumption models are created. 
 
At the other end of the simulation tools’ scope is work [22], which was based on SPICE. Like 
for [18], this simulation environment only simulated the required minimum logic to carry a 
DPA, inheriting the same drawbacks mentioned before in regards to its ability to test certain 
countermeasures. 
 
This simulation environment needed 100 plaintexts to guess the key of the target SBOX of a 
DES module without countermeasures, which was designed at the transistor level – all equally 
sized and by hand – and based on domino logic. This kind of SBOX design provides a clear 
and clean power signature, which facilitates the power analysis, and is contrary to the 
implementation approach followed by almost all digital designs, which consists of designing 
the IP in RTL using a hardware description language (HDL) and then synthesising it to a gate 
level netlist. The designs resulting from this later approach produce a higher number of gate 
switching, that is, a less clear signature. 
 
Another, more recent, simulation environment is that covered in [23]. This simulation 
environment also relies on SPICE as a simulation tool with some promising results, as it can 
successfully guess the right key associated to a DES or AES SBOX implementation with no 
countermeasures within just 2 minutes. 
 
No simulation environment was found to cover both attack methods or threats, perhaps due to 
the distinctive simulation tools used for each purpose. The simulation environment developed 
in this research line, however, does just that. It targets the simulation of both threats using the 
same low level simulation tool, Nanosim. Nanosim is a SPICE like simulation tool that trades 
accuracy for speed. 
 
Unlike with [18], [22] and [23], the simulation environment developed here targets the whole 
DES module, which enables the possibility of testing a wider range of countermeasures. On 
the other hand, despite the higher accuracy of the generated power trace means the need for 
less plaintexts, the simulation speed of the simulation environment developed here might not 
get close to that of the simulation environment [18], especially considering that the GAPASE 
simulates the whole DES and [18] only focused on the minimum required logic. 
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3.1.2 Glitch Attack and Power Analysis Simulation Environment 
 
This research line has resulted in a simulation environment capable of testing designs against 
glitch attacks and power analysis. Briefly, it could be said that GAPASE is actually a wrapper 
around a simulation tool (currently Nanosim). GAPASE reads a configuration file and, from it, 
it generates the required input files for the simulation. Once the simulation is completed, the 
output data can be post-processed depending on the targeted simulation. A block diagram of 
the current GAPASE environment is shown in the Figure 3-1. In addition to the configuration 
file, GAPASE needs the design netlist and stimulus files as inputs from the user before 
launching the simulation. It also needs to know the location of SPICE devices’ model library. 
The path to these files is indicated in the configuration file. 
 
The following sub-sections cover the current features of GAPASE and its implementation. 
 
 





This is a list of the features of the current version of GAPASE: 
• GAPASE has been designed in a modular architecture, providing flexibility and 
enabling future extensions. 
• It currently supports Nanosim as the only simulation tool. Only SPICE netlists of the 
target designs can be simulated. Back-annotated netlists with parasitic information 
can also be loaded. 
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• The simulation can be detached from the console to allow the simulation to run in the 
background, i.e. even if the user logs out. 
• Simulations are configurable with up to 51 parameters, divided in three groups: 
parameters applicable to all simulations; parameters applicable to glitch attack 
simulations, and parameters applicable to power analysis simulation. The full 
parameter list is available in Appendix B. 
• GAPASE targets three kinds of simulations: 
1. Normal simulations, which are effectively simulations without any 
disturbance. These simulations only use general configuration 
parameters. 
2. Simulations of a circuits’ response to glitch attacks. These simulations 
use general and glitch specific configuration parameters. Glitches and 
noise can be applied to any input source of the design under test. 
3. Power analysis simulations on DES cryptographic modules. Power 
analysis simulations use general and power analysis related configuration 
parameters. The GAPASE environment is used to generate power 






At the first instance, the requirement was to develop a simulation environment capable of 
running a glitch attack simulation. Since the associated tasks for such simulation were not too 
complex, this initial simulation environment was achieved with some Bash scripts. The later 
requirement to add the power analysis feature, however, resulted in the need for a major 
rework. This was carried out by porting the whole simulation environment to Perl and adopting 
a modular approach by using Object Oriented Perl programming style –currently totalling 
about 2,800 lines of code. Figure 3-2 shows a layer diagram of the latest implementation. 
 
In its current implementation, GAPASE can be divided in three layers: 1) the core layer at the 
bottom; 2) the simulation specific objects layer (SSOL) in the middle; and 3) the post-
simulation layer (PSL) at the top. The core layer carries out some generic operations, such as 
parsing the configuration file, checking and generating general parameters and files. On top of 
that, it also provides an application protocol interface (API), so that the layers above can send 
messages to a log file and access simulation environment variables. This layer also provides 
the simulation_type class, which defines the methods to be inherited by the objects in the 
SSOL. 
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Figure 3-2 GAPASE's layer division 
 
Each simulation type is instantiated as an object that inherits the methods in the 
simulation_type class. Some of the inherited methods are modified by the target simulation 
object. The function of these objects is to check the parameters specific to the target 
simulation, to create support files for this task and to generate the commands that would 
launch the simulation. 
 
Post-simulation layer currently implements just one module. When Nanosim completes the 
simulation, this module is called by the power analysis object to extract the power 
consumption waveform into individual power trace waveforms. These power traces can later 
be used by Matlab scripts to perform DPA by either a difference-of-means or correlation 
power analysis. 
 
The process of running a simulation is as shown in the diagram in Figure 3-3. The user would 
first edit the GAPASE configuration file, which defines the simulation conditions as well as 
pointing to the location of the required input files. After this, GAPASE could be launched and 
the whole process started. Initially, GAPASE would load all parameters and check the generic 
ones. Next, simulation specific parameters will be checked, and if any error is found in any 
parameter, the simulation is aborted. The user can check the errors in the log file. If, on the 
other hand, no errors are found, GAPASE will create first all generic input files followed by 
simulation specific ones. At this point Nanosim simulation will be launched and no further 
action will be taken by GAPASE until the simulation is finished. After the simulation, GAPASE 
will gain control over the environment. If the target attack was power analysis, the post-
simulation functions would be executed, wavex in this case. Otherwise, GAPASE will 
terminate and the user will be able to check the results. The section 4 of the report 
SimEnvTech1 covers this flow in more detail, including a description of the configurable 
parameters shown in the Appendix B. 
 
Regarding the GAPASE’s internal operation, it powers the circuit under test by applying the 
supply voltage value specified in the configuration file (VOLTAGE parameter) to the circuit’s 
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power rail. The default power rail (VOLTAGE_NODE parameter) is Vdd!. This is the device’s 
internal supply rail, once rectified by the voltage regulator. Setting VOLTAGE_NODE to Vdd! 
allows a faster simulation by avoiding the simulation of the voltage regulator. However, 
GAPASE also allows simulating the voltage regulator if required. 
 
The simulation environment allows applying glitches to both power rails, Vdd and GND, of the 
circuit under test. A built-in glitch generator function allows the user applying any glitch 
definable with up to four points. The first and last points of the glitch would usually represent 
Vdd! or GND! just before and after the glitch. Examples of the glitches that can be applied with 
the built-in glitch generator function are shown in Figure 3-4. For more complex glitches, 
repetitive glitches and or noisy supplies, GAPASE allows defining power supply waveform 
vectors. Noise and glitches can also be applied to any input signal through waveform vectors. 
 
The power analysis is divided in two parts; power trace generation and power trace analysis. 
GAPASE is responsible of generating the power traces, which are later analysed in Matlab. 
Currently, the power analysis is only enabled for the DES cryptographic algorithm, and the 
whole DES design is simulated regardless of the targeted SBOX. 
 
Despite DES having 64-bit data and key registers, the CPU and the DES module 
communicate via an 8-bit wide interface. The implication of this interface is that in order to run 
an encryption, 16 clock cycles are needed in order to setup the plaintext and the key. 
GAPASE avoids this non-productive simulation by directly forcing the input or output of data 
and key registers. To further save on simulation time, GAPASE can also limit the number of 
rounds to be simulated, as not all rounds are used to perform DPA. Typically, only the first two 
rounds are simulated. After these rounds have been simulated, the DES block is forced to a 
reset status before the next plaintext encryption process is started. 
 
Finally, only SBOX1 can be targeted on the current implementation and, consequently, only 
the 64 plaintexts that exercise this SBOX should be used during the simulation. The 
processing of all 64 plaintexts is based on the Atmel’s security group approach. This approach 
consists on feeding all plaintexts in a sequential order, from the smallest to the highest 
hexadecimal value. Each plaintext is followed by a reset status. This set of plaintexts can be 
simulated several times one after the other. 
 



























Figure 3-3 Simulation flow diagram 
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Figure 3-4 Examples of glitches that can be defined with GAPASE 
 
After the simulation is completed, the post-simulation module is launched so that the recently 
generated simulation-long power trace can be divided into individual power traces 
corresponding to each ciphered plain text. These power traces are then analysed in Matlab. 
Current Matlab scripts allow carrying out two type analyses on this data, difference-of-means 
(DOM) [5] and correlation power analysis (CPA) [24]. Matlab scripts to perform DOM are 
based on the scripts developed by Andrew Burnside for the Security Group, whereas CPA 
scripts were developed exclusively for this simulation environment. These Matlab scripts can 





The initial requirement of a glitch attack simulation environment, where the focus was on 
finding out how a glitch attack can affect a circuit or a design, implied the use of simulation 
tools capable of simulating the analogue behaviour of digital designs. This meant moving 
away from RTL or pure logic level simulators where the information they work with is either a 
logic 0 or a logic 1. 
 
Two SPICE based simulation tools were available at Atmel, HSPICE and Nanosim. Nanosim 
trades accuracy for simulation speed; in fact, an HSPICE simulation of a glitch that takes over 
eight hours to complete, it could be completed in around half the time when simulated in 
Nanosim. Since the simulation speed was a priority, Nanosim was chosen over HSPICE as a 
simulation tool. Still, due to the input stimulus compatibility between both simulation tools, 
GAPASE could be easily adapted to simulate on HSPICE when higher accuracy is required. 
 
Creating a glitch attack simulation environment around a SPICE based simulation tool is not 
very hard. Proof of it was the fact that the initial version was developed as a Bash script. The 
main requirements for the script were being able to define: a) the target design; b) the SPICE 
device model; and c) an easy way to define glitches. 
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Rather, the limitation of the glitch simulation environment is the SPICE device model itself. 
The behaviour of passive and active elements of a given technology node, e.g. transistors and 
resistors, are modelled so that they can be simulated using tools such as SPICE. These 
elements could be modelled to a wide range of operation parameters, such as temperature 
ranges from -40 to 125 or Vds of a transistor from 0V to 20V, even when its normal operation 
value is around 1.6V. However, since the use of these elements in such a wide range is 
unrealistic and the modelling very time consuming, in reality, they are accurately modelled for 
a short operation range only. 
 
The impact of a limited model is that, out of range simulations might not be accurate enough 
and as a result, unrealistic glitches might be needed to inject a fault. This was the case when 
simulating test glitches for low and medium simulation accuracy levels in the report 
SimEnvTech2. On these cases, Vdd! should be raised as high as 6.4V in order to be able to 
inject a fault. However, on real silicon and SPICE simulated behaviour of a voltage regulator, 
on the other hand, Vdd! would rarely rise above 3.5V or 4V, see Figure 3-15 and Figure 3-16. 
Section 5.1 of the report SimEnvTech1 covers the work made on validating the glitch attack 
feature of GAPASE, which includes the design of the test-chip covered in LaserTech1. 
 
Another aspect to consider when setting up a simulation environment is the resistivity in the 
power rails, which results in an uneven distribution of the power supply fluctuations. This 
feature could create circumstances where nearby circuitry is powered at voltage levels 
different enough to inject faults. This is a feature not simulated by GAPASE, among other 
reasons, because taking into account the resistivity in the power supply would increase the 
complexity the target design’s mathematical model and it would take far longer to simulate. 
 
Later simulations fixed the unrealistic glitch issue by setting the following simulation 
parameters: set_sim_eou sim=4 model=4 net=4. Subsequent simulations produced results 
comparable to real glitch attacks. 
 
Regarding the DPA feature of the simulation environment, several power analysis attacks 
were performed with GAPASE on a DES module with no countermeasures, commonly known 
as a vanilla implementation, and on a secure DES module with a countermeasure. 
Simulations were run with different simulation resolution settings (time and current amplitude) 
and encryption key values. 
 
Table 3-1 collects the main power analysis simulation results, which are expanded in more 
detail in the section 5.2 of the report SimEnvTech1. GAPASE has shown the feasibility of 
correctly guessing the key bits associated to the SBOX1 of a vanilla DES cryptographic 
module. The electrical noise free environment provided by GAPASE allows guessing the key 
bits associated to the SBOX1 using only the theoretical 64 plaintexts.  
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When performing DPA on a silicon implementation of a vanilla DES module, one or two order 
of magnitude more plaintexts might be needed to guess the key bits associated to the SBOX1. 
The need for additional plaintexts is to filter out the electrical noise introduced by: a) 
measurement instruments; b) electronic components; and c) other IPs in use within the target 
device, such as a CPU. This difference in the plaintexts requirement to crack the key was also 
shown in the RTL based DPA simulation in [18], where 10 times more plaintexts were needed 
in silicon than in simulation to crack the key. 
 















30000 13h12m 1  
75 26m 1  
3000 6h12m 1  
2E3A44BB4248D774 64 
75 16m 1  
940AEBA0604CF479 64 3000 4h58m 1  
Vanilla 
DES 
83373F5D2CF55BC8 64 3000 5h29m 1  
64 3000 14h10m 1  2E3A44BB4248D774 
1024 3000 2d2h53m 4  Secure DES 
0000000040008010 1000 3000 2d2h32m 4  
 
The discrepancy between the required amounts of plaintexts to crack the key can only reflect 
one thing. While the typical behavioural simulation is run to model a circuit’s behaviour as 
accurate and realistically as possible, DPA simulation results should not be taken as absolute 
ones, but as an index or reference of how secure a particular DES implementation is. 
 
Any DES implementation that takes more than 64 plaintexts to compromise its key will, 
inherently, be more secure than the vanilla implementation. However, the important 
information is not only whether a given implementation is more secure or not than the vanilla 
one, but by how much and how does it translate into silicon implementations. 
 
For instance, given a DES implementation, say DES Secure1, that takes in simulation 200 
times more plaintexts than the vanilla implementation to crack the key, it could be considered 
200 times more secure than the vanilla implementation. DES Secure1 could have a security 
index of 200. The difficulty here is on translating this simulated security index into a silicon 
security index, which depends on the noise sources of the silicon DPA setup and the 
technology node of the silicon die. 
 
One approach of estimating the index translation function would be applying the minimum 
mean square error to a series of DPA results in several DES implementations in silicon and 
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simulation for different key values. Subsequent simulations could use the index translator to 
estimate the real security index of a given DES implementation. Furthermore, if silicon DPA 
data is generated, this data could be used to improve the index translator. 
 
Regarding the simulations run with GAPASE and which results are shown in Table 3-1 above, 
two out of three encryption keys were correctly guesses with the vanilla DES implementation 
with just 64 plaintexts, whereas simulations on the secure DES implementation failed to guess 
the encryption key. The encryption key that was not correctly guessed in vanilla DES 
simulation is 83373F5D2CF55BC8. Perhaps, this failure could be explained by the fact that, 
for this encryption key, all the key bits to be used in the SBOX1 were logic zero, causing a 
particular case were the analysis failed. This case needs to be studied further in order to 
determine whether more plaintexts are needed for these cases, higher simulation accuracy or 
the power analysis algorithm needs being improved. The real impact of resetting the DES 
module after each encryption should also be analysed. 
 
A total of 2024 random plaintext encryptions with a secure DES were simulated without 
guessing the right key. At first instance, this could indicate that the countermeasure used in 
this DES implementation results in a security index of over 31 (2024/64). More plaintexts could 
be used with the aim of guessing the key, say another 3000 or 8000, totalling 5000 and 10000 
respectively. There are two possible outcomes: a) eventually guessing the right key and, 
hence, determining a more accurate security index of the target DES module; or b) still not 
guessing the right key. This last case is necessary but not enough to prove that a design is 
immune against power analysis, as it only proves that the correct key was not guessed within 
a given practical amount of time and plaintexts. Spending any more time on guessing the key 
is no longer practical. 
 
On the GAPASE case, the practicality is measured in the combination of simulation accuracy 
and the time required to run the power analysis. So much so, that it can be a key factor when 
determining its feasibility as a production power analysis tool. 
 
Encrypting 64 plaintexts with a silicon implementation of a DES module running at 50MHz 
takes under a second, and running enough encryptions to guess the SBOX1 key bits of a 
vanilla DES would take few minutes. Running the same operation on a DES module within a 
Smart Card takes longer due to the communication overhead. 
 
Simulating the DES module in GAPASE does not have the Smart Card communication 
overhead. Still, running successful power analysis attacks simulating the first two rounds of 64 
plaintext encryptions with GAPASE took around 5 hours. The accuracy set for these 
simulations was 0.001ns simulation time resolution, and 3000 sample points per trace (s/t). 
Lower accuracy simulations did not yield successful power analyses. A 5-hour simulation can 
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be common for certain analogue simulations, but for a vanilla DES module it could be 
considered excessive. 
 
Adding countermeasures implies the need to more plaintexts to begin with, which increases 
the simulation time. Furthermore, the increasing circuit complexity of some countermeasures 
could result in increasing the simulation time per round. This is, having a double impact on the 
overall simulation time. 
 
This is the case of the secure DES, where 2 days and 5 hours were employed to simulate 
1000 plaintexts divided in 4 CPUs. This is, if all plaintexts where simulated on a single CPU, it 
would have taken about 11 days to complete the power analysis and not guessing the right 
key bits of the SBOX1. While 5 hour or even 2 day long simulations could be manageable, 
especially if as a result the key is correctly guessed, running additional 3000 or 8000 plaintexts 
would take around 6 or 16 days respectively using four CPUs. Taking this amount of time to 
run power analysis, which is what DES modules with countermeasures might need, is no 
longer practical. The limiting factor here is the simulation tool, Nanosim, and or its 
configuration. 
 
The power traces used on real power analysis might be less accurate and with less sample 
points per power trace than those used here, yet the key can be successfully guessed from 
them. One approach to speed up the power analysis could be reducing the simulation 
accuracy and increasing the number of plaintexts or power traces. In fact, the recent work [25] 
has achieved successful power analysis on Nanosim with resolutions of 1uA and 10ps. The 
resolutions used in GAPASE simulations are of 1pA and 10ps. With the simulated DES 
modules consuming in the order of few mA, peaking around 12 to 20mA, reducing the current 
resolution to 1uA could still produce current consumption values of up to 4 digits. In principle, 
high enough to carry a successful power analysis. 
 
Reducing the current consumption simulation resolution by a factor of 106 would no doubt 
speed up the simulation process. The work [25] does not provide any information on 
simulation times, hence, unless new simulations are run, this performance improvement 
cannot be quantified. Anyway, for this performance improvement to be meaningful, it should 
reduce the simulation time of generating 1000 power traces with the secure DES module with 
countermeasures from 2 days to just few hours. 
 
Regarding the simulation tool itself, the Nanosim versions up to Z-2007.03 are not capable of 
multi-threading the simulation. In other words, a simulation would use only one CPU or core 
on a multi-CPU platform or a multi-core CPU, which could be considered as an important 
limitation or drawback when multi-cores are common even on modern low end consumer 
rated desktops. This multi-thread limitation is the result of the mathematical model of the 
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circuitry to be simulated that is generated by Nanosim and could still affect newer Nanosim 
version. 
 
The only work around to this limitation and to increase overall simulation time is, dividing a 
long simulation into smaller ones and launching several simulations concurrently as different 
processes. This was done when performing power analysis to the DES module with 
countermeasure. 
 
Finally, Nanosim is an RTL to transistor level simulation tool, allowing the co-simulation of RTL 
and SPICE netlist. Simulating part of the DES module as a SPICE netlist (e.g. SBOX1) and 
the rest of the design in RTL could dramatically shorten the simulation time, however, this 
feature requires an additional license. Such license was not available when this research was 
carried out, hence, GAPASE does not take advantage of this feature. 
 
The current power analysis approach comes with its share of drawbacks, namely simulation 
speed or performance, which could limit its use as a production tool. Other power analysis 
simulation alternatives could be considered, for instance field-programmable gate array 
(FPGA) emulation. This approach would allow instantiating the target DES module into an 
FPGA and using the same power analysis setup as the one used for production devices. An 
indirect benefit of this approach is that any setup improvement or development of new 
analysis techniques can be easily and equally applied to development and production devices. 
 
However, FPGA and application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) instantiation will yield 
different power traces. This might not have major implications, other than considering FPGA 
analysis results as a security index or security degree. Furthermore, FPGA emulation might 
not be able to test certain countermeasures, certainly not layout based ones. 
 
Coming back to the simulation results, the work done in [18] seems promising too. Similar 
techniques could be used, perhaps, with tools such as PrimePower, which is capable of 
generating dynamic and static power consumption waveforms of simulations at gate and RTL 
levels. PrimePower would result in faster simulation than Nanosim, although loosing on some 
accuracy. Work [18] showed that this needs not to be an issue though. 
 
Furthermore, PrimePower can simulate the design in RTL and as a gate level netlist. 
Generating the gate level netlist is a common task for digital designers, and avoids the extra 
step of generating the SPICE netlist needed by GAPASE, making the workflow simpler. Also, 
it would allow using simple RTL test benches or even the ones used during the development 
process as a source of stimulus to generate the power traces for the power analysis. Using 
PrimePower as a simulation tool would also allow embedding glitch attack and power analysis 
tests within the actual design cycle and test flow. 
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3.1.4 Conclusion of the simulation environment 
 
Simulation tools and environments are a requirement for IC manufacturers, as they can help 
them determining the quality and fidelity of their products. GAPASE allows Atmel designers to 
test their designs against glitch attacks and power analysis. The glitch attack feature is 
functional. The power analysis feature needs further improvements in the performance side. 
 
The down side of high level simulation tools, such are RTL, is that they not be capable of 
testing certain countermeasures, such as those that focus on the layout, e.g. WDDL and 
differential routing [21], and perhaps dual-rail or similar. Nanosim, on the other hand, is more 
suited for this kind of countermeasures. 
 
 
3.1.5 Future work 
 
This simulation environment can be considered to be in continuous development, hence, there 
is still room for development and improvement, especially on the power analysis side. The 
following, lines of work are proposed here, divided in what is need and/or desirable at 
immediate, short and long terms. 
 
Immediate future, the consolidation of the simulation tool. The following points should be 
accomplished: 
• Determine whether the encryption key of a vanilla DES module can still be correctly 
guessed by reducing the resolution of the current consumption and, if so, determine 
the obtained simulation performance to test vanilla DES modules and modules with 
countermeasures. The results of these simulations could indicate the feasibility of 
Nanosim as a simulation tool for power analysis. 
• If applicable, test the performance of co-simulating RTL level and SPICE level netlists 
in Nanosim. 
• Test other alternative tools such as FPGA emulation or PrimePower. 
• The simulation environment’s performance should be benchmarked against the 
results from a commercial silicon power analysis tool. The new secure DES block 
being designed Atmel could be used for this purpose. 
 
These are the suggestions for the short term future: 
• Enable running power analysis on AES cryptographic blocks. This would make the 
whole simulation environment more useful to Atmel for their current and future needs. 
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• Integrate the current Matlab based post-simulation analysis into the GAPASE 
simulation environment. This would allow running the whole analysis on a single 
computer, rather than forcing to run the analysis only on computers loaded with 
Matlab. 
• On the post-simulation side, the simulation environment should also generate output 
data readable by the RisCureTM software, so that readily available post-simulation 
analysis tools could be used, allowing running other analyses more complex than 
difference of means and correlation power analysis without having to develop these 
for GAPASE. 
 
Finally, for the long term, following points should be studied: 
• Updating the simulation environment to adopt other attacks, such as laser or 
electromagnetic analysis (EMA). By keeping the simulation environment up-to-date on 
attack techniques, Atmel would benefit from extending this tool’s life. 
• Target of additional cryptographic blocks, such as RSA. By adding further targets, 
Atmel could test other IPs used in their chips against these attacks. 
• Designing a graphical front-end. Although this has a lower priority, this feature could 
make the simulation environment easier to use. 
 
Figure 3-5 shows a block diagram of how GAPASE could be formatted in the long term future. 
 
 
Figure 3-5 Example of future GAPASE 
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3.2 Glitch Detector 
 
As covered in Section 2.3.1 Glitch Attacks of this Volume, glitch attacks aim at fault injection 
by means of fast alterations of the supply’s voltage level. The effect of these attacks can be 
minimised by designing a robust built-in voltage regulator, however, this is often not enough or 
possible, due to the negative impact on cost in terms of design effort, area or price of the final 
product. Instead, glitch detector circuits are used to monitor the power rails’ voltage level to 
make sure the supply voltage is within the allowed operation range. Glitch detectors are, 
hence, a fundamental part of the Smart Card design, as in the event of a glitch detection, 
measures can be taken to correct or avoid the fault [26]. 
 
Smart Cards have a built-in voltage regulator, whose output powers the device and, by design, 
cannot be accessed by an attacker. Hence, glitch attacks on Smart Cards focus on injecting 
voltage level alterations on the device’s Vcc and GND pins. Glitches applied to Vcc or GND 
can still propagate to the internal Vdd power rail and into the system. This implies two 
requirements [27]: 
1. Voltage regulators design can have a great impact on how glitches are 
propagated into the system. 
2. Detectors have to monitor Vcc and GND power rails as well as Vdd. 
 
There are two glitch detection approaches: a) direct; and b) indirect. The direct approach 
monitors the power rails to detect supply voltage anomalies as they are happening. The 
indirect approach detects glitches by monitoring the status of a circuit sensitive to power 
supply voltage fluctuations. This is, a circuit prone to error injection by fluctuations in the 
power supply voltage. 
 
Since the width of a glitch (the time it can be present on the power rails) ranges from 
hundreds of nanoseconds to just few nanoseconds, the direct detectors’ response time is key 
to detect fast glitches. So much so, that glitch detectors with shorter response time, not only 
can detect fast glitches that those with longer response time cannot, but also, they detect 
glitches quicker. However, the detection of fast glitches can be challenging with this approach, 
as making the detector too fast or sensitive could result in detecting legitimate supply noise as 
a glitch. This leads to false detections. 
 
Unlike with the direct approach, where the supply voltage level anomaly is present only for the 
duration of the glitch, with the indirect approach, the effect of a glitch on a sensitive circuit can 
be present for longer that the glitch itself. So, by playing with this circuit’s sensitivity, it is 
possible to detect fast glitches with longer response time monitors whilst minimising false 
detections. In other words, indirect approach detectors can achieve safer detection of fast 
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glitches but with slower detection times than direct approach detectors. The glitch detector 
proposed in this research falls into the indirect detector category. 
 
The following sections cover the literature review; the proposed glitch detector; simulations 
and test carried out on this detector; a discussion on its usability and the conclusions of this 
research line. Finally, some possible future developments are proposed. 
 
Volume II includes the following reports related to and supporting this research line: 
• GlitchTech1(Glitch Detector Report); 
• GlitchPub1(Paper: Detecting Voltage Glitch Attacks on Secure Devices); 
• GlitchPub2(Paper: Characterization of a Voltage Glitch Attack Detector for Secure 
Devices); 
• GlitchPub3(Patent WO 2008/033712 A2: Detecting Voltage Glitches) 
 
 
3.2.1 Literature Review 
 
Glitch detectors are key components to protect devices, such as Smart Cards, against glitch 
attacks. Publishing any kind of information in regards to these circuits can compromise the 
device's robustness or security. Hence the lack of relevant publications on this topic, 
especially about current glitch detector circuit designs. Fortunately, two glitch detector patents 
were found [28, 29], both falling into the indirect category. 
 
The detector in patent [28] detects glitches by monitoring fault injections into single-bit 
registers and the read operation of a SRAM. These components are usually designed to 
operate at the silicon technology node’s nominal voltage level (e.g. 1.8V for 0.18um 
technology node, 1.6V for 0.13um, 0.9V for 90nm). Hence, by the components used in this 
design, it is safe to assume that this detector has been designed to detect glitches at the 
output of a voltage regulator. This design is capable of detecting positive and negative glitches 
in Vdd and positive glitches in GND. This is a fast detector, as the fault injection can be 
detected within/after a clock cycle. The drawbacks with this detector, however, are the fact 
that it requires a clock signal and the registers' sensibility to glitch attacks. 
 
Simulation results in the technical report SimEnvTech2 demonstrated that glitches could have 
an instantaneous impact on combinational logic depending on the data being operated at the 
time the glitch is applied. Storage units, such as registers, however, were only affected when 
updating data, especially if the data was already corrupted in the preceding combinational 
logic. The design in [28] shows the registers being fed directly from the power rails. For these 
registers to latch the wrong value, two factors need to be involved. One is that the voltage 
difference between the original and the abnormal supply levels need to be high enough to 
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change in logic values. In other words, Vdd should fall low enough to be interpreted as a logic 
zero or setting the register, at which point the power on reset (POR) could kick in too. The 
second factor is that the glitch has to happen close to the positive clock edge of the registers' 
clock signal, which takes us to the other drawback of this detector. 
 
Glitches are asynchronous supply voltage alterations. Despite an attacker trying to apply them 
in reference to certain time or clock signal (external or internal), the truth is that they are an 
uncontrolled phenomenon. So, for an error injected into a combinational logic to be latched 
into a register, the error needs to be propagated throughout the combinational logic. The 
propagation time depends on where the error has been injected. If it has been injected at the 
end of the data generation path, for this error to be registered, the glitch needs to happen 
close to the clock's positive edge. Design [28] could detect these glitches. However, if the 
error is injected at the very beginning of the data generation path and propagated through to 
its output, then, for this error to be registered, the glitch should be applied earlier on. Design 
[28] would miss this glitch all together. This issue could be minimised by using a faster clock 
frequency for the detector, but it would increase the area and complexity of the device and, 
hence, its cost. 
 
The detector in patent [29] is more suited for the asynchronous nature of glitches, as it detects 
glitches by continuously comparing the response to glitches of three different resistor-
capacitor (RC) filters. With this detector, the glitches would be detected regardless of their 
likeliness to inject faults. By its components, this design is capable of detecting glitches at 
both sides of the voltage regulator (Vcc or Vdd) as well as glitches in the ground rail. This 
detector is capable of detecting positive and negative glitches in both power rails. 
 
Two drawbacks can be identified with this design too. Firstly, due to the RC circuits' design, 
they will drain current continuously. This continuous current drainage is particularly undesired 
for battery powered applications due to the limited current budget. The drainage can be 
reduced by increasing the resistors’ values; however, doing so would impact negatively on the 
area and slow down the capacitor's charge speed, potentially missing some fast glitches. 
Secondly, is its dependency on the correct instantiation of resistors and capacitors, as process 
variations can result in a mismatch of the real value and, hence, not behaving as expected. 
Despite the drawbacks, this detector seems to be relatively fast at detecting glitches too, 





The glitch detector proposed in this research is a mono-stable circuit which is always set to a 
given state. This state will only change as a result of a fault injection, in this case by a glitch 
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attack. The mono-stable circuit designed in this work is based on the comparison between a 
reference voltage and a function of this reference voltage, as it is shown in the block diagram 
in Figure 3-6. The function block is characterised as a non-linear transfer function, where the 








Figure 3-6 Diagram block of the glitch detector 
 
The actual design of the glitch detector developed in this work is shown in Figure 3-7. Three 
parts compose it: a) a modified inverter, which is the non-linear transfer function; b) an 
operational amplifier (OpAmp) setup as a comparator; and c) an RS latch to register any 
detected glitch. This detector was designed to detect glitches at the output of the voltage 
regulator, hence, the reference voltage is the voltage regulator’s output. Despite being 
designed to detect glitches at the voltage regulator’s output, and as it will be covered in the 




















Figure 3-7 Proposed glitch detector 
 
In normal supply conditions and when the circuit is disabled (the reset input is logic one), Vout 
is a logic zero. It results in the OpAmp’s output being set to a logic zero and resetting the RS 
latch to a logic zero. When the circuit is enabled (the reset input is a logic zero), the modified 
inverter sub-circuit provides a constant voltage at its output, which is lower than Vdd due to 
the voltage drop in the diode D1. As Vout is lower than Vdd, the OpAmp’s output is a logic 
zero. As a result, the value stored in the RS latch is unchanged. 
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When the detector is enabled, the inverter circuit can be substituted by its equivalent circuit in 
Figure 3-8. Here the inverter’s transistor P1, which is conducting, is substituted by its 
equivalent RonP (in the order of ohms). The inverter’s transistor N1, which is not conducting, is 
substituted by its equivalent RoffN (in the order of mega ohms) in parallel with CN, the parasitic 
capacitance between its source and drain. In addition to the inverter sub-circuit, Figure 3-8 
also shows the equivalent load seen by the inverter’s output, the OpAmp’s input, represented 













Figure 3-8 The inverter's equivalent circuit and load 
 
The proposed glitch detector’s response to a glitch attack when the detector is enabled is 
shown in Figure 3-9 and can be described as follows. When Vdd is stable, Vout is stable too 
and set to Vdd minus the voltage drop in the diode D1, which is around the diode’s threshold 
voltage (Vt). If, as a result of a glitch, Vdd rises, the parasitic capacitor CN is charged further, 
raising the voltage level at Vout. When Vdd falls, CN starts to leak its charge through RoffN and 
Zin.a.o, hence, lowering Vout. If Vdd falls at a higher rate than CN is discharged, the diode D1 
will, eventually, become inversely polarized. As a result, Vout will become higher than Vdd and 
stay higher even after the glitch’s effects on Vdd have disappeared. This phenomenon can be 
detected by the comparator, which sets its output to a logic one, setting the RS latch to a logic 
one and triggering the glitch detection alarm. Upon a glitch detection, the CPU can run the 
appropriate routine or procedure related to glitches on the supply power. A Smart Card’s 
typical response to a glitch detection is resetting the whole device. 
 
 
Figure 3-9 The modified inverter's response to a glitch 
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After detecting a glitch, the glitch detector would have to be reset in order to detect more 
glitches. This is achieved by setting the reset input to a logic one and back to logic zero. This 
process will discharge the capacitor CN and reset the RS latch. If no action is taken after 
detecting a glitch, CN will gradually discharge due to the leakage current, gradually reducing 
Vout to its previous level, i.e. below Vdd. However, the RS latch would continuously indicate 
the detection of a glitch, and no further glitch would be detected. 
 
The diode D1 plays an important role in this design, as without it, the parasitic capacitor Cn 
could also be discharged through the power supply. This additional leakage source would 
result in faster discharge rates and, hence, reduce the chances of glitch detections, as it 
would be harder for Vout to become higher than Vdd and, when becoming higher, it would 
stay that way for shorter periods of time. Ultimately, this design would require a faster 
comparator. 
 
This glitch detector is patented under the International Publication Number WO 2008/033712 
A2. This patent is included in the Volume II of this portfolio, GlitchPub3. 
 
 
3.2.3 Test and Results 
 
A series of simulations and silicon tests were conducted, to determine the performance of this 
design and whether it is capable of detecting a series of fast glitches that currently go 
undetected by the glitch detectors used by Atmel. Two different versions of the proposed 
design were simulated and four versions of this design were instantiated and tested in the 
test-chip 01VGA. Following subsections cover the simulation and silicon test and results. 
 
 
3.2.3.1 Simulation Test and Results 
 
In order to test this glitch detector’s performance, a simulation environment was setup, which 
emulated the conditions in which this detector would operate. The setup in particular, shown in 
Figure 3-10, consisted of a voltage regulator powering the glitch detectors under test and a 
variable resistive load and a fixed capacitive load. The voltage regulator used in this setup 
was designed for low security applications such as global system for mobile communications 
(GSM). The variable load, connected to Vdd, was designed to emulate the typical loads the 
voltage regulator can be subject to during normal Smart Card operation. The load values 
were: high load (80 Ohms); medium load (1K6 Ohms); and low load (3K2 Ohms). The 
capacitive load was of 2.2nF. The glitch detectors were connected to the voltage regulator’s 
output, Vdd. 
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Two versions of the proposed glitch detector were designed and simulated; they differed in the 
transistor type they were built with. The first glitch detector, Design A, had its diode and RS 
latch made of low leakage transistors and the inverter and OpAmp made of high voltage 
transistors. The second glitch detector, Design B, was made out entirely of low leakage 
transistors. The section 3 of the GlitchTech1 covers the transistor sizes of the modified 
inverter of both designs. 
 
 
Figure 3-10 Diagram of the glitch detector test setup 
 
Low leakage transistors are designed with a higher threshold voltage (Vt) than their normal 
counterparts. Increasing the Vt helps reducing a transistor’s leakage current when it is in the 
cut off region, an increasing issue with deep-submicron technologies. However, it also 
reduces the transistor performance when comparing to transistors with lower Vt. The diode 
was designed with a low leakage transistor in both designs to minimise the leakage through 
the diode and, hence, to isolate Vout as much as possible from Vdd. High voltage transistors 
should allow the OpAmp to operate within its specified voltage range even when the effects of 
a glitch is present. 
 
The above setup was simulated with HSPICE where the designs were tested for the following 
power supply scenarios: 
• clean external Vcc supply, 3v and 5v; 
• noisy external Vcc supply, 3v and 5v with a +/-10% ripple noise at 100Hz (the 
standard for this application states that +/-10% ripple at 50Hz is a valid supply 
source)2; 
• two fast positive glitches; one that went from 2.7v to 7v and back to 2.7v in 100ns 
(Glitch A), and the other that went from 3v to 15v and back to 3v in 10ns (Glitch B) 
 
Each of these power supply scenarios were repeated with three different load values (i.e. high, 
medium and low) and two different SPICE models of transistors. Only extreme SPICE models 
were simulated, i.e. worst-case and best-case. Worst-case model had the following 
                                                          
2
  Knowledge gained at Atmel 
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parameters: mos_wcs, rlow, clow, temp=125. Best-case model had the following 
paramenters: mos_bcs, rhigh, chigh, temp=-40. 
 
In total, 12 different noisy scenarios and 12 different glitch scenarios were simulated for each 
detector design version. For the clean power supply cases, only medium load was used, as 
repeating the test with different load values would not provide further valuable data. Hence, 
only 4 different clean power scenarios were tested per design. 
 
None of the simulations with a clean source supply, or the simulations with a noisy supply 
source triggered the glitch detector. Out of the 12 glitch scenarios each design was subjected 
to, Design A managed to detect the glitch in 11 scenarios with an average detection time of 
1,073ns. Design B managed to detect the glitch in 9 scenarios with an average detection time 
of 7,657ns. The time results of both designs for each glitch scenario simulations are collected 
in Table 3-2. The report GlitchPub1 shows more simulations results. 
 
Table 3-2 Glitch simulation results 
Applied glitch Design version Load SPICE model 
Glitch A Glitch B 
worst-case not detected 741ns high load 
best-case 571ns 611ns 
worst-case 1,375ns 1,281ns mid load 
best-case 1,015ns 990ns 
worst-case 1,508ns 1,394ns 
A 
low load 
best-case 1,252ns 1,062ns 
worst-case 629ns 8,273ns high load 
best-case not detected not detected 
worst-case 2,093ns 1,947ns mid load 
best-case 1,359ns 25,522ns 
worst-case 2,163ns 2,170ns 
B 
low load 
best-case not detected 24,755ns 
 
 
3.2.3.2 Simulation Discussion 
 
When comparing glitch detectors, the comparison needs to focus on two axis, detection range 
and detection time. In general terms, these simulation results demonstrate that this glitch 
detector is capable of detecting glitches that detectors used with the instantiated voltage 
regulator are not capable of. The detection time ranges from 571ns to 25,522ns, depending 
on the simulation scenario. Not so immediate in computing terms as, in the worst case 
scenario, an AVR CPU running at 50MHz could execute up to 50 instructions per 
microsecond. 
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Comparing the simulated designs, Design A excels over Design B in terms of amount of 
successful detections and detection times. This is primarily due to the different composition of 
each design. Low Vt transistors have a lower performance, and that is reflected in Design B’s 
amount of detections and detection times. Furthermore, during a glitch, low Vt transistors 
might be subject to voltage levels outside their specifications, and this can temporally affect 
the circuit’s ability to detect such glitch. When it comes to high voltage devices, however, the 
voltage levels they are subject to during the glitch are likely to be within or not that far of their 
operational specifications, hence, having a lower impact. 
 
The transistor choice can explain one design taking longer than the other to detect or 
detecting more or less glitches. However, the detection time divergences between Glitch A 
and Glitch B needs further explanation. Analysing the evolution of Vdd and Vout in both 
designs during and after a glitch, it can be noticed that the voltage difference between Vout 
and Vdd is lower in the case of the Design B. This difference is particularly small when 
applying the Glitch B, Figure 3-11 and Figure 3-12. The smaller the voltage difference 
between Vout and Vdd, the longer the OpAmp takes to trigger the alarm and the more 
chances of missing that particular glitch. This indicates that Glitch B sits in the detection range 
limit of Design B. Furthermore, it seems that the closer a glitch is from a detector’s detection 
range limit, the longer it takes to be detected. 
 
 
Figure 3-11 Design A's response to Glitch B with high load and worst-case SPICE 
models 
 
Design A, again, performs better than Design B in these simulations. It is also capable of 
detecting glitches that detectors used with the instantiated voltage regulator cannot. However, 
its average detection time, 1,073ns, is longer than the direct approach detectors’ typical 
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detection time, in the order of tens of nanoseconds. This is, Design A takes one to two orders 
of magnitude longer to trigger the alarm signal. For obvious reasons, it is better to detect a 
glitch than not detecting it at all, but in terms of detection time, what is the detection time 
boundary after which, the detection can be considered too late? This is, when the fault 




Figure 3-12 Design B's response to Glitch B with high load and worst-case SPICE 
models 
 
Looking at a Smart Card from a high level perspective, the following two aspects can be 
identified. Firstly, a Smart Card is a device that carries out transactions, where it first receives 
a command, it executes that command, and then transmits the result back. Secondly, a Smart 
Card has both, volatile memory (i.e. SRAM) and non-volatile memory (e.g. EEPROM), where 
volatile memory is used to store temporal data and the NVM is used to store Smart Card 
software applications and application and user data. 
 
Command transfer and result transfer are made in a serial mode at a maximum clock speed 
of 5MHz, according to the ISO standard. In this context, a transaction will require in the order 
of milliseconds to seconds to be completed. If a glitch is applied aiming to disturb a 
transaction, with an average detection of just over 1 microseconds, the glitch could be 
detected before the transactions has been completed and act in consequence, such as 
invalidating the transaction by producing an erroneous response and or resetting the Smart 
Card. 
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It be could argued that the execution of transaction commands is not atomic, as it takes 
several CPU instructions to execute the transaction command. This is correct and, in this 
context, a glitch attack might result in diverting the program flow and/or corrupting data stored 
in the registers and/or SRAMs, which takes us to the second aspect mentioned above, the 
memory. An attack that corrupts the SRAMs and registers is an attack that the device can 
recover itself from by resetting itself, as it would result in an initialisation of certain registers 
and the SRAM memory to a known status. If an attack resulted in corrupting the NVM, 
however, the matter would be different, as it would be virtually impossible for the Smart Card 
to know which data has been affected and what its previous value was. However, with NVM 
writing times in the order of 2 milliseconds, with the proposed detectors, the Smart Card could 
still reset itself in time to stop the write operation and avoid corrupting the NVM. 
 
Another interesting feature that can be noticed in Table 3-2 is the load’s impact on the 
detection time. Overall, there is a trend of longer detection times for lower loads, which is 
more noticeable with Design A. To understand this feature, let us focus on the evolution of 
Vdd and Vout when the voltage regulator is under a glitch attack, Figure 3-13. The simulations 
have shown that the time required to detect a glitch can be divided in two parts: a) t1, the time 
needed for Vout to become higher than Vdd; and b) t2, the time between Vout becoming 
higher than Vdd and the raise of the alarm signal. When subjecting the voltage regulator to 
different loads, the time t1 suffered significant variations, whereas time t2 did not. Higher 
loads resulted in shorter t1 times than lower loads. In synthesis, a voltage regulator subjected 
to higher loads, outputs a higher current. This means that when subjected to a glitch attack, its 
output tends to correct itself faster (Vdd raises and falls faster), hence, Vout becoming higher 
than Vdd earlier on and allowing the glitch detection sooner than with low loads. 
 
 
Figure 3-13 Simulation of glitch attack detection under a high load 
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Looking at the bigger picture, the detector proposed in this research is capable of detecting 
glitches that current detectors cannot. However, it could only be used as a complement to 
current detectors due to its prolonged detection time. This way, in the range where both 
detectors can detect glitches, current detectors would trigger the alarm immediately. Whereas 
the proposed design would be left in charge of detecting glitches that current detector cannot. 
 
3.2.3.3 Test-chip Test and Results 
 
Two instances similar to the glitch detector simulation setup were instantiated into a test-chip 
to characterise the proposed detector’s detection range and time for different voltage regulator 
and load scenarios. Each instance included a different voltage regulator, capacitive and 
resistive loads and four different versions of the proposed glitch detector. The obtained 
characterisation data was compared against the detection range and time of the glitch 
detectors embedded in the instantiated voltage regulators. The aim of this comparison is to 
determine the detection range improvement provided by the proposed detector. A block 
diagram of the test-chip is shown in Figure 3-14, where GD_0, GD_1, GD_2 and GD_3 




Figure 3-14 Block diagram of the test-chip 
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The instantiated versions differ in the following: GD_0 was designed using low leakage 
transistors for the diode D1 and the RS latch and high voltage transistors for the inverter and 
the OpAmp, same as the simulated Design A; GD_1 was designed using low leakage 
transistors throughout, same as the simulated Design B; GD_2 was designed using high 
voltage transistors throughout; and GD_3 was designed using high voltage transistors 
throughout too but with a different OpAmp design. 
 
The voltage regulators instantiated in this test-chip differ in their target product and, hence, 
their performance. VR1 is the same voltage regulator as the one used in the previous 
simulation setup, which was designed for products with low security requirements. VR2, in the 
other hand, was designed for high security products. These voltage regulators were 
instantiated with their corresponding glitch detectors, so that they could be characterised too 
and compared against the proposed detector. Since the simulation results already determined 
that the proposed detector could only be used in conjunction with existing ones, and the aim is 
to determine the detection range improvement provided by the proposed detector, only the 
voltage regulator’s Vcc, Vdd and GND glitch detector’s combined detection signal was 
monitored. A side effect of this comparison approach is not being able to establish a direct 
comparison between the proposed designs against those built-in ones monitoring Vdd. 
 
These voltage regulators have different responses to a glitch attack, as shown in Figure 3-15 
and Figure 3-16, where the amber waveform shows the glitch applied to Vcc and the pink 
waveform shows the impact on the voltage regulators’ output, Vdd. As in the simulation setup, 
each voltage regulator also powered a fixed capacitive load of 2.2 nF and an independently 
controllable variable resistive load, which could be set to: high load (80 Ohms); medium load 
(1K6 Ohms); and low load (3K2 Ohms). 
 
 
Figure 3-15 VR1's response to a 17V and 300ns glitch under high load, Vcc = 3V 
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Figure 3-16 VR2's response to a 17V and 300ns glitch under high load, Vcc = 3V 
 
Each glitch detector version was characterized for detection range and detection delay using 
both voltage regulators, four resistive load combinations (high, medium, low and variable) and 
two base voltage levels, 3V and 5V. Furthermore, these tests were repeated in four different 
test-chips. Figure 3-17 shows a block diagram of the test environment. The characterisation 
was run by applying positive glitches of different amplitudes and widths on Vcc with the 
HP81110A pulse generator, which higher pulse is limited 20V. In total, 416 different glitches 
were applied for the 3V base supply, and 364 glitches for the 5V base supply. The test 
environment and test board are covered in detail in the section 4 of the report GlitchTech1. 
 
 
Figure 3-17 Diagram of the test environment 
 
Figure 3-18 shows the detection characterisation of the proposed glitch detectors when 
powered with the VR1 for high and low loads, as well as the combined characterisation of the 
glitch detectors embedded into the VR1 and how it compares to GD_3. All these figures focus 
on glitch widths between 10ns and 150ns as this is where the most useful information lies. 
The proposed detectors monitoring the VR2’s output hardly detected any glitch at all. Hence 
no valid characterization or comparison could be done for the VR2 case. 
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Finally, Table 3-3 presents the maximum, minimum and average detection time for each 
detector when VR1 is subject to high and low loads. The longest detection times are 
associated to glitches in the detectors’ detection limit, whereas short detection times are 




















Figure 3-18 Glitch detection range for different detectors when Vcc = 3V: a) GD_0 3V; b) 
GD_1 3V; c) GD_2 3V; d) GD_3 3V; e) VR1 3V; and f) GD_3 vs VR1 3V 
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Table 3-3 Overall detection times in nanoseconds 
Detection time 
Detector Load 
Min average max 
High 870 1200 1640 
GD_0 
Low 910 1310 2460 
High 1100 1400 2005 
GD_1 
Low 1250 1600 2020 
High 310 420 1250 
GD_2 
Low 320 470 1380 
High 310 440 1300 
GD_3 
Low 310 460 1370 
High 40 55 400 
VR1 
Low 50 60 440 
 
The technical report GlitchPub2 also covers the characterisation work of the glitch detectors 
and the results. 
 
 
3.2.3.4 Test-chip Discussion 
 
Several deductions can be made from these results. Firstly, these results corroborate the 
simulation results. The best detectors’ maximum detection time is around 1,300ns, and in 
general it takes between 3.10 and 8.5 times longer to trigger the alarm than the current 
detectors. However, this is well within the typical Smart Card transaction time as well as the 
typical NVM write time. Hence, the statement made in the simulation analysis still holds valid: 
the proposed detector could be used only in conjunction with current detectors due to their 
slower detection time. 
 
Also, it is clear that the load and voltage regulators play a key part on the detectors’ detection 
range and time, although the load impact is not as severe as initially indicated from the 
simulation results. The voltage regulator, in the other hand, had a massive impact on the 
detector’s performance, as detectors coupled with the VR2 hardly detected any glitch. The 
explanation can be found in the voltage regulator’s response to a glitch. 
 
The VR1’s output behaviour when a glitch is present in Vcc can be very dramatic. In Figure 
3-15, the voltage regulator’s output raises almost immediately from 1.8V to about 3.5V and 
then it drops it back very quickly too. On the other hand, the VR2’s output behaviour is much 
more controlled. In Figure 3-16, the VR2’s output raises to just over 2V but then it drops it 
gradually back to 1.8V. This VR2’s behaviour does not allow the modified inverter’s output, 
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Vout, to become higher than the nominal Vdd, 1.8V. Without this first step, the glitch detector 
is not capable of detecting a glitch. Furthermore, even if a glitch could raise Vout over 1.8V, 
Vdd’s gradual drop is too slow to allow it becoming lower than Vout. Hence, dissipating at 
once any chance of detecting a glitch on Vdd with this detector when is paired with the VR2. 
 
Focusing on the VR1 scenario’s results, detectors GD_0 and GD_1 performed worse than 
GD_2 and GD_3 when it comes to detection range. Their timing performance was the poorest 
too. This is directly related with the detectors’ design decisions. GD_0 and GD_1 used low 
leakage transistors, which are characterized by their low speed. 
 
Detectors GD_2 and GD_3 showed a similar behaviour both in terms of detection range and 
time, where GD_3 has a slightly better detection range, whereas, at times, GD_2 is a slightly 
faster detector. Since in this work, expanding the detection range is a priority, detector GD_3 
is considered marginally better than detector GD_2. The detection range improvement 
provided by the GD_3 over the VR1’s combined detection range in shown in Figure 3-18.f), 
where the dashed line represents the VR1’s combined detection range and the continuous line 
is GD_3’s detection range. This improvement is repeated across most of the tests carried out 
in this work. 
 
Looking at the effect the load has in the detection range and time, it can be noticed that when 
VR1 is subject to lower loads, all detection ranges are expanded at the cost of speed. This 
same phenomenon can be seen too in the VR1’s built-in detectors. Section 3.2.3.2 Simulation 
Discussion explains why a higher load results in faster detection times, and why it takes longer 
to detect a glitch when it sits in a detector’s detection range limit. The phenomenon highlighted 
here works as a combination of the two previous ones. 
 
When it comes to detecting glitches, at the detection range limit, the evolution of Vdd 
becomes crucial. Vdd not raising high enough or falling before Vout has risen above the 
nominal Vdd (1.8V) could easily mean missing the glitch, and this is what actually happens. As 
previously explained, Vdd shows a faster recovery when subjected to higher loads and, at the 
detection range limit, this is translated by not letting Vout becoming higher than Vdd. Low load, 
on the other hand, allows more severe changes on Vdd after a glitch, which, at the detection 
range limit is translated as still detecting the glitch. 
 
Finally, characterising the combined detection range and time of the detectors built into VR1 
and VR2, makes it impossible to know each individual detector’s performance both, at the 
voltage regulators’ input and output. Whilst the individual comparison was not the objective of 
this work, having that information could have helped with discerning each detector’s 
contribution to the combined detection range and time. Furthermore, it could have helped on 
determining the performance improvement introduced by the proposed detector when 
comparing it to glitch detectors at the VR1’s and VR2’s output. 
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3.2.4 Conclusion of the glitch detector 
 
Detectors currently used in Smart Cards primarily focus on detecting glitches in real time by 
directly monitoring the power rails. Detecting fast glitches with this approach is challenging, as 
legitimate noise could be mistaken for a glitch, triggering false detections. Instead, the glitch 
detector proposed in this work, and for which a patent has been granted (see GlitchPub3 in 
Volume 2), allows the safe detection of those fast glitches by monitoring the glitches’ effect on 
a sensitive circuit. 
 
Test results have demonstrated the usability of the proposed detector and how it improves the 
overall detection range and, hence, the security. However, and due to the high detection delay 
comparing with direct approach detectors, the currently proposed detector could only be used 
in conjunction with current detectors. This is, as a supplement to the other detectors. 
 
There has been a limitation on the comparison between the proposed glitch detector and the 
current ones. This limitation was produced by the combined monitoring of the built-in 
detectors’ behaviour, which did not allow us to make any further analysis on how the 
instantiated versions compare against the individual built-in detectors, especially the internal 
ones. 
 
The instantiation of different versions of the proposed glitch detector has proved that small 
changes in the design can result in faster glitch detection and bigger detection range. There 
might still be room for improvement. By making the comparator even faster and more 
sensitive, the detection range could be expanded and the detection time reduced, whilst still 
avoiding detecting noise as a glitch. 
 
Furthermore, it has been corroborated that the same glitch might affect a design differently 
depending on the environment parameters. The voltage regulator was the single factor with 
the highest impact on their detection capabilities, to the point where in one of the cases, no 
detections were registered. Other two factors affecting the detection capabilities included: a) 
the detector’s design; and b) the voltage regulator load, although this last factor had a lower 
impact than the previous two. 
 
Finally, throughout all this work, the glitch detector has been designed to detect glitches at the 
voltage regulator’s output. However, the design principle could still apply if designed to detect 
glitches applied in Vcc, and it would be interesting to see how it performs at detection range 
and time, especially for the case of the VR2. 
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3.2.5 Future work 
 
As with many other detectors and analog circuits, this detector might need tweaking for each 
new technology node. Hence, the design will need to be constantly reviewed. In addition to 
this iterative improvement, three lines of action could be suggested: a) adapting the glitch 
detector to detect glitches in Vcc; b) characterise the voltage regulators’ internal and external 
detectors separately and compare them to the Vcc and Vdd glitch detector versions; and c) 
testing the current detector with negative glitches on the ground and redesigning it to detect 
negative glitches in Vcc. 
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3.3 Laser Attacks 
 
Silicon devices’ susceptibility to lasers is well known by the aerospace community, since they 
used a laser beam for the first time in 1965 [7] to simulate the effects of ionising radiation on 
semiconductors. Nowadays the laser technology is more affordable, making laser attacks 
more likely. In fact, in [8], a successful attack on a SRAM was achieved with a camera flash, 
which shows the potential threat posed by this attack technique. 
 
Unlike consumer devices, aerospace devices are developed to withstand these kind of 
threats. This research line analysed the applicability of a few radiation hardening 
countermeasures to Smart Card devices and developed the understanding of laser attack 
effects. The following section reviews the state of art of different laser attacks techniques and 
radiation countermeasures. The next section covers the instantiated countermeasures and the 
tests carried out. This is followed by the conclusions and future work. 
 
The following sections cover the literature review; the countermeasures tested in this work; 
and the conclusions of this research line. Finally, some possible future developments are 
proposed. 
 
Volume II includes the following reports related to and supporting this research line: 
• LaserTech1(Tartalo test-chip 01OKA) 
 
 
3.3.1 Literature Review 
 
The impact of energy particles (radiation) on microelectronic circuits produces a phenomena 
commonly referred to as single-event effect (SEE), which can cause temporal or permanent 
changes on microelectronic devices [30, 31]. A full list of SEEs can be found in Appendix C. 
Lasers have a similar behaviour but with some key differences: a) test repeatability; b) needs 
direct access to silicon; and c) only induces a subset of the radiation SEEs. The actual 
differences between radiation and laser hits are collected in Table 3-4. 
 
A particle’s hit size and energy are determined by the particle itself; as different particle types 
might have different sizes or energy levels. A particle hit is also random in the temporal and 
spatial domains. Even if particle accelerator chambers used for radiation tests, such as [30], 
allow defining a variable target area and radiation level, the actual hit cannot be controlled. 
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Table 3-4 Radiation vs. laser effects on silicon 
Feature/Property Radiation Laser 
Hit location random controlled 
Hit time random controlled 
Hit duration in the order of pico seconds controlled 
Hit size particle’s size laser spot size (controlled) 
Hit energy particle’s energy controlled 
Barriers 
Penetrates the whole chip 
(package, metal layer and die) 
Needs direct access to the silicon. 
Package and metal layers act as 
barriers 
Induced upsets (SEE) SEU, SEL, SEB, SEGR, SETD, 
SET 
SEU, SEL, SET, SETD 
 
Laser beams, on the other hand, are far more controllable, as the beam can be directed to a 
specific area and the hit time controlled and even synchronised with a particular event in the 
device under test (DUT). The laser beam’s spot size and energy level can also be controlled, 
and enables targeting anything from an individual transistor to the whole device. 
 
Although in theory a laser beam could be on for an undetermined amount of time, in practice, 
short pulses are used. Applying a laser beam for a long time might render the targeted area 
unusable for as long as the laser is present, and depending on the laser energy level it could 
even damage it permanently. After all the aerospace industry’s aim is to emulate the 
radiation’s behaviour, and an attacker aims to inject some sort of temporal fault that produces 
valuable behavioural information. A short pulse is enough for that. 
 
Controllability of laser beam parameters allows test repeatability, making laser beams 
desirable for the aerospace industry to tests electronic devices’ response to a space like 
environment. Controllability also allows carrying a series of attacks not possible with radiation, 
such as synchronising the laser beam to the DUT’s system clock. Another attack option could 
be using big laser spots to comb the device and identify the location of IPs. Then, a small 
laser spot could be used to target specific parts of the IP, such as registers. These test 
scenarios makes laser attacks desirable to an attacker. 
 
One of the laser beam limitations is barriers. The laser needs to target the silicon in order to 
induce a SEE, and packaging and metal layers act as barriers to laser beams. Furthermore, 
with the increasing design complexity, the silicon gets buried under several metal layers and 
successful front-side attacks are harder to achieve [32]. This can be worked around, however, 
with back-side attacks [33], although substrate milling is often required first to improve the 
laser penetration. 
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Comparing to radiation, laser beams can only induce a subset of SEEs, of which SEU and 
single event transient (SET) are the ones an attacker would aim for. SEUs cause a change of 
the data stored in registers and memory cells. SETs cause short duration effects that could 
result in error injection. These errors are temporary in nature. 
 
A lot of effort has been put towards hardening devices against radiation. Radiation 
countermeasures include those proposed in [34-40], where the use of radiation hard 
processes (RHP) has been the most commonly used countermeasure. Devices built on RHPs 
are inherently more robust than commercial ones, however, the use of RHPs is in decline, as 
they are more expensive and power hungry than commercial CMOS processes and usually 
lag two generations behind commercial ones [41]. 
 
Foundry level countermeasures are out of the scope of this research. However, RHP would be 
hard to justify in a commercial environment such as that of Smart Cards, were size, power 
consumption and price are major constraints. More adequate than RHP are the 
countermeasures based on radiation hardening by design (RHBD), which rely on specific 
circuit design techniques to increase the radiation resistance of a device [30, 34]. RHBD 
techniques include: a) redundancy; b) memory immunity [35, 38]; and c) transistor layout [37]. 
 
Memory immunity RHBD focuses on sequential logic and storage, whereas redundancy and 
transistor layout are applicable to both, sequential and combinational. Hardening data storage 
cells is important to avoid corrupting the information they hold, but with soft errors in 
combinational logic increasing exponentially with the clock frequency [39, 41], hardening 
combinational logic is also becoming a need. 
 
There are two main kinds of redundancies [3]: time redundancy and hardware redundancy. 
Time redundancy is based at computing the same input data at different times and comparing 
the results. This countermeasure could potentially help detecting laser pulses that last less 
than the whole cycle of processing and comparing the data. Although [3, 36, 39, 40] cover the 
hardware instantiation of this countermeasure, it could actually also be instantiated in software 
for some functions such as cryptographic operations. 
 
One intrinsic feature of this technique is, however, the time delay penalties it incurs on, as the 
same data needs to be processed at least twice within the same cycle. The imposed delay 
might be prohibitive on applications or ICs which are already struggling to meet timing 
specifications or where applying this technique implies reducing the device’s maximum 
performance. 
 
Hardware redundancy countermeasure is based on instantiating the same block several times 
and comparing the outputs of these blocks [3]. The time penalty associated to these 
techniques is not that severe, as all blocks will process the data at the same time; the voting 
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circuit will be the only additional time delay to the design. The main drawback of this approach 
is, however, the area penalty it incurs on, as the same block needs to be instantiated at least 
twice for a fault to be detected, and at least threes times for a fault to be corrected. 
 
By using hardware redundancy, a circuitry’s or blocks immunity against radiation or laser 
attacks could be improved greatly, as all redundant blocks would have to be attacked at the 
same time and inject the same error in order to work around this countermeasure. 
Redundancy blocks can be located apart from each other in order to improve the immunity 
further. 
 
There is, though, a question on how well protected the voting circuit will be against laser 
attacks. The voting system improves a block’s immunity to laser attacks, but unless the voting 
circuit’s immunity is matched to the block’s one, an attacker could potentially target the voting 
circuit to inject a fault, bypassing then the voting technique itself. And, if the voting circuit can 
be designed in such a way, other than redundancy, that hardens it against laser attacks, would 
it be possible to design the block following the same approach in first instance and avoiding 
the use of redundancy? 
 
Given a radiation resistant voting circuit, hardware redundancy could be used in Smart Cards 
to enhance the immunity of certain critical blocks or functions, such as FSMs, the CPU’s ALU 
or the crypto engine. The area and power consumption penalty resulting from the use of 
hardware redundancy would suggest against extensive use of this technique though. 
 
Radiation hardened cells like dual interlocked storage cell (DICE) [38] and SERT SEU 
immune register [42] improve the cell’s stability and robustness against radiation effects by 
duplicating the feedback paths. A particle hitting one transistor in a DICE structure most likely 
will not inject any upset, and the stored value will remain unchanged [38]. This hit, however, 
could result in two nodes or transistors driving a net or wire simultaneously and with different 
voltages for as long as the hit effect is present, which would increased power consumption. 
Also multiple simultaneous particle hits might result in fault injection in the memory cell. 
 
Low power SERT SEU structure improves on the DICE’s disadvantages. By design, a single 
hit could not result in two nodes driving a wire concurrently, and it can handle up to two 
simultaneous particle hits. The downside of SERT SEUs is their size, as the amount of 
transistors needed for a standard latch cell is 4, the transistors for a DICE latch cell is 8 and 
the number of transistors for a SERT SEU latch can be as high as 12. 
 
In any case, it might only be suitable for specific registers or latches. Instantiating a SRAM 
with any of these two countermeasures would dramatically increase the area overhead, hence 
it should be avoided. Instead, error detection and correction circuitries or policies such as 
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parity and Hamming code should be added to further increase the device’s robustness against 
radiation or laser attacks. 
 
Finally, radiation induces edge current leakage on affected transistors, which in turn can inject 
a fault into adjacent devices [30]. Enclosed layout transistors (ELT), also known as edge-less 
transistors, mitigate the radiation effects by designing transistors with no edges, as shown in 
Figure 3-19. The main drawback of these transistors is their size, as they can be three times 
bigger than standard transistor layout. In addition to the size, these transistors also have a 






Figure 3-19 Enclosed layout transistor 
 
 
3.3.2 This Work 
 
A test-chip (01OKA) was designed with some of the countermeasures described above 
instantiated into simple 4-bit adders, as the one shown in Figure 3-20. These 
countermeasures included: 
• Layout alterations: A laser attack success depends not only on the timing, i.e. when 
a specific transistor is illuminated, but also on the transistors that can be targeted 
individually or as a group, which might be affected by its layout. Three register layouts 
shown in Figure 3-21 were instantiated to determine how the layout can influence on 
the effects of a laser attack. 
• Enclosed layout transistor: ELT transistors were designed and instantiated to test 
their performance against light attacks. 
• Low power radiation hardened register: SERT registers were designed to test their 
response to laser attacks. 
• Radiation mitigation on combinational logic: The radiation countermeasure 
presented in [36] was instantiated at the output of all adders, as shown in Figure 3-22. 
• Parity error detection: This simple error detection technique was used to calculate 
the addition’s parity and storing it in a register. 
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• Covering the silicon with a metal layer: This technique was used to completely 
cover a test circuitry with a metal layer. This metal plate was grounded to avoid it 
getting charged with static electricity. 
 
 
Figure 3-20 Basic light attack test circuit 
 
 



















Figure 3-22 Implemented combinational block SEU mitigation logic 
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Six adders were designed in total, each of them targeting a particular set of countermeasures. 
The relationship between the adder design and the instantiated countermeasures is shown in 
Table 3-5. All designs except for ELT design were built using normal MOS transistors. The 
ELT design was fully built of ELT transistors, so their performance in the registers and the 
combinational blocks could be measured. 
 
Table 3-5 Design and countermeasure relation table 
Layout version 
Design name 







Layout_a design x - - - - x x - 
Layout_b design - x - - - x x - 
Layout_c design - - x - - x x - 
RHBD design - - - X - x x - 
ELT design - - - - x x x - 





The test consisted of targeting the adder circuitries with laser pulses when the registers stored 
a fixed value and whilst exercising the adder circuitries. The actual test methodology is 
covered in the report LaserTech1. The test-chip was fabricated with a fibre glass coating that 
hid the designs, see Figure 3-23, which made it difficult to target individual transistors. Hence, 
laser pulses were set to target the combinational block of all circuitries, the registers 
associated to each circuitry in Table 3-5, referred here as direct attack, and the registers of all 
circuitries at once. 
 
The setup only allowed front-side attacks, which only Metal design and radiation hardened 
(RH) registers demonstrated to be immune against when they were targeted directly. No other 
countermeasure withstood direct attacks. ELT was expected to pass the tests, however it 
failed and was weaker than MOS circuitry. Leaving the reasons for ELT’s failure aside, which 
could be design related or not, the area penalty resulting from using these transistors is too 
high to justify their use even if they were immune against laser attacks. 
 
As expected, parity error detection only detected a limited amount of error injections and the 
combinational SEU mitigation circuitry failed to protect the combinational logic against error 
injections. Combinational SEU mitigation was designed to mitigate single particle impacts, and 
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hence it failed when targeted with a spot size that affected several transistors or the whole 
countermeasure. 
 
Initially it was expected that a laser attack would almost always set all registers to the same 
value, say logic 0. This would ease detecting error injections by defining the right parity policy 
for the adder registers, either even or odd parity. In reality however, the errors injected in 
registers changed for different stored values, laser energy level and laser target areas. 
 
 
Figure 3-23 Silicon view with circuitry boundaries 
 
The injected error value was more consistent for ELT transistor based registers; especially 
with high energy laser attacks. The injected error value would almost always be 0x1F when all 
registers are targeted at once, and 0x10 when only ELT registers were targeted. 
 
An interesting behaviour was noticed when targeting the registers of all circuitries. In this case 
all registers became affected, including those in the Metal design and the RH registers. In 
other words, otherwise immune registers were prone to error injections when a high enough 
number of neighbouring transistors were attacked with a laser. This behaviour could be 
explained by the laser producing temporary localised shortcuts when a high enough energy 
level targets a high enough number of P and N transistors. 
 
 
3.3.4 Conclusions of laser attacks 
 
Only one usable countermeasure was immune to direct laser attacks, SERT SEU immune 
registers; although even this one would be affected when attacking enough neighbouring 
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transistors. This means that no single countermeasure might be adequate as a universal 
remedy. 
 
Metal layer countermeasure also succeeded in protecting the design against direct front-side 
attacks. However, the drawbacks of this technique discard it as a valid option in commercial 
devices. In one side is the raise of fabrication costs. The primary function of metal layers in a 
semiconductor device is connecting the different building blocks (e.g. transistors, capacitors, 
resistors). Placing metal plates to cover parts of an IC will consume valuable routing space, 
and could force the device to grow in area and/or using an additional metal layer. 
 
Laying down metal layers in a semiconductor device is an expensive process, and so, designs 
must use the least amount of metal layers. A bigger die minimises the number of devices that 
can be fabricated in a given wafer. Hence, any of these two growing approaches minimise the 
benefit margin per device and could potentially force Atmel to increase price per die. 
 
The other important drawback of a metal plate is its lack of protection to back-side laser 
attacks. These kind of attacks, not tested in this research, consist of milling the die substrate 
and applying the laser to the die’s back side. Milling the substrate increases the laser 
penetration depth and enables fault injection through back-side attacks. A metal plate can 
protect a circuitry from a front-side attack but would fail to protect it from a back-side attack. 
Hence, back-side attacks would make this countermeasure redundant. Back-side attacks also 
force to focus on structure and/or architecture based countermeasures such as RHBD. 
 
A design’s sensitivity to neighbouring circuitry should be studied further, as it could provide 
clues as to how to harden certain critical functions, such as crypto blocks. It could also help 
defining sensors and design strategies to detect attacks on neighbouring circuitry. 
 
 
3.3.5 Future work 
 
This research line was cut short by a shift of interest; however, it would be interesting to test 
other radiation hardening structures similar to the SERT SEU, including custom ones. 
Alternatively, the commercial viability for using the same RH register tested here could be 
studied. 
 
Again, an in depth knowledge of a design’s sensitivity to its neighbouring circuitry could be 
crucial to the success of any particular countermeasure and detection strategy. Finally due to 
the sensitivity shown by ELT transistors, its use as a laser sensor could be considered or 
analysed. 
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4 Low Power Design for Smart Card 
 
With every new technology node, transistors get faster, smaller and more complex designs 
can be integrated in the same area. With new technologies nodes, the nominal supply voltage 
level is also reduced, which in turn lowers the dynamic power. However, deep-sub micron 
technologies are accompanied by other challenges, such as process variations (e.g. random 
doping) and an increase of the leakage current [43]. The leakage current is the direct 
contributor to static power consumption, which wastes valuable energy. This is an undesired 
side-effect, especially on mobile applications and devices with a tight energy budget, such as 
contact and contactless Smart Cards. 
 
Despite the leakage current being still manageable at 180nm and 150nm technology nodes, 
smaller technology is already suffering severely from it. As a result, several techniques have 
been developed to minimise leakage or static power consumption, such as adapting 
dynamically the threshold voltage [44], power gating [45] or reducing Vdd [46], each with 
different success rates. 
 
In Smart Cards, as with most SoCs, SRAMs are the main contributors towards leakage 
current, generating over 80% of the overall leakage current [47]. Hence, this research line was 
initiated to: a) look at SRAM leakage reduction techniques; and b) test the robustness and 
possible security issues related to the proposed techniques. This research line was carried out 
in collaboration with Atmel’s Memory Group based in Rousset, France. 
 
Three lines of work were initiated in relation to low power. The first one focused on the 
impacts and approach to enable memory partitioning, where a memory is divided into different 
sections or partitions and each powered independently according to their usage and contents. 
This work resulted in a proposal and design considerations when adapting the Smart Card 
SRAM to enable memory partitioning. 
 
The second approach consisted of powering the SRAM continuously to a supply level lower 
than its nominal value, in order to reduce the static power consumption. Initial simulations 
carried out by the Memory Group suggested against this approach. 
 
The third and final line of work focused on the security impact of a few leakage reduction 
techniques. This work was divided in two parts, one developing custom SRAM bit cells and 
another one testing SRAM memories with different leakage reduction techniques developed 
by the Memory Group when subjected to power attacks commonly used against Smart Card 
devices. Test setup issues prevented from carrying out the planned tests. 
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The three research lines are highly related to each other, and so, the next section provides a 
common literature overview. The next three sections cover the work carried out on each 
research line, including an introduction to the research line, the obtained results, the 
conclusions drawn in relation to that particular research; and future lines of actions. In addition 
to this, the memory partitioning research line expands the literature review. 
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4.1 Literature Overview 
 
One of the side effects of smaller technology nodes is the increase of leakage current. This 
leakage is the result of shorter channel distances and geometries and, as shown in [48], the 
static power consumption is set to offset the dynamic power unless measures are taken to 
minimise the leakage. This increase of leakage current is especially critical for battery 
powered applications, as more energy will be wasted, resulting in a shorter battery life. This is 
added to the fact that the batteries’ capacity has increased at a slower rate than the power 
requirements of portable devices. 
 
Six different mechanisms contribute to the leakage; these are shown in Figure 4-1, where gate 
tunnelling oxide (a.k.a. gate oxide) and sub-threshold leakage are the major contributors [49]. 
Gate oxide leakage is the result of thin gate oxides, thus, this leakage mechanism needs to be 
tackled at foundry level and is out of the scope of this research line. Current proposals focus 










1 Gate tunnelling oxide






   Leakage
N+ N+
 
Figure 4-1 Leakage contribution mechanisms [49] 
 
Several techniques have been developed to help reducing leakage current, ranging from low 
level (e.g. foundry and/or transistor level) to high level (e.g. system and/or software level) [46, 
49]. On the low end, one approach is enabling the technology process having transistors with 
different Vt. This allows using high Vt transistors throughout the design, which are less leaky 
but slower, and reserving lower Vt transistors for critical paths, which are leakier but faster 
[51]. This approach, already used by Atmel, enables reducing the leakage of any design, be it 
a memory or logic. 
 
On a typical device, its resources or functions are used on demand. This implies that some of 
these resources might sit idle for long periods of time. One approach to reduce the leakage on 
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the unused functions is power gating them, and powering them on or off depending on 
whether they are needed or not [45]. This is achieved with the addition of sleep transistors, 
which are placed between the main power rails and each function, block or area’s power rails 
or ring [45]. Power gating is the most effective approach to minimise leakage current, as it can 
reduce a function’s leakage by a 97%, however, it comes with its share of issues. Powering up 
and down a block or function takes time and, unless it is managed carefully, it can impact on 
the device’s performance. 
 
Sizing the power gates correctly is crucial, as they need to be able to conduct the maximum 
current needed by the block powered through them. However, designing too big power gates 
would result in higher area overhead, but more importantly, longer power up and power down 
times, which reduces the number of times the block or function can be powered down. 
 
When powering down a block or function, its outputs are left floating, which can cause 
leakage in the circuitry that reads these outputs. This can be fixed easily by driving the outputs 
to either a logic one or logic zero when the function is powered down, e.g. by using pass-
gates. Another issue to consider is that when a circuitry is powered down, loses its current 
status, it is reset. If preserving the status is desired, the desired data storage units, e.g. 
registers, should not be powered down. In other words, data storage and combinational logic 
should have different sources of power. Alternatively, the circuit’s current status could be 
stored to a memory, e.g. main data memory, before powering it down, and restored it once the 
circuit is powered back up again. 
 
A similar approach to minimise the leakage when a function or block is not active is reducing 
its supply voltage, Vdd, instead of powering it down. Although this approach does not reduce 
leakage current as much as power gating, recovering from a low power mode is much 
quicker, hence reducing the impact on performance [52]. Furthermore, if Vdd is not lowered 
below the data retention voltage (DRV), the registers or memories within the block or function 
would not lose the stored data, hence, preserving its status. 
 
However, lowering Vdd implies the need for a variable supply source. This could mean an 
additional, controllable, voltage regulator, or powering the functions or blocks through power 
gates with a sophisticated management or control. 
 
This leakage reduction technique is very common when reducing an SRAM’s leakage [46, 53-
55]. However, reducing the supply voltage not only reduces memory’s performance, but also 
its static noise margin (SNM), which determines the memory’s robustness. New SRAM cells 
have been presented to improve the SNM. In [56] it was achieved with bulk biasing, whereas 
in [57-59] it was achieve by changing the SRAM bit cell’s structure. 
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4.2 Memory Partitioning 
 
Extensive research has been carried out on SRAM memories aiming to reduce their power 
consumption and leakage current. Leakage reduction techniques have primarily focused at 
the foundry level, transistors’ design and SRAM architecture [49, 60]. The common factor in 
these techniques is that they focus at the hardware level, ignoring software’s impact on power 
consumption. Other techniques, such as memory partitioning and power management [61, 
62], not only allow saving power via hardware techniques, but also through analyzing the 
software applications’ use of the memory, dividing a monolithic memory into different smaller 
memories and redistributing the data to minimise power consumption. 
 
Memory partitioning and power management have been primarily used with the on-chip 
memory of 16-/32-bit CPU based devices, where the main memory is external. This work 
focuses on the unique challenges involved when applying memory partitioning to Smart Card 
devices, which are mostly designed around 8-bit CPUs with on-chip memory only. 
 
The following sections cover the literature review of the memory partitioning approach and a 
description of the main issues when applying this approach to Smart Card devices. This is 
followed by a description of the simulated test cases to analyse a Smart Card SRAM memory 
usage and the obtained results. The next section covers the proposed memory partitioning 
implementation, followed by the discussion section. The last two sections draw some 
conclusion and suggest a few lines of action for future work. 
 
Volume II includes the following reports related to and supporting this research line: 
• LowLeakageTech1(SRAM Memory Partitioning for Leakage Reduction) 
 
 
4.2.1 Literature Review 
 
Memory partitioning and independently powering individual partitions has extensively been 
used on Cache and Scratch-pad Memories (SPMs) for reducing both, dynamic and static 
power [61, 62]. The dynamic power consumed by a circuit is defined by its effective capacitive 
load, the supply voltage and the frequency the circuit is exercised at, just as defined in (1). 
Smaller memory arrays have a smaller capacitive load for read/write operations than bigger 
ones, hence, partitioning or dividing a monolithic memory into smaller size memories results in 
reducing the dynamic power consumption [61]. The static power consumed by a circuitry, on 
the other hand, depends on the supply voltage and its leakage current. Hence, by reducing the 
supply voltage of the non accessed partitions, the static power of these partitions is reduced 
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                        (1) 
 
When partitioning a memory, it is important to know: (a) the partitioning approach to be 
targeted; (b) partition sizes or granularity; and (c) the partitions’ powering policy. Programming 





Two partitioning approaches are possible: uniform and non-uniform. Uniform consists of 
dividing the memory into equally sized partitions. Whilst this is the simplest approach, it does 
not necessarily maximize the energy savings; especially on mono-application systems [61]. 
Non-uniform partitioning consists of dividing the memory into different size partitions, so that 
the most used variables can be stored in the smaller partition in order to further reduce the 
dynamic power. This partitioning approach is better suited for mono-application systems and 
the cases where there is a prior knowledge of the code to be run. The main drawback of this 




4.2.1.2 Partition sizing or granularity 
 
Partitioning a memory increases the area overhead, as the periphery overhead increases with 
the number of partitions [62]. This penalty is more significant when partitioning smaller 
memories. Furthermore, additional control logic and power management registers will be 
needed. Hence, the optimum partition sizes would be determined by those sizes where the 
difference between energy savings and area cost is maximized. 
 
The energy efficiency of a partitioned memory is determined by its usage, in other words, by 
the code run by the CPU. When the code is available, optimum [63] or sub-optimum [62] 
partition sizes can be determined by analyzing the memory usage and grouping the most used 
variables into one small partition, and the least used variables into the biggest partition. The 
amount and size of each partition required to maximise power reduction is, hence, application 
dependant. 
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For the cases where the code is not available, the number of partitions and their size can be 




4.2.1.3 Powering policy 
 
Partitioned memories can be defined by their contents and use as: a) being accessed; b) not 
accessed but with valid data; or c) not accessed and without valid data. An accessed partition 
contributes towards dynamic and static power, whereas not accessed partitions only 
contribute towards static power. Based on these definitions, accessed partitions are powered 
to nominal Vdd so that they can be read and written to without losing on performance; not 
accessed partitions but with valid data are powered at a lower supply, so that their static 
power consumption is reduced; and partitions without valid data are powered off to avoid their 
contribution towards static power [61, 62, 58, 64]. 
 
Techniques to low power a partition include dynamic voltage scaling (DVS) and power 
switching. Since all partitions can be powered independently, this technique requires a more 
complex voltage regulator and/or supply power distribution mechanism. This technique is 
mainly targeted at the partitioning level, although it can also be used at individual address 
level. DVS must be used with care on noise prone environments, as low powered memories 
are susceptible to soft errors and fault injection [65]. This weakness can be minimized with bit 
cell architecture modifications such as [57, 58]. An alternative static power reduction 
technique is to reduce leakage current by forward/reverse biasing. Although this technique 
could target address level more easily, the decreasing effectiveness of forward biasing with 
smaller technologies [66] and the need of triple-well for reverse biasing makes them inefficient 
or too expensive. 
 
Powering off partitions can be achieved through power gating. Two approaches are possible, 
positive metal-oxide semiconductor (PMOS) or negative metal-oxide semiconductor (NMOS) 
transistors. Although power gating does not fully eliminate the leakage current, the work 
carried out in [45] shows that it achieved up to 97% of energy savings. 
 
Switching power states results in a power consumption and a performance penalty [62], which 
is worst for higher voltage differences between states. These penalty effects are usually 
mitigated with timing policies that determine the maximum number of cycles between 
accesses before a partition goes to low power mode. 
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Despite the timing policy missed accesses will still occur, where accessing a not ready 
partition is attempted. For these events, the CPU and memory should be provided with a 
wait/ready signal, which is usually a standard in a CPU. 
 
 
4.2.1.4 Software techniques 
 
Software tools, compilers especially, also play an important role in saving power, as these can 
greatly impact on the memory usage [63, 67-69]. Two main approaches have been proposed 
to manage data in non-uniform SPMs: static and dynamic allocation. A static approach 
consists of placing the overall most used variables in the smallest partition for the whole 
execution time [70]. Dynamic approach, on the other hand, consists of moving the contents 
between the partitions and the main memory in order to maximize the usage of the smallest 
partition. This is, in order to maximize power saving [69]. 
 
A static approach can result in a high enough power saving for mono-application software 
codes, whereas a dynamic approach is more suited to multi-application codes. In any of the 
cases, new software tools are required to allow programmers develop code abstracting from 
the memory layout and in order to exploit the benefits obtained from partitioning the memory. 
This requirement might also mean that for a particular IC, there are less available software 
tools than for others. This is particularly important when taking into account studies such as 
[71], which showed the importance of the available software development tools when deciding 
which CPU to use on a project. 
 
 
4.2.2 Considerations when partitioning the memory of a Smart 
Card 
 
When applying memory partitioning to Smart Cards, there are three main aspects that differ 
from other cases where this technique has been applied and which can impact on its use or 
implementation. The first difference is that previous works focused on either cache and/or 
SPM memories, leaving system the memory aside. In Smart Cards, there is not cache or SPM 
memory; instead, the leakage reduction approach targets the whole system memory. This fact 
limits the amount of memory that can be set in lower power mode or even powered off. 
 
Furthermore, the data space of an 8-bit CPU is usually limited to 64Kbytes, although 
accessing more memory is still possible by using memory pagination. Nevertheless, an 8-bit 
CPU based Smart Card’s internally SRAM memory is usually below 8Kbytes. Since the 
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periphery overhead is higher for smaller memories, partitioning a memory into separated 
smaller memories might not be cost effective for a Smart Card. 
 
The second difference is that some previous works required prior knowledge of the target 
application and or applications to be run in the system to optimise the memory partitioning. 
Due to the security level required with Smart Cards, manufacturers have no access to the OS 
nor the applications run by their customers. Furthermore, different customers can use the 
same device in different ways. This diversity makes it difficult to estimate the memory usage 
and the partitioning formulation for any one product. Also, optimising a particular device for a 
particular application or customer might not provide other applications or customers with extra 
benefit. 
 
Instead, studying a Smart Card’s general behaviour and software architecture could help 
estimating a memory usage pattern and formulating a memory partitioning approach. For 
example, a Smart Card usually stays idle until it receives a command. It then executes the 
command and sends back the appropriate response. The Smart Card could then go to an idle 
mode again if no further commands are received within a certain amount of time. With this 
behaviour example, a partition could be assigned to act as a communication buffer, and power 
it on or off to save on static power consumption depending on the Smart Card’s status. 
 
Regarding the software architecture, the OS is likely to allocate certain memory sections 
dedicated to different OS related functions. If these OS functions can be related certain 
memory partitions, the static power consumption could be reduced by powering off those 
partitions related to the unused OS functions. Since the OS and application are likely to locate 
their data in different memory regions, a similar memory behaviour and or usage analysis 
could also be applied to the application data. 
 
Finally, Smart Cards use a memory scrambler that interfaces between the CPU and the data 
memory. The scrambler maps logical memory addresses into random physical ones, where 
logical memory addresses are the ones the CPU is aiming at and physical memory addresses 
are the ones the CPU is actually accessing. The relationship between the physical and logical 
memory can be changed over time, which can make it harder to implement some previously 
stated techniques. One example would be non-uniform partitioning, as with the current 
scrambler, two addresses belonging to the same logic partition could end up in different 
physical partitions. 
 
Although the scrambler is capable of scrambling the whole memory as one unit, a typical 
scrambler implementation approach is to divide the memory into identical sections and 
scramble the addresses within each section. Further security can be achieved by scrambling 
these sections. 
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These aspects are covered in more detail in the section 3 of the report LowLeakageTech1. 
The next case study provides a better inside of the memory usage for different operations and 
how the scrambler can impact on the physical memory usage. 
 
 
4.2.3 Smart Card memory usage case study 
 
When it comes to studying the memory usage of a Smart Card under normal operation 
circumstances, ideally, customers’ OS and applications should be run. However, as previously 
stated, this is not possible. Instead, for this case study in-house developed OS and 
applications were used. The OS, which for confidentially reasons will be referred to as Smart 
Card OS (SCOS), was designed to run on a Smart Card which, again, for confidentiality 
reasons will be referred to as Smart Card Device A (SCD-A). The Smart Card in particular is 
unimportant for this test, as the accessed addresses will depend on the OS and applications, 
not the Smart Card. 
 
SCD-A has built-in cryptographic capabilities and comes with 6Kbytes of SRAM memory 
divided into two 3Kbytes memories. Built in 0.18µm technology and powered at 1.8V, each 
memory had a leakage current of 2.1µA and a dynamic power consumption of 17µW/MHz. 
 
The SCOS was statically linked–with fixed size variables and in fixed locations. The memory 
needed by the OS and applications ranged from 512 to 3Kbytes, leaving another 3Kbytes of 
unused memory at all times. Furthermore, taking this device to low power mode would result 
in losing all the SRAM contents but the first 128 bytes. 
 
At first glance, the memory’s leakage current could be approximately halved if one of the two 
3Kbytes memory instances could be powered down. Additional power savings could be 
achieved by dynamically enabling and disabling SRAM partitions according the application’s 
needs. Finally, and considering that setting the device to low power mode results in the loss of 
all but 128 bytes, further power savings could be achieved if all but the first 128 bytes can be 
powered down when the Smart Card is set into low power mode. 
 
Despite this case study only uses a portion of the available memory (50%), and one could 
expect that other OS and applications might have a higher memory usage, this case study is 
still a good indicator of the potential benefits of this technique. 
 
The section 4 of the report LowLeakageTech1 analyses in detail the memory usage of the 
SCOS and SCD-A combo running three different applications: 
• Application 1; basic application protocol data unit (APDU) commands 
• Application 2; Smart Card personalisation 
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• Application 3; several consecutive random number generations 
 
The impact of a scrambler can be appreciated clearly by comparing Figure 4-2 with Figure 
4-3. Figure 4-2 shows the logical memory addresses used by the three applications. Figure 
4-3, in the other hand, shows how these logical addresses are spread across the physical 
memory. In the case of Figure 4-2, the memory distribution is compact and localised, whereas 
in the case of Figure 4-3, the memory is spread by inserting gaps in un-used memory. This 
clearly indicates that the scrambler will impact on the memory partitioning policies for Smart 
Card devices, and that these policies might also have an impact on the scrambler. 
 
 
Figure 4-2 Logical memory usage of different applications. Blue indicates low activity, 
red indicates high activity. 
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Figure 4-3 Physical memory usage of different applications. Logical addresses are 
scrambled. Blue indicates low activity, red indicates high activity. 
 
These figures also show how the memory usage both in spatial and frequency terms vary for 
different applications. Here, the blue colour indicates small amount of accesses. The red 
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4.2.4 A Proposed SRAM Memory Partitioning for Smart Cards 
 
Based on the awareness raised by the previous sections, this section highlights the main 
aspects of the SRAM memory partitioning approach and powering policy for Smart Card 
applications proposed in this research line. The aim of which is saving on the static power 
consumed by the SRAM memory. 
 
The aspects covered here include the partitioning method, the partition size, the powering 




Two partitioning approaches can be suggested. Firstly uniform partitioning. This approach is 
mandated by potential memory usage differences from different customers and applications. 
Also, this partitioning approach would ease the memory scrambling and the scrambler’s 
design. The second option could be non-uniform partitioning. Here though, the bigger 
partition’s size should be a multiple of the smaller one (e.g. 256 and 512 byte partitions). Such 




4.2.4.2  Sizing 
 
Partitioning an already small memory into smaller independent instances has a high area 
overhead. The alternative here is partitioning only the memory array, where the minimum 
partition size is determined by the array’s natural partition. Natural partitions are considered 
those sections of the memory array surrounded by power tracks, just as depicted in Figure 
4-4. 
 
The amount of partitions and their sizes will depend on the total amount of available memory 
and the device’s target application. Each partition will need a control bit to turn it on and off, 
which could be located with the CPU’s special function registers. The more available 
partitions, the more registers are needed to control their state; hence, limiting to a maximum 
of 8 partitions is suggested (one additional special function register). 
 











Figure 4-4 Typical SRAM organization showing natural partitions 
 
Another aspect of partitioning the memory array instead of the whole memory is that, for the 
memory in Figure 4-4, it does not necessarily result in a reduction of the dynamic power, as 
the pre-charge logic still sees the same capacitive load. Some read/write capacitive load 
values can be reduced by embedding the column decoder block into the memory array, as 
shown in Figure 4-5, and isolating the bit-line and bit-line# wires of the north and south 
partitions. Still, even in this case, the capacitive load might not be reduced to its minimum, as 
the sub-arrays could be grouped into several partitions. This case is shown in Figure 4-6, 
where the north sub-array consists of four partitions and the south one consists of two. In this 
scenario, accessing Partition 1 or Partition 6 would result in similar dynamic power 
















Figure 4-5 SRAM divided into two memory arrays 














Figure 4-6 Example of two size partitions 
 
 
4.2.4.3  Powering policy 
 
Ideally a powering policy with three power states would be used: 
• fully powering a partition being accessed; 
• low power partitions with valid data but not being accessed; 
• and, powering off empty partitions 
 
However, partitions in low power mode are potentially susceptible to soft-error injections by 
glitch attacks. Hence, only two possible power states are suggested: 
• Power ON: this mode should be used with all partitions with valid data, whether they 
are being accessed or not. 
• Power OFF: this mode should be used with empty partitions. 
 
Each partition should have its own power ring so that they can be powered independently. 
Work [52] shows that PMOS power gates resulted in 86% energy saving when in standby with 




4.2.4.4  Scrambler 
 
The memory partitioning approach should be reflected on the scrambler circuitry. Logical and 
physical memories should have the same number of partitions and of the same size. The best 
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solution here is having a two tier scrambler, where one tier scrambles the addresses within a 
memory partition, and the other tier scrambles the partition order. Figure 4-7 shows an 
example of how the scrambler could work. Here, the first tier scrambles the partitions’ order, 
and the second tier scrambles the addresses within each partition. In this example all 



























Figure 4-7 Example of a two tier scrambler 
 
 
4.2.5 Potential power savings on SCD-A with a partitioned memory 
and coding considerations 
 
High level programming language compilers for Atmel Smart Cards are developed by third 
party companies. Whilst ideally compilers should take care of the memory management, 
adapting the compilers to accommodate a partitioned memory might be costly and might not 
be guaranteed. 
 
For the case that there is not compiler support, software developers should manage the 
memory power state. Two approaches could be used to control the partitions’ power state: a) 
initialisation only; and b) ad-hoc mode. Initialisation consists of powering off the partitions that 
will not be used under any circumstance. This approach can only be used in the cases where 
there is more memory available than needed, such as in the case study covered before. 
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The SCD-A’s SRAM is made of two 3-Kbyte memory units. When running the SCOS on the 
SCD-A, only less than half the available SRAM memory is used. With the proposed memory 
partitioning approach, all the required memory could be concentrated into a single memory 
unit and power off the non-used memory unit. Based on the power saving figures of [45], the 
proposed partitioning approach could result in saving up to 43% of the 6-Kbyte SRAM’s 
current static power. This power saving figure could be achieved within a few instruction after 
powering up the SCD-A by just commanding the memory power management unit (MPMU) to 
disable or power off the unused memory unit. This is a limited yet simple approach to reduce 
power consumption with a minimal code overhead. 
 
Ad-hoc approach can result in further power reduction by powering memory partitions on or off 
as they are needed. Powering partitions on and off increases the dynamic power consumption 
[62], so this technique should be used with care. The energy cost of powering off a partition 
should be lower than energy cost of keeping it powered on. 
 
Carefully analysing the OS memory usage shows that certain memory blocks could be linked 
to certain functions. Some functions are needed for specific tasks and/or for a determined 
amount of time. After these tasks have been completed, the value of these memory blocks 
can be ignored. Powering off the partitions related to these memory blocks could help further 
reducing the static power consumption. An obvious example is the APDU communication 
buffer. Once an APDU command is received and decoded, if no further access is required to 
the communication buffer until the command has been executed and a replay is being 
constructed, then, the communication buffer could be powered off to save on static power. 
Again, the energy cost of either power state would determine the applicability of this policy. 
 
Another example could be the case of the execution of a routine or function which has a 
considerable need of memory (e.g. a complex arithmetic function). Instead of using the heap, 
a partition could be assigned to this function, so that the partition is powered on just before the 
function begins its execution, and powered off after completing it. For this case, powering the 
partition on and off could be done from within the function. 
 
Yet another method to save energy is when the Smart Card goes into IDLE state, where all 
data in the SRAM is lost except for the lower 128 bytes. With the proposed memory 
partitioning approach, when the Smart Card goes into IDLE state, only the logical partition 0, 
P0L, would remain powered on (automatically controlled by the MPMU). Again, taking the work 
[45] as a reference, this partitioning approach could save up to 86% of the static leakage of 
the periphery logic and up to ((n-1)*86/n)% of the static leakage generated by the partitions, 
where n is the number of partitions. On the SCD-A case, with 8 partitions per 3KB memory 
instantiation (i.e. 16 partitions in total), the partition leakage reduction could be around 80.63% 
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All power saving figures are based on hypothesis and estimations, hence simulations need to 
be run to validate these values. An environment similar to that described in [72] could be used 





It has been shown that memory usage is highly application specific. The effectiveness of 
memory partitioning as a leakage reduction technique, then, depends on the thorough study of 
the memory usage by these and other applications, as well as by understanding how variables 
are used by the OS and applications. The case study has also shown the potential power 
savings by just powering embedded monolithic memories independently. 
 
Also, the pros and cons of this technique have been argued, and possible solutions to the 
different issues here discussed have been presented too. Undertaking such approach will 
have an impact to the whole system and process, starting from the SRAM module itself, the 
Smart Card system, the compiler and even the programming approach. The success of this 
approach is tied to the success at each of these levels. 
 
 
4.2.7 Future work 
 
Atmel’s Memory Group should decide on the feasibility of the proposed partitioning approach 
and the continuation of this research. Also, the memory access analysis could be refined so 
that OS SRAM accesses could be differentiated from application ones. If necessary, additional 
applications could be simulated too. 
 
Finally, if this topic is to be followed, methods for managing the partitions at compile time 
should be investigated, and compiler designers approached to integrate these methods in 
their compilers. 
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4.3 Supply Voltage versus Performance 
 
Supply voltage reduction is being used to minimise the leakage current. Reducing the supply 
voltage of a device, however, also reduces its performance. Applied to SRAMs, the main 
approach aims to reduce the memory’s supply voltage when it is not accessed (idle mode), 
and raising the memory’s supply voltage back to normal when it is being accessed (active 
mode). Accessing the memory in low power mode could reduce the device’s performance, but 
more importantly result in a read/write failure. 
 
Some recent works have solved this memory access limitation and achieved successful read 
and write cycles with SRAMs in low power mode and even at sub-threshold voltage levels [56-
58, 73]. Their key achievement is, undoubtedly, the ability to access the SRAM at such low 
supply voltages without incurring on a read/write failure. 
 
On Atmel Smart Cards, the maximum performance of the SRAMs can be up to double of the 
maximum performance they can be subject to. In other words, these SRAMs can be clocked 
at up-to twice as fast the AVR can be. This raised the question of the feasibility of powering 
the SRAMs constantly to a voltage level below their nominal value in order to reduce the 
leakage current but without losing performance. 
 
The initial analysis of this proposal was made by the Memory Group, as the SRAMs needed to 
be characterised and they already had the right environment to do so. The contributions in this 
work relate to its proposal and the analysis of the Memory Group’s results. The following 
sections highlight the Memory Group’s work and conclusions, followed by my discussion on 
the results and possible future lines of action. 
 
The following sections cover the results obtained by the Memory Group; a discussion on these 
results and the validity of this leakage reduction technique; and the conclusions of this 
research line. Finally, some possible future developments are proposed. Since the simulations 
were carried out by the Memory Group, there are no supporting reports in the Volume II. 
 
 
4.3.1 Results of the simulations carried out by the Memory Group 
 
The Atmel Memory Group carried out some simulations of the critical path of a 3Kx9 SRAM 
typically used in Smart Card devices. The SRAM was modelled on a 0.13µm technology node 
and the simulations where run on the following two corners: 
• Typical parameters at 25C 
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• Worst-case parameters at 125C 
 
The simulations looked at the access time and the read SNM of a SRAM cell for different 
supply voltages, ranging from 0.5V to 1.2V. The relationship between the access time and the 
supply voltage of the 3Kx9 SRAM is shown in Figure 4-8. The SNM variations in relation to the 
supply power are presented in Figure 4-9. 
 
 
Figure 4-8 Simulated SRAM access time vs. supply voltage [12] 
 
In their report, [12], they concluded that these results show a trend in the access time in 
relation to the supply voltage. A key difference between the simulation results and a real 
device, mainly at 0.13µm and below, is the effects that random doping fluctuations have on 
transistor mismatches and threshold voltage variations. These process variations would be 
the limiting factor for the lowest possible supply voltage, not the access time. 
 
Finally, they proposed to run Monte-Carlo simulations with random doping fluctuations. 
However, the transistor models of the technology used for these simulations did not allow this 
feature. 
 






















mos nom, 25C 
mos wcs, 125C 
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Reducing the supply voltage increases the access time and reduces the read SNM. An 
increase of the access time impacts solely on the system’s performance, whereas decreasing 
the SNM impacts on the SRAMs robustness. From data retention and security perspective, 
the latter one is more important that the former one. As the Memory Group report highlighted, 
the SNM can be particularly bad for lower supply voltages and, while this is true, it is also true 
that simulation results depend on the model characterisation. In fact, the use of better models 
was suggested in their report, so that simulations could produce more accurate SNM results. 
This can offset the actually available SNM data in any direction, for good and for bad. 
 
The main limiting factor raised in their report against the proposed leakage reduction 
technique was the process variation. However, SRAM designs capable of running below its 
nominal supply voltage have been presented, [56]. This could imply several things. On the one 
side, that the characterisation model used in these simulations is not accurate enough at 
voltage levels below their theoretical nominal supply voltage. This can result in misleading the 
simulation readings. If this is the case, this would be an issue that needs to be tackled; as with 
each new technology process, low power becomes more and more important, and the use of 
                                                          
3
  Figure generated from the SNM data available in the report [12] 

















mos nom, 25C 
mos wcs, 
125C 
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several power sources could eventually become a standard even for Smart Card devices. 
Hence, the libraries or models should expand their characterisation range. 
 
It could also mean that Atmel’s process variations are too high in comparison to their 
competitors or other commercial processes. Process and foundry changes are out of the 
scope of this research. Hence, this has not been looked further. However, and if this is the 
case, the trade-offs and benefits from developing a tighter process control should be balanced 
out. How does tightening the process affect the yield? How does it benefit the low power 
design? Would it be possible to develop a process focusing on low power or improving current 
ones? 
 
It might also imply the need to develop new SRAM bit cell architectures to improve the read 
SNM at lower voltages. This approach has actually been followed on several works where 
they have powered the SRAM well below their nominal supply power. Some of these works 
have even achieved read and write cycles at sub-threshold voltage. This seems to imply that, 
after all, the leakage reduction technique proposed here might still hold valid for a few 
technology generations to come. 
 
Finally, and in addition to these technology limitations, the implementation costs should also 
be analysed. This leakage reduction technique implies the Smart Card needing two internal 
voltage regulators; one for the SRAM and another one for the rest of the device. Like the main 
voltage regulator, the SRAM voltage regulator should also have built-in glitch detectors. All this 
additional circuitry not only increases the area, but also offsets the power consumption. 
Furthermore, the need for voltage level shifters on the SRAM’s address and data buses would 
increase the memory access time. Hence reducing the SRAM performance and limiting the 






Despite initial simulation results and analysis, that imply the unsuitability of this approach, 
recent papers have shown that it is possible to access SRAM memories when powered at a 
lower voltage level than their nominal value. There are three possible reasons why initial 
simulation results might have induced to think the unsuitability of this approach: a) library 
models not being accurate enough at lower supply voltages; b) Atmel having a technology that 
suffers a relatively high process variation; and c) the need of designing a new SRAM bit cell 
that results in better SNM when powered even at low supply voltage. 
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4.3.4 Future work 
 
Three main lines of action could be considered for future work: a) determine the accuracy 
level of the simulation models when running at low voltage level; b) simulate the memory’s 
critical path modelling process variations; and, c) estimate the implementation costs in terms 
of power and memory access time overhead. 
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4.4 Memory Cell Hardening 
 
As already covered, reducing a SRAM’s supply voltage reduces its performance and SNM, 
and this last parameter determines a memory’s robustness. In the Smart Card business, 
losing out on robustness is not an acceptable trade-off. Some leakage reduction techniques 
have boosted the SNM when in low power mode so that successful read and write operations 
can be achieved even when the memory is in low power mode [57]. The SNM obtained by 
these techniques is, however, still below the 200mV defined by [12] as the minimum safe 
value. 
 
This research line was initiated to: a) evaluate how different leakage reduction techniques 
would respond to attacks Smart Cards can be subjected to; and b) determine how a custom 
SRAM bit cell impacts the memory's robustness. The first part would use a test-chip 
developed by the Atmel Memory Group, 01HLB. Unfortunately, constant delays in 
manufacturing another test-chip needed for the test, the 01VGA, and later issues with the test 
setup impeded the evaluation of the different leakage reduction techniques instantiated in 
01HLB. 
 
The following subsections provide a better idea of what was achieved and what was intended 
to be achieved in this research. The first subsection covers the custom SRAM bit cells and 
their simulated SNM for different supply voltage levels. The next subsection discusses the 
tests intended to be run on the SRAM memories with leakage reduction techniques 
instantiated in the 01HLB test chip. Finally the future lines of action are laid-out. There are no 
supporting reports in the Volume II. 
 
 
4.4.1 Custom SRAM bit cell design and simulation results 
 
Custom cell bits were designed, all revolving around the same principle, increasing the cell's 
hysteresis as an approach to minimise undesired flips and increasing the SNM. These custom 
SRAM cells were based on Schmitt triggers instead of standard inverters as Schmitt triggers 
have build-in hysteresis, which in theory should harden the cells against undesired bit flips. 
Four designs where instantiated in total: 
• Standard cell, a standard 6 transistor cell, such as the one depicted in Figure 4-10, 
was instantiated for comparison purposes. 
• Schmitt half, Figure 4-11, where partial Schmitt triggers were used instead of 
inverters. 
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• Schmitt half sf weak feedback, same as the previous one but with a weakened 
feedback. 
















Figure 4-12 Schmitt inverter based memory cell 
 
Simulations were run to calculate the read SNM of each of these four memory cells. These 
results are collected in Table 4-1. Graphical representations of the SNM for the standard cell 
and the Schmitt 2 cell for Vdd supplies of 1.6v and 0.7v are shown in Figure 4-13. 
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Table 4-1 SNM of different bit cell designs for different Vdd values 
Vdd SRAM cell type 
1.6v 0.8v 0.7v 0.4v 0.2v 0.1v 
Standard 0.3159v 0.1795v 0.1505v 0.0753v 0.0291 0.0042v
Schmitt half 0.5087v 0.2371v 0.2047v 0.1032v 0.0358v 0.0027v
Schmitt half sf weak 
feedback 
0.5001v 0.2485v 0.2151v 0.1135v 0.0418v 0.0029v
Schmitt 2 0.5138v 0.2416v 0.2034v 0.1019v 0.0334v 0.00082v
 
Figure 4-13 a) and b) show the standard memory’s SNM when Vdd is set to 1.6v and 0.7v 
respectively. Figure 4-13 c) and d) show the Schmitt 2 memory’s SNM when, again, Vdd is set 
to 1.6v and 0.7v respectively. 
 
Simulation results show how custom SRAM bit cells provide a better SNM than the standard 
one. Taking 200mv as the absolute lower limit [12], standard cells would struggle when Vdd 
goes to half the nominal supply voltage, whereas custom cells could achieve supply voltage 
lower than half the nominal one. This can also be seen in the SNM diagrams in Figure 4-13, 
where the custom cell has a higher switching point than standard one. 
 
The use of Schmitt inverters for the custom SRAM cell has resulted in increasing the SNM. 
However, there are other aspects where an SRAM has to excel on too; these are area and 
power consumption. Schmitt inverters are bigger than normal ones, and hence, the custom 
SRAM cells using in these simulation are also bigger than a standard one. The custom SRAM 
cells' sizes are 10 and 14 transistors, whereas standard cell's are made of 6 transistors. 
 
The current consumption for the custom cells was not measured. However, it is well known 
that Schmitt inverters can be leaky when the input value gets close to the switching point. 
From the SRAM's point of view, when the value of a bit cell is to be changed, the bit cell inputs 
would be set to voltage values close to Vdd and GND and away from the switching point. 
Hence, the hysteresis of the Schmitt inverters might not affect the write access, yet hardening 
it against undesired flips. 
 
However, if the cell inputs are set to values close to the switching point, the leakage reduction 
achieved by any other technique could be offset by the leakage added by this memory cell. 
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Figure 4-13 SNM graphs for different SRAM bit cell structures and supply voltages:     
a) SNM of a standard bit cell powered at 1.6V; b) SNM of a standard bit cell powered at 
0.7V; c) SNM of a Schmitt half sf weak bit cell powered at 1.6v; and d) SNM of a Schmitt 
half sf weak bit cell powered at 0.7v 
 
 
4.4.2 Silicon Test Methodology 
 
The Memory Group designed a test-chip, 01HLB, which instantiated six different 64KByte 
memory, one standard and five with different leakage reduction techniques .These memories 
were evaluated by the Memory Group for behaviour and power consumption. However, their 
robustness when subjected to typical Smart Card attacks was not tested. In fact there is no 
available data regarding the behaviour of standard Smart Card SRAM’s when subjected to 
glitch attacks either. Hence, the standard SRAM instantiation in 01HLB would be tested 
against glitch attacks too and used as a reference or benchmark. In order to consider any of 
these leakage techniques valid for Smart Card applications, they should produce similar 
results to the standard SRAM. 
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A Smart Card emulation environment was setup to evaluate the robustness of these 
memories, Figure 4-14. The PC configured the pulse generator to apply different glitches. It 
also communicated with the FPGA to perform the tests and trigger the glitches. Two different 
Smart Card voltage regulators were setup, one designed for GSM applications and another 
one used for more secure applications. 
 
 
Figure 4-14 Diagram of the SRAM robustness test setup 
 
This setup aimed at characterising each memory’s behaviour when subjected to a series of 
glitches. Three test scenarios were considered: a) applying glitches while holding data (i.e. not 
accessing the SRAM); b) applying glitches while writing data to the memory; and c) applying 
glitches while reading data from the memory. All SRAMs were to be tested at nominal Vdd 
when running read and write tests. When running hold test, low leakage techniques would be 
used where applicable. 
 
However, a printed circuit board (PCB) layout mistake first and a communication failure later 
between the FPGA and the SRAMs did not allow carrying the intended tests. Several basic 
access tests were performed, on all SRAMs and three 01HLB dies. These tests consisted of 
writing data to the memory and reading it back. Read operations produced erroneous data. A 
lack of time did not allow diagnosing the source of the communication error and completing 
the intended tests. 
 
The PCB layout mistake was fixed with the design of an adaptor for the 01HLB. The FPGA 
communicated with the SRAMs through some level shifters. Either the 01HLB test chips and 
or the level shifters might have been affected by the initial layout error. 
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4.4.3 Conclusions 
 
An SRAM bit cell's SNM can be improved by adding elements of hysteresis to its design. 
However, the increase of area and potential offset of the reduced leakage consumption could 
make it an unlikely approach to be used in real designs. 
 
 
4.4.4 Future work 
 
The issue or fault in the test environment should be fixed to test the SRAM leakage reduction 
techniques’ robustness against typical attacks Smart Cards are subjected to. The results 
obtained from these tests will determine the real need for more robust SRAM designs for 
secure and low power applications such as Smart Cards. These results will also determine 
what steps would follow this research line, which could be for example, improving the SRAM 
cell or looking for error detection and correction techniques. 
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5 Re-configurable Instruction Set CPU for Smart 
Cards 
 
Smart Cards typically use a secured version of commercially available CPUs (e.g. AVR, 
8051), whose instruction set could be adapted to include a few Smart Card specific 
instructions. The main advantages of using such CPUs include the programmer’s prior 
knowledge of the instruction set and the minimal impact on existing programming tools. This 
approach reduces Smart Card software application development times and, ultimately, the 
time to market. 
 
Paradoxically, using a CPU with a publicly known instruction set can introduce a degree of 
weakness, as in the event of the program code (opcode) is leaked, anyone could understand 
it. This includes hackers and crackers. Another potential weakness comes from using power 
analysis techniques to identify instructions being executed [3] or even to guess the value of an 
operand [4]. Reconstructing the program code by monitoring instructions’ current signature 
can be a daunting task, and perhaps even not possible. However, these techniques can still 
be used to guess the executed instructions in certain critical circumstances. 
 
One alternative to harden the program code interpretation and power analysis is using an 
application specific or a non-commercial CPU, which instruction set is kept in secret. 
However, the security level provided by this alternative depends on the instruction set’s 
secrecy; and leaking it would jeopardise all the devices using the same or derivative CPUs. 
Hence, technically speaking, the added security provided by this approach is arguable. 
 
Another hardening alternative is using a CPU with a re-configurable instruction set. Such CPU 
would allow mapping a given opcode to different instructions, hence, hardening the program 
code interpretations and, potentially, current signature too. This alternative, however, would 
require new, appropriate, development tools and developers familiarising with the architecture. 
These drawbacks are harder to overcome when marketing such devices for first time. 
 
Atmel proposed in [74] a re-configurable instruction set architecture targeted at the AVR CPU 
and capable of executing two instructions in parallel. Their approach hardens the opcode 
interpretation and current signature analysis. The current work proposes an improvement to 
Atmel’s re-configurable AVR, an additional instruction de-standardisation technique and a 
new, hidden, instruction. 
 
This chapter is divided as follows: section 5.1 covers the need for reconfigurable instruction 
set processors (RISPs) and Atmel’s approach to re-configurable CPU. Section 5.2 collects the 
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improvement, the instruction de-standardisation technique and the instruction proposed in this 
work. Section 5.3 analyses the impacts and feasibility of de-standardising a CPU and section 
5.6 draws the final conclusions on re-configurable CPUs. 
 
This research line was initiated and dropped by Atmel’s Marketing Department. Due to the 
short period of time this research line was active, only few de-standardisation techniques were 
proposed, one of which is Atmel’s re-configurable instruction set architecture introduced 
above. No proposal was ever instantiated nor simulated. Due to Atmel’s lack of interest on 
pursuing this research line, there are no future work proposals. 
 
The outcome of this research line is a single report which content is presented in this chapter 
in almost all its integrity. Sections of this report with little relevance such as the proposal 
discussed in the section 5.2.2 have been summarised. Volume II does not include any 
supporting report for this research line. 
 
 
5.1 Literature Review 
 
Generic CPUs have a fixed, standard, instruction set that allows them executing a set of 
instructions of limited complexity. Performing certain complex or application specific functions 
with these CPUs would require the execution of several instructions. In some cases, RISPs 
are used to increase the CPU’s overall performance [75]. Unlike generic CPUs, RISPs can 
adapt their instruction set to execute not only typical branch, arithmetic and data transfer 
instructions, but also complex or application specific instructions or functions. Hence, needing 
fewer instructions and increasing the performance. 
 
The re-configurability level of a RISP depends on its architecture. Typical RISPs have a limited 
re-configurability level, which is achieved by adding a number of re-configurable functional 
units (RFUs) to a fixed instruction set CPU, as shown in Figure 5-1 [75]. In this architecture, 
the CPU’s standard instruction set is extended with a re-configurable one. That is, for any 
instruction set configuration, the CPU’s original instruction set remains unmodified. This 
architecture’s aim is to increase the CPU’s overall performance. 
 
From the security standpoint, expanding the CPU’s standard instruction set only helps 
hardening the code interpretation partially. Partially, as the standard instruction set is not 
modified and can still be interpreted. To really harden a RISP against opcode interpretation, 
the different instruction set configurations should also change the CPU’s standard instruction 
set. This can be achieved by making the instruction decoder block (IDB) re-configurable, as 
shown in Figure 5-2. 
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Figure 5-2 Diagram of a RISP with a re-configurable instruction decoder block 
 
A RIDB enables not only creating new instructions, but also defining different opcodes for the 
same instruction at different memory locations, i.e. different contexts. Hence, it hardens the 
opcode interpretation. It also brings some interesting challenges to the programming approach 
and software development tools, covered in the discussion section. 
 
The IDB is an essential part of the CPU and part of the sequential process of executing an 
instruction. Making it re-configurable would hence impact on the CPU’s behaviour. In a one-off 
configuration or single context setup, where the whole program code shares the same RIDB 
configuration, such an IDB would delay the CPU’s power-up process to allow the RIDB to be 
configured. On a dynamically re-configurable scenario, however, where different memory 
regions use different contexts (i.e. different RIDB configurations), re-configuring the RIDB 
could result in halting the CPU for the duration of the configuration process, which would 
impact on the CPU’s performance and make the program execution less deterministic. 
 
There are the costs associated to the configuration level. The cost of creating a fully re-
configurable RIDB can be too high for most applications. On one hand are the hardware 
costs. A higher configuration level requires more area and power consumption. It also 
increases the configuration file size. On the other hand are the actual RIDB configuration 
costs, as whatever the instruction set configuration, basic branch, arithmetic and data transfer 
instructions will be needed. On a dynamically reconfigurable RISP, this could mean 
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reconfiguring or re-mapping several times the same instruction. Furthermore, basic 
instructions’ configuration data could be duplicated on different configuration files, taking even 
more space needlessly. 
 
Atmel proposed in [74] an architecture that tackles these two issues, the re-configurable dual 
instruction set architecture (ReDISA). The next section covers Atmel’s ReDISA. 
 
 
5.1.1 Re-configurable dual instruction set architecture 
 
Atmel’s solution to the context switching issue was the ReDISA, shown in Figure 5-3, where a 
standard IDB (SIDB) is coupled with a re-configurable one. The architecture in Figure 5-3 
allows switching between code compiled with the AVR standard instruction set and code 
compiled with a non-standard or re-configurable one without halting the CPU. Hence, allowing 


















Figure 5-3 Diagram block of the approach proposed by Atmel 
 
With this architecture, the AVR SIDB is operational at all times, this is, it decodes all 
instructions read from the program memory and asserts the corresponding flag to execute it. 
The RIBD, on the other hand, is enabled or disabled as required and it can be configured to 
produce interpretations of a given opcode different to the standard one. The glue logic in this 
architecture allows both IDBs driving concurrently the instruction flags. 
 
Since the SIDB and the RIDB can have different interpretations of the same opcode, enabling 
the RIDB results in executing a re-configurable non-standard instruction set where two 
instructions can be executed in parallel. Disabling the RIDB results in executing the standard 
instruction set and allowing the RIDB being configured. This feature is what allows the CPU to 
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process instructions while configuring the RIDB. The instruction decoded by the SIDB is 
referred to as the primary instruction. The instruction decoded by the RIDB is referred to as 
the secondary instruction. 
 
Atmel’s ReDISA would, hence, not only solve the context switching issue, but it would also 
harden the program code interpretation, as a hacker gaining access to the program code 
could easily interpret the primary instructions but would miss on the secondary ones. 
Furthermore, since two different instructions are executed concurrently, this architecture 
would harden the current signature analysis too. 
 
However, if the impact on the CPU core is to be minimised, only instructions that use different 
resources should be paired to run concurrently, e.g. data transfer instructions with branch 
instruction but not data transfer and arithmetic ones. Following are some code examples with 
parallel instructions, where secondary instructions are in square brackets: 
 
Hidden update on a routine 
 -- 
 rjmp somewhere [bset C] 
somewhere: 
 adc r0, r1 
 
Loading a value from the SRAM 
my_routine: 
 -- 
 xor r3, r4 
 st z, r3 
 clr r3 
 ret [ld r3, z] 
 
Hidden move instructions 
 -- 
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A simple example program using some secondary instructions (note: 
setting of parameters for secondary instruction has been omitted): 
 ldi r16, $(HIGH_ADDRESS) ; 
 ldi r17, $(LOW_ADDRESS)  ; 
 ldi r18, $05             ; 








 rjmp step3 [mov r0, r18] ; 
 -- 
step3: 
 ldi r16, $00             ; 
 ldi r17, $07             ; 
step4: 
 cpi r0, $00              ; 
 breq cont [bset C]       ; 
                          ; 
 add r16, r17             ; 
 rjmp step4 [subi r0, $01]; 
cont: 
 adc r3, r16              ; 
 jmp somewhere [st Z, r3] ; 
                          ; 
somewhere: 
 
What a hacker would see from the code on the left (note: darker grey 
colour indicates instructions with hidden secondary instructions): 
 ldi r16, $(HIGH_ADDRESS) ; 
 ldi r17, $(LOW_ADDRESS)  ; 
 ldi r18, $05             ; 








 rjmp step3               ; 
 -- 
step3: 
 ldi r16, $00             ; 
 ldi r17, $07             ; 
step4: 
 cpi r0, $00              ; 
 breq cont                ; 
                          ; 
 add r16, r17             ; 
 rjmp step4               ; 
cont: 
 adc r3, r16              ; 
 jmp somewhere            ; 
                          ; 
somewhere: 
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5.2 Proposed CPU de-standardisation techniques in this 
work 
 
Three different AVR de-standardisation techniques were proposed in this research line. The 
first one is an improvement to Atmel’s proposed dual-instruction set architecture [74]. The 
next two techniques explore other AVR de-standardisation methods, one by making use of 




5.2.1 Improving Atmel’s dual instruction architecture 
 
According to Atmel’s ReDISA’s instruction pairing requirements [74], the AVR’s branch 
instructions can be paired with all other instruction types; instructions that manipulate the 
STATUS register, instructions that use the file register, and bit instructions. The usage of 
conditional branch instructions are common to all programs, they determine which action 
should be taken when a given condition is met and which when the condition is not met. A 








AVR assembler code: 
 .. 
 cpi r0, $50;       $50=80 decimal 
 brne else; 
 mov r1, r2; 
 rjmp cont: 
else: 




A conditional branch would, usually, be followed by different instructions depending on 
whether the prior condition was met or not. However, when pairing two instructions with 
Atmel’s current ReDISA, executing the primary instruction will always result in executing the 
secondary one. In other words, the follow up instruction would be the same regardless of the 
branch condition. 
 
One approach of executing different follow up instructions depending on the branch condition 
is to enable two different secondary instructions, where the actual secondary instruction to be 
executed would be determined by the branch condition. The assembler code below illustrates 
the AVR if-else assembler code when using one secondary or two secondary instructions. 
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AVR assembler code: 1 secondary 
 cpi r0, $50; 
 brne cont [mov r1, r3]; 
 mov r1, r2; 
cont: 
 .. 
AVR assembler code: 2 secondary 
 cpi r0, $50; 




In the case of one secondary instruction (left), the secondary instruction paired or associated 
to the branch instruction (mov r1, r3) will be executed regardless of the branch condition. On 
the case of two secondary instructions (right), if the branch condition is met, the first 
secondary instruction (mov r1, r3) will be executed. However, if the condition is not met, then, 
the second secondary instruction (mov r1, r2) will be executed. 
 
Here is another example where having two secondary instructions might be useful. On this 
example, the instruction inc r19 would be executed if the condition is met and mov r3, r2 
when the condition is not met. 
 ldi r19, $0 
loop: 
 add r1, r0 
 sub r2, r1 
 cpi r19, 9 
 brne loop [inc r19] [mov r3, r2] 
 
In order to enable two secondary instructions, the RIDB should assert two instruction flags 
instead of one; one flag per secondary instructions. Additional logic would then determine the 
actual secondary instruction to be executed depending on whether a given condition has been 
met or not. Figure 5-4 shows an implementation that allows pairing two secondary instructions 
to a primary one. 
 
This design is made of two parts, a shared condition checking circuitry and the circuitry for 
each individual secondary instruction. The condition source in this case is the STATUS 
register, although other sources could be used too. The STATUS register would enable 
pairing conditional branch instructions with two secondary instructions and selecting between 
them depending on whether the branch condition has been met or not. Instruction bits 0, 1 
and 2 define the particular STATUS bit to be checked, whereas bit 10 defines its polarity.  
 
The individual instruction circuitry shown here allows enabling or disabling each secondary 
instruction and, if enabled, setting it as the first or second secondary instruction. When 
disabled, the primary instruction would be paired with only one secondary instruction (either 
first or second secondary instruction), which will be executed only and only if, the condition 
has been met, or vice versa, if the condition has not been met. This property can be exploited 
if the RIDB is configured to flag a single secondary instruction at a time instead of two.























































































































































































Figure 5-4 Implementation example for two secondary instructions 
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A block diagram of Atmel’s ReDISA enabled for two secondary instructions is shown in Figure 
5-5. Here the AND gates of the individual logic have been moved to the glue logic area. Table 
5-1 shows the impact that two secondary instructions feature might have on power, area and 
performance when instantiating it on 150nm technology node. These are simulation results. 
Due to the lack of information on the RIDB instantiation costs, the information shown in Table 
5-1 refers to the instantiation cost of the shared logic, the individual logic and the glue logic in 
Figure 5-5. For comparison purposes, this instantiation cost is compared with the SIDB. 
 
The performance of the ReDISA will be determined by the instruction decode time. In the best 
case scenario, the RIDB delay will be lower than the SIDB delay, ‘Performance min’ in Table 
5-1. In the worst case scenario, the RIDB delay will be higher than the SIDB delay, 
‘Performance max’ in Table 5-1. In any case, maximum delay of the design in Figure 5-4 is 

























Figure 5-5 Atmel's ReDISA enabled for two secondary instructions 
 
Table 5-1 Implementation costs of two secondary instructions 
Parameter Value Unit Relative to SIDB (%) 




tRIDB + tAND + tOR 




tSIDB + tOR 
(6.56 + 0.2) ns 3.05
1
 
Static Power 71.89 pW 14.23 
Dynamic Power 441.8 uW 25 
tRIDB longest RIDB decode delay (unknown) 
tSIDB longest SIDB decode delay 
tAND AND gate delay 
tOR OR gate delay 
1. Overall, this additional instruction decode delay would reduce the CPU’s maximum clock frequency in 
between 0Hz to 500Hz. 
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5.2.2 Mapping valid instructions with non-valid ones 
 
CPUs only use a limited number of all the possible opcode combinations allowed by their 
instruction word, where the used opcodes are referred to as valid (or legal) opcode and 
unused ones are referred to as non-valid (or illegal) opcode. Under normal circumstances, 
when an instruction decoder block reads an illegal opcode, it could either ignore it or trigger an 
illegal instruction violation alarm. 
 
The second de-standardisation technique covered in this work proposed disguising the 
execution of legal opcode under a set of illegal ones. By storing illegal opcode in the program 
memory and providing the CPU with a mechanism to convert illegal opcode back into a legal 
one, this de-standardisation technique could harden the program code against code analysis. 
 
This technique would not alter legal instructions in any way, keeping their interpretation true at 
all times. In fact, disguised or mapped instructions could be executed in either their original, 
legal, form or their mapped, illegal form. In other words, it allows the use of legal and illegal 
opcodes when desired rather than forcing its usage. 
 
As well as previous de-standardisation techniques, this one could also be designed to be 
enabled or disabled as required; so that attempting to execute a non-valid opcode when this 
feature is disabled results in the response expected on the standard CPU. 
 
The conversion between mapped instructions could be achieved with a look-up table (LUT) or 
any other circuit designed for that purpose. Figure 5-6 shows an approach suggested in this 
proposal. It uses a 16-combination LUT, which allows mapping up to 16 different legal 
opcodes with illegal ones; the odd opcode values between $0001 and $001F on this case. 
When enabled, this design would allow mapping the illegal opcodes with legal ones and 
executing the later. When disabled, all illegal opcodes would bypass the mapping logic and 




























Figure 5-6 Block diagram example 
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This design has not been instantiated nor simulated, so there is no data on its impact on area, 
power and performance. 
 
 
5.2.3 Enabling indirect data memory addressing with variable 
displacement 
 
The AVR’s current instruction set allows 5 modes of accessing the external data memory [76]. 
These modes are: data direct; data indirect; data indirect with post-increment; data indirect 
with pre-decrement; and data indirect with displacement. Data direct addressing mode 
embeds the target address as the operand value of the instruction; hence, the same opcode 
would always access the same data from any location in the program memory. This 
addressing mode can only be used for global static variables, where their location is 
predetermined. 
 
Indirect addressing modes, on the other hand, use special function registers (pointer 
registers) to generate the base of the target address. For data indirect addressing mode, the 
target address is the value stored in the pointer register. This addressing mode allows 
accessing not only the global static variables, but also the non-static ones. The target address 
of the data indirect approach with post-increment addressing mode is, again, the value stored 
in the pointer register. After accessing the data, though, the pointer value (i.e. the base 
address) is incremented by one. This addressing mode can be very useful when working with 
arrays or a list of variables need to be accessed on a sequential mode. Data indirect with pre-
decrement addressing mode works in a similar way to the last one. Here, though, the base 
address is decremented by one before using it as the target address. The pointer register is 
updated with the target address for future use. Like with the previous case, this addressing 
mode is very handy to access arrays or a list of sequential variables. 
 
The last addressing mode currently available in the AVR instruction set is data indirect with 
displacement. Again, this addressing mode uses a pointer register as the base address. The 
actual target address, though, is generated by adding an offset value to the base address. The 
offset value is embedded into the opcode (i.e. it is fixed) and the pointer value, or base 
address, is not altered by this addressing mode. This addressing mode could be useful for 
accessing the nth element of different arrays or metadata variables, e.g. the header of a file. 
 
The next logical addressing mode, but not implemented in the AVR instruction set, would be 
data indirect with variable displacement. Such addressing mode, used in older CPUs such as 
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the 8086 based indexed addressing modes4, would allow generating the target address by a 
combination of the base address and an offset register. This addressing mode could be used 
in ‘for loop’ operations, where the loop index value can be used as the offset value. With the 
current addressing modes pre-decrement and post-increment modes are the more likely ones 
to be used in ‘for loops’. This is the addressing mode proposed as an additional CPU de-
standardisation technique. 
 
Instantiating another addressing mode would help hiding or obscuring external data access for 
as long as the attacker is not aware of the new addressing mode or its implementation. The 
main aspects to take into account when instantiating this new addressing mode are: 
• defining an opcode, using a new opcode versus sharing a currently available one 
(i.e. enabling two interpretations of a current opcode); 
• defining the possible base pointer registers, the AVR has three pointer registers, 
X, Y and Z. All indirect addressing modes, except for indirect data with displacement, 
can use any of them as a base address. Indirect data with displacement can only use 
Y and Z; and 
• defining the possible offset registers, using fixed register(s) versus any register in 
the CPU File Register. 
 
Several implementation approaches were studied covering the three points above. The main 
emphasis was related to minimising the impact on the current CPU architecture and blocks. 
The conclusion of this study was to: 
a) share a valid opcode between a valid, original, instruction and the data indirect with 
variable displacement instruction. Due to the similarity of this instruction and the data 
indirect with fixed displacement, using the later instruction’s opcode was proposed. 
Switching between opcode interpretations would be achieved by the use of an I/O 
register, which could be accessed only from a given program memory range; 
b) use only Y and Z pointer registers, since data indirect with fixed displacement only 
uses them too, and enabling the use of register X would require a change to the 
instruction decoder block when using the non standard interpretation of the opcode; 
and 
c) three offset value storage scenarios, which are covered next. 
 
All three scenarios will impact on the CPU’s Register File, as an additional read port will be 
needed to enable the variable displacement. The impact level will however vary for each 
scenario. The first one, diagram shown in Figure 5-7, uses a fixed register as the offset 
register. This is the scenario with the lower impact on the CPU in general and the Register 
File, as only the output of one register would have to be routed to the address generator logic. 
                                                          
4
  mov     al, [bx][si] move into al the value of the memory location pointed by bx + si. 
 


























Figure 5-7 Diagram of the fixed offset register scenario 
 
When the original opcode interpretation is enabled (i.e. fixed displacement), the displacement 
multiplexor would feed the opcode’s ‘q’ field into the address generator logic. When enabling 
the variable displacement interpretation, the displacement multiplexor would feed the offset 
register’s value into the address generator logic. 
 
The second scenario, diagram shown in Figure 5-8, uses a fixed offset register per pointer. 
This scenario would need an additional output from the Register File. The instruction bit 3 
would select the offset register to feed the address generator logic, since this is the bit that 





























Figure 5-8 Scenario with an offset value register per pointer register 
 
The third and final scenario, diagram shown in Figure 5-9, uses the ‘q’ displacement value as 
a selector to a series of offset registers. The more offset registers are enabled, the more ‘q’ 
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bits and Register File outputs would be needed. Out of the presented three scenarios, this one 
would have the greatest impact to the Register File, but it would also be the more flexible one 
and, by allowing the use of several offset registers, potentially the one that hardens the code 






























Figure 5-9 Scenario with several offset register selected with 'q' displacement value 
 




The proposed CPU de-standardisation techniques will enhance the CPU’s security as long as 
they harden the opcode interpretation and power signature analysis. Hiding or obscuring the 
execution of an instruction by executing two instructions in parallel or, by executing an 
instruction under a different one’s opcode could lead hardening the opcode interpretation. This 
is, if the attacker has access only to the mnemonic or the assembler code. Code written with 
higher level languages, such C or Java, would not be affected by these techniques, making 
the code understandable. 
 
However, even with access to only the opcode, there might be usage conditions of these 
features that could highlight their existence to an attacker and provide information of how to 
enable or disable them. Hence, the implementation of these techniques and the mechanisms 
to enable and disable them should be carefully studied and designed by the Smart Card 
manufacturer. Likewise, the use of these techniques should be carefully planned by the Smart 
Card vendors too. 
 
Storing the de-standardisation configuration data, e.g. the ReDISA configuration data, into a 
memory location only accessible by a configuration unit, not even the CPU, could help 
securing the implementation of the de-standardisation techniques, as even on the event of an 
attacker knowing the presence of a given de-standardisation technique, the data required to 
fully interpret code would be non-accessible to him or her. 
 
Executing two instructions concurrently would, in principle, result in a current signature 
different to each instruction’s current signature, but most likely different to the sum of both 
current signatures too. This difference could be the result of two factors: a) the additional 
required logic to enable parallel execution; and b) both instructions sharing the decode stage 
and operand values. 
 
Executing an instruction under another opcode, however, might not provide any security 
enhancement, as some key power consumption patterns might still remain identifiable to an 
attacker. 
 
The Marketing Department’s early decision to terminate this research did not allow for an in 
depth research of the AVR de-standardisation techniques. However, from the above analysis, 
parallel execution of instructions and the additional memory addressing modes are the only 
de-standardisation techniques that could be considered fit to investigate further. 
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As per the above analysis, the two secondary instructions technique would have a 
considerable impact on the power consumption waveform when this technique is used. 
However, it would have a considerable impact on the IDB in terms of area (16%) and power 
(25%). Its impact to performance in relation to the ReDISA, in the other hand, would be 
negligible or none at all. 
 
The impact to the current signature of the variable displacement addressing mode would be, 
however, limited and highly dependant on the chosen implementation, as the only hardware 
difference between the original setup and those shown in Figure 5-7 to Figure 5-9 is the 
addition of one or two multiplexers. The approach shown in Figure 5-7 would be the one with 
less impact to the current signature. In fact, variable displacement and fixed displacement 
instructions with the same r0 and q values respectively could result in almost identical power 
consumption patterns. 
 
However, this similarity could be an advantage, as it would allow an attacker inadvertently 
interpreting original meaning of the opcode. Hence, this new addressing mode could 
potentially be successfully disguised under the current one. 
 
In addition to the security enhancement, there are other aspects to bear in mind that were not 
considered within allowed time-frame. Usability and tools are the main two. 
 
The similarities between variable and fixed displacement addressing modes and the little 
hardware changes required to enable the new addressing mode are an indicator of its 
usability. A simple change of a bit, select in Figure 5-7 to Figure 5-9, is enough to change 
between addressing mode interpretations, virtually allowing the programmer to switch 
between interpretations at any time. 
 
The usability of the ReDISA, on the other hand, is determined by the usefulness of the paired 
instructions and how easy it is to change the context or configuration. The proposed 
architecture is limited to pair together only instructions that use different resources, and in 
some circumstances executing concurrently both paired instructions might not be desired. The 
two-secondary instruction circuitry allows deciding whether executing a secondary instruction 
is desired or not. It could even be altered to introduce more flexibility, however, the higher the 
desired flexibility the higher the circuit complexity. 
 
Another alternative to change the paired instructions is to switch contexts. However, the 
higher the number of contexts, the more memory is required to store the configurations and 
the likelier the context changes would impact the CPU’s overall performance. 
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Yet another feature of the ReDISA that can impact on the usability is the current hardwired 
relationship between the operands of the primary and secondary instructions. Currently, the 
operands of the secondary instruction are determined by the operands of the primary 
instruction. This dependency reduces the techniques flexibility and, hence, its usability. 
 
Regarding tools, a new CPU architecture implies the need of new, tailored, tools such as 
compilers and assemblers. In addition to these needs, and due to the introduced re-
configurability features, the here proposed techniques might impact even the integrated 
development environment (IDE). 
 
C and Java compilers for AVR processors are developed by third parties. Atmel Smart Card 
customers are also likely to use third party IDEs. Adapting these tools to the new architecture 
would require the disclosure of the instantiated techniques to third parties other than the direct 
customers. For this disclosure to be viable, these techniques should be implemented in such 
way that their mere disclosure does not jeopardise the code nor does it provide an attacker 
with any substantial information. 
 
The high dependency on the software development tools might prove to be conclusive on the 
usability of some de-standardisation techniques. 
 




These proposals show that a few hardware changes and additions enable the possibility of 
introducing de-standardisation to commercial CPUs used in Smart Cards, which have the 
potential of improving the CPU’s security against power analysis and opcode interpretation. 
This is especially useful in the scenario where an attacker gets access to the program code, 
either in assembler or binary format, or identifies the execution of critical instructions by 
monitoring the CPU’s power consumption. 
 
Security through obscurity should be avoided. Just as with cryptographic algorithms, where 
the algorithm is public and the cipher text is protected by keeping the encryption/decryption 
key secret, any CPU de-standardisation technique should focus on protecting the re-
configurable instruction set by securing the access to the CPU de-standardisation 
configuration data. So that gaining access to the instantiated CPU de-standardisation 
technique does not compromise the opcode. Out of the presented CPU de-standardisation 
techniques, ReDISA is the only one that could fit into this description. 
 
One major drawback of the re-configurable instruction set is the impact these features can 
have on the software development tools. Since Atmel does not develop these tools itself, the 
right implementation and support of IDEs from third parties might play a critical part on the 
success and marketability of a CPU with the proposed de-standardisation techniques. 
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6 General conclusions and future work 
 
The security level of a system is determined by the security level of its components or parts. A 
weak component could compromise the security of the whole system. In the Smart Card 
context, Smart Cards are a small part of a complex system, which has several sources of 
potential weakness, such as the communication channel between a Smart Card and the 
reader; the hardware; the software; or the end user just to name a few. Even the most secure 
Smart Card can be fooled if the end user carries the PIN number attached to the card. Anyone 
having access to it could easily misuse the card. 
 
Smart Cards are designed to meet the security requirements of their target applications. The 
security of a Smart Card has to be looked at from a holistic point of view to ensure the highest 
levels of security for the Smart Card and its IP. That is, from the hardware perspective, the 
software perspective, taking usage patterns into account and identifying possible 
interdependences of several factors and how they might affect the security. The different 
topics covered in this research help with this. 
 
Simulations are an intrinsic part of the development process of any device and help minimise 
errors and development costs. With Smart Cards, simulations can be beneficial not only for 
behavioural simulations, but also for testing devices and countermeasures against certain 
attacks even before they are manufactured. The two major attacks Smart Cards can be 
subjected to include glitch attack and power analysis. 
 
The GAPASE simulation environment research line covered in Chapter 3 focused on 
providing Atmel with an additional simulation tool to test their designs against these common 
Smart Card attacks. This simulation environment is functional, although the power analysis 
feature needs performance improvements in order to make it usable. The simulation tool 
chosen in this research, Nanosim, might be more restrictive on the maximum possible 
performance than other higher level simulation tools. However, Nanosim is better suited for 
testing layout related countermeasures or dual-rail designs. Several suggestions were made 
to improve the simulation environment’s performance, which included reducing the Nanosim 
simulation resolution and testing gate level simulation tools. 
 
Regarding glitch attacks, a device can be hardened against glitch attacks with an appropriate 
design of voltage regulator. This was demonstrated in the glitch detector research line 
covered in Chapter 3, where different voltage regulator designs had a dramatically different 
response to glitch attacks. However, despite the controlled response of a voltage regulator 
restricting fault injection to the device, glitch detectors are still needed as, these glitches could 
still inject faults in the communication channel. 
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The glitch detector proposed in Chapter 3 has shown how a change on the detection 
approach can result in detecting fast glitches that current detectors were unable to detect. 
Despite the detection speed of the proposed glitch detector can be one order of magnitude 
slower than detectors currently used, it is also a few orders of magnitude faster than data 
transactions between the Smart Card and the terminal or the time taken to update the NVM. 
Avoiding the completion of any of these two tasks after a glitch event is mandatory to avoid 
unrecoverable errors or faults. The current detection times (up to 2µs depending on the 
design) allows aborting these operations. 
 
Security threats could come from unsuspecting sources. Cryptographic algorithms, despite 
being mathematically strong, can be subjected to weaknesses introduced by the technology 
they are implemented in, CMOS in our case. The implementation of these algorithms can be 
hardened by using design techniques such as WDDL or dual-rail. Following this line of 
thought, new design techniques adopted to provide solutions to specific issues, such as 
reducing the static and dynamic power consumption in SRAM memories, should be adopted 
with care as, unless proven otherwise, these could be a source of new weaknesses and, 
hence, threats to Smart Cards. 
 
The research line covered in Chapter 4 aimed at evaluating the impact that certain leakage 
reduction techniques might have on SRAM immunity to glitch attacks. Test setup issues 
prevented us from generating any data in this respect; hence, for the time being, the use of 
leakage reduction techniques that potentially reduce the static noise margin of an SRAM are 
not recommended. This recommendation was reflected in the powering policy suggested for 
the memory partitioning approach proposed for Smart Cards.  
 
The memory partitioning research line covered in Chapter 4 focused on applying to Smart 
Cards this partitioning technique used elsewhere. Other than the partition powering policy 
mentioned above, this research line also minimised the impact on security by proposing a two 
tier scrambler and uniform partitions. This approach allows not only scrambling the data within 
a given partition, but also scrambling the partitions. 
 
Simulation results and data usage analysis demonstrated the potential power saving with a 
partitioned memory. However, the real power savings will be subjected to programming styles 
and how available development tools manage the partitioned memory. 
 
Despite the effort made to secure Smart Cards, the constant evolution of attacks and threats 
makes it impossible to develop a device robust enough against current and forthcoming 
threats. As a result, improving the security of a device is continuous work. 
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Currently, the Smart Card industry seems to be playing a cat and mouse game with hackers, 
leaving to hackers the job of finding new weaknesses and threats and the Smart Card industry 
developing countermeasures to those threats. Smart Card manufacturers should consider 
researching for new threats or weaknesses by themselves, as it would help them to not only 
further the security of their products, but it would also provide them with a competitive 
advantage. The re-configurable logic research line covered in Chapter 5 could be considered 
a step forward in this respect. 
 
A re-configurable instruction set CPU would no doubt harden its opcode interpretation and 
perhaps the simple power analysis too. There are two main challenges for this technique to 
succeed. The first one is its implementation. The same as with cryptographic algorithms, the 
security enhancement brought by this technique should rely on keeping the configuration data 
secret and restricting the access to this configuration data. In other words, making the re-
configurable architecture public should not jeopardise the use of this technique. 
 
The other main challenge key for the success of this technique is highly tied to the availability 
of software development tools that support the re-configurable instruction set feature. These 
tools are developed by third party companies, hence, all the more reason for this security 
technique not to rely on keeping it secret. 
 
Finally, the same way as IC manufacturers can use a Reuse Methodology Manual (RMM) to 
support them on the IC development process, security companies and Smart Card 
manufacturers could benefit from a Security Methodology Manual (SMM). Even if such a 
manual is company dependent and access is limited to a number of employees, it could 
provide guidelines on the best security practices, countermeasure implementations and help 
cross-referencing security dependencies. 
 
The SMM could include recommendations that go beyond the purely hardware focus of this 
research and take a more holistic approach by including techniques for securing data 
transactions and the software. Ultimately, it could have the potential to fast track the adoption 
of new design techniques and technologies, such as low power memory. The Open Source 
Security Test Methodology Manual (OSSTMM) published by the Institute for Security and 
Open Methodologies (ISECOM) [77] could be a starting point or a reference for the SMM. The 
lessons learned with this research and the general knowledge of the Security Group could 
also be included in the SMM. 
 
Atmel could take this research forward with the following proposed future actions: 
• Atmel should consider putting together an SMM which summarises all their current 
knowledge and expertise on security approaches and techniques. With time, this 
manual or reference could cross-reference security dependencies. 
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• For practical reasons, power analysis based on RTL simulations should be 
considered. A behavioural level simulation environment (RTL) might not be as 
accurate as transistor level one (Nanosim), but it will have a faster run time. For 
further accuracy, RTL simulations could be run with gate delay information. The 
power consumption resulting from each gate switching or the amount of total gate 
switches per time unit could then be used to generate the power trace to be analysed 
with DPA. 
• Improve the glitch detector. Study the use of faster operational amplifiers to achieve 
faster detection. Other design alterations could achieve a bigger detection range. 
• Test the glitch detector against negative glitches and glitches on the ground 
rail. Tests whether the current design provides additional protection in these 
circumstances too, even when using a secure voltage regulator. 
• Study the actual need of using radiation/laser hardened registers. The SERT 
SEU immune cell has proved to be robust against laser attacks. Consider using it or a 
custom hardened register to protect key registers of the Smart Card. 
• ELT transistors as a laser countermeasure. A number of close ELT transistors 
around a fixed value register could be used as an enhanced laser detector. For 
certain spot sizes and energy levels, surrounding the fixed value register with ELT 
transistors will make it more sensitive to lasers, resulting in better detector. 
• Analyse the proposed memory partitioning technique’s worthiness for 
production devices. The proposed memory partitioning approach should be 
implemented on silicon and tested for effective leakage reduction. The impact on 
development tools should be analysed further. This partitioning approach could be 
expanded to other commercial AVR microcontrollers. Doing so, could help the 
development of libraries and development tools required to exploit the benefits of this 
feature. 
• Test the leakage reduction techniques’ sensitivity to Smart Card threats such 
as glitch attacks. This was originally intended in this research but not achieved due 
to issues with the test setup. 
 
 




1. S. Burns, and G.R.S. Weir, “Trends in Smartcard Fraud”, in Proceedings 4th 
International Conference in Global E-Security, CCIS12, Springer, pp.40-47, 2008 
2. Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, Data Encryption Standard 
(DES), FIPS PUB 46-3. 
3. H. Bar-El, H. Choukri, D. Naccache, M. Tunstall, and C. Whelan, “The Sorcerer’s 
Apprentice Guide to Fault Attacks”, Proceedings of the IEEE, Vol. 92 Issue 2, pp 370-
382, Feb. 2006 
4. J. Courrege, B. Feix, M. Roussellet, “Simple Power Analysis on Exponentiation 
Revisited” in Smart Card Research and Advanced Application, LNCS 6035, Springer-
Verlag, pp. 65-79, 2010 
5. P. Kocher, J. Jaffe, and B. Jun, “Differential Power Analysis” in Advances in 
Cryptology – CRYPTO ’99, LNCS 1666, Springer-Verlag, pp. 388-397, 1999. 
6. Y. Han, X. Zou, Z. Liu and Y. Chen, “Efficient DPA Attacks on AES Hardware 
Implementations” in International Journal in Communications, Network and System 
Sciences, 2008, Vol. 1, pp. 68-73 
7. Origins of Laser Testing for Single-Event Effects. Crosslink, Summer 2003, [cited 
16/05/2005]; Available from: 
http://www.aero.org/publications/crosslink/summer2003/04_sidebar1.html 
8. S.P. Skoroboatov, R.J. Anderson, “Optical Fault Induction Attacks” in Workshop on 
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems – CHES 2002, LNCS 2523, 
Springer-Verlag, pp. 2-12, 2002 
9. T. Kawahara, “Low-voltage embedded RAMs in the nanometer era” in IEEE 
Conference on Electronic Devices and Solid-State Circuits, pp. 333-338, Dec. 2005 
10. Jinhui Chen, L.T. Clark, Tai-Hua Chen, “An Ultra-Low-Power Memory With a 
Subthreshold Power Supply Voltage” in IEEE Journal of Solid-State Circuits, Vol. 41, 
Issue 10, pp. 2344-2353, Oct. 2006 
11. T. Suzuki, Y. Yamagami, I. Hatanaka, A. Shibayama, H. Akamatsu, H. Yamauchi, “A 
sub-0.5-V Operating Embedded SRAM” in IEEE Journal of Solid-State Circuits, Vol. 
41, Issue 1, pp. 152-160, Jan. 2006 
12. S. Léomant, “Simulation Study on supply voltage reduction in SRAM 3Kx9”, Atmel 
Memory Group (Rousset) Internal Report, 2007 
13. E. Vetillard, A. Ferrari, “Combined Attacks and Countermeasures” in Smart Card 
Research and Advanced Application, LNCS 6035, Springer-Verlag, pp. 65-79, 2010 
14. Marker pens, sticky tape crack music CD protection. The Register, [cited 14/05/2002]; 
Available from 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2002/05/14/marker_pens_sticky_tape_crack 
 EngD portfolio – Volume I, A. Goikoetxea Yanci 118 
15. Known Attacks Against Smartcards. Discretix, [cited 08/02/2005]; Available from 
http://www.discretix.com/PDF/Known%20Attacks%20Against%20Smartcards.pdf 
16. K. Rothbart, U. Neffe, Ch. Steger, R. Weiss, E. Rieger, A. Muehlberger, "High Level 
Fault Injection for Attack Simulation in Smart Cards" in Asian Test Symposium, 
pp.118-121, 2004 
17. OSCI Completes First Analog/Mixed-Signal Standard for SystemC-based Design. 
SystemC, [cited 06/12/2010]; Available from 
http://www.systemc.org/news/pr/view?item_key=8a9239a446e452ce040b0f8cfc3fab2
a30d29e75&comp=osci 
18. S. B. Ors, F. Gurkaynak, E. Oswald, B. Preneel, “Power-Analysis Attack on an ASIC 
AES implementation” in Proceedings of the International Conference on Information 
Technology: Coding and Computing, Vol. 2, pp. 546-522, Apr. 2004 
19. K. Tiri and I. Verbauwhede, “Securing Encryption Algorithms against DPA at the Logic 
Level: Next Generation Smart Card Technology” in Workshop on Cryptographic 
Hardware and Embedded Systems – CHES 2003, LNCS 2779, Springer-Verlag, pp. 
125-136, 2003 
20. T. Popp and S. Mangard., “Masked Dual Rail Pre-Charge Logic: DPA Resistance 
without Routing Constraints” in Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded 
Systems – CHES 2005, LNCS 3659, Springer-Verlag, pp. 172–186, 2005 
21. K. Tiri, D. Hwang, A. Hodjat, B.-C. Lai, S. Yang, P. Schaumont, and I. Verbauwhede, 
“Prototype IC with WDDL and Differential Routing—DPA Resistance Assessment” in 
Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems – CHES 2005, LNCS 
3659, Springer-Verlag, pp. 354-365, 2005 
22. Lin, L. Simple power analysis by Hspice - A quick start. [cited 27/02/2006]; Available 
from: http://www-unix.ecs.umass.edu/~llin/lab4report.html 
23. G. Di Natale, M.-L. Flottes, B. Rouzeyre, “An Integrated Validation Environment for 
Differentail Power Analysis” in IEEE International Symposium on Electronic Design, 
Test & Applications (DELTA 2008), pp. 527-532, Jan. 2008 
24. E. Brier, C. Clavier and F. Olivier, “Correlation Power Analysis with a Leakage Model” 
in Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems – CHES 2004, 
LNCS 3156, Springer-Verlag, pp. 135-152, 2004 
25. F. Regazzoni et al., “Evaluating Resistance of MCML Technology to Power Analysis 
Attacks” in Transaction on Computational Science IV, LNCS 5430, Springer-Verlag, 
pp. 230-243, 2009 
26. Frew, L., Informal discussion on glitches, Atmel Smart Card ICs. 2005. 
27. Frew, L., Informal discussion on glitch detectors, Atmel Smart Card ICs. 2006. 
28. E.S. Kim and J.H. Kim, “Voltage glitch detection circuits and methods thereof” in US 
Patent Office, US 2007/0058452 A1 
 EngD portfolio – Volume I, A. Goikoetxea Yanci 119 
29. C.Y. Kim, S.J. Jun, and E.S. Kim, “Voltage-glitch detection device and method for 
securing integrated circuit device from voltage glitch attack” in US Patent Office, US 
7,085,979 B2 
30. S. Crain and R. Koga. Heavy-Ion Testing for Single-Event Effects. Crosslink, Summer 
2003, [cited 16/05/2005]; Available from: 
www.aero.org/publications/crosslink/summer2003/05.html 
31. Humphrey, S., S. LaLumondiere, and S. Moss, Lasers Simulate Space Radiation 
Effects. Crosslink, Winter 2000, [cited 16/05/2005]; Available from 
www.aero.org/publications/crosslink/winter2000/03.html 
32. Huixian Wu and James Cargo, “Backside Failure Analysis and Case Studies for 
Cu/Low k Technology” in Int. Symposium on the Physical Failure Analysis of 
Integrated Circuits (IPFA), pp. 127-134, Jul. 2004 
33. T. Ishii, M. Inoue, N. Asatani, K. Naitoh, J. Mitsuhashi, “Functional Failure Analysis of 
Logic LSIs from Backside of the Chip and Its Verification by Logic Simulation” in Int. 
Symposium on the Physical Failure Analysis of Integrated Circuits (IPFA), pp. 27-32, 
Jul. 1997 
34. Mayer, D.C. and R.C. Lacoe. Designing Integrated Circuits to Withstand Sapce 
Radiation. Crosslink, Summer 2003, [cited 16/05/2005]; Available from: 
www.aero.org/publications/crosslink/summer2003/06.html 
35. D. Wiseman, J. Canaris, S. Whitaker, J. Venbrux, K. Cameron, K. Arave, L. Arave, 
N.M. Liu, K. Liu, “Design and Testing of SEU-SEL Immune Memory and Logic Circuits 
in a Commercial CMOS Process”, in Radiation Effects Data Workshop, pp. 51-55, Jul. 
1993 
36. P. Mongkolkachit and B. Bhuva, “Design Technique for Mitigation of Alpha-Particle-
Induced Single-Event Transients in Combinational Logic” in IEEE Transactions on 
Device and Materials Reliability, Vol. 3, Issue 3, pp. 89-92, Sep. 2003 
37. D.G. Mavis and D.R. Alexander, “Employing Radiation Hardness by Design 
Techniques with Commercial Integrated Circuit Processes” in Digital Avionics 
Systems Conference, Vol. 1, pp. 2.1 15-22, 1997 
38. T. Calin, M. Nicolaidis, and R. Velazco, “Upset Hardened Memory Design for 
Submicron CMOS Technology” in IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, Vol 43, 
Issue 6, pp. 2874-2878, Dec. 1996 
39. K.J. Hass, J.W. Gambles, B. Walker, M. Zampaglione, “Mitigating Single Event 
Upsets From Combinational Logic” in Proceeding of the 7th NASA Symposium on 
VLSI Design,. pp. 4.1.1-4.1.10, 1998 
40. M.P. Baze and S.P. Buchner, “Attenuation of Single Event Induced Pulses in CMOS 
Combinational Logic” in IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, Vol. 44, Issue 6, pp. 
2217-2223 Dec. 1997 
 EngD portfolio – Volume I, A. Goikoetxea Yanci 120 
41. S. Buchner, M. Baze, D. Brown, D. McMorrow, J. Melinger, “Comparison of Error 
Rates in Combinational and Sequential Logic” in IEEE Transactions on Nuclear 
Science, Vol. 44 Issue 6, pp. 2209-2216, Dec. 1997 
42. J.W. Gambles, K.J. Hass, S.R. Whitaker, “Radiation Hardness of Ultra Low Power 
CMOS VLSI” in Proceeding of the 11th NASA Symposium on VLSI Design,. May 2003 
43. S. Asai, and Y. Wada, “Technology Challenges for Integration Near and Below 01.um” 
in Proceedings of the IEEE, Vol.85, Issue 4, pp. 505-520, Apr. 1997 
44. F. Assaderaghi, D. Sinitsky, S.A. Parke, J. Bokor, P.K. Ko, Chenming Hu, “Dynamic 
threshold-voltage MOSFET (DTMOS) for ultra-low voltage VLSI” in IEEE Transactions 
on Electronic Devices, Vol. 44, Issue 3, pp. 414-422, Mar. 1997 
45. M. Powell, S.H. Yang, B. Falsafi, K. Roy and T.N. Vijaykumar, “Gated-Vdd: A Circuit 
Technique to Reduce Leakage in Deep-Submicron Cache Memories” in Proceedings 
of the 2000 International Symposium on Low Power Electronics and Design, pp. 90-
95, 2000 
46. H. Qin, Y. Cao, D. Markovic, A. Vladimirescu, J. Rabaey, “SRAM Leakage 
Suppression by Minimizing Standby Supply Voltage” in International Symposium on 
Quality Electronic Design, pp. 55-60, Aug. 2004 
47. S. Pickles, “Submicron leakage reduction techniques”, Atmel Smart Card ICs Internal 
Report, 2006 
48. N.S. Kim, T. Austin, D. Baauw, T. Mudge, K. Flautner, J.S Hu, M.J Irwin, M. 
Kamdemir, V. Narayanan, “Leakage Current: Moore's Law Meets Static Power” in 
Computer, Vol. 36, Issue 12, pp. 68-75, Dec. 2003 
49. K. Roy, S. Mukhopadhyay, and H. Mahmoodi-meimand, “Leakage Current 
Mechanisms and Leakage Reduction Techniques in Deep-Submicrometer CMOS 
Circuits” in Proceedings fo the IEEE, Vol. 91, Issue 2, pp. 305-327, Apr. 2003 
50. S. Datta, G. Dewey, M. Doczy, B.S. Doyle, B. Jin, J. Kavalieros, R. Kotlyar, “High 
Mobility Si/SiGe Strained Channel MOS Transistors with HfO/sub 2/TiN Gate Stack” in 
IEEE Int. Electron Devices Meeting, pp. 28.1.1-28.1.3, Dec. 2003 
51. M. Ashouei, A. Chatterjee, A. D. Singh and V. De, “A Dual-Vt Layout Approach for 
Statistical Leakage Variability Minimization in Nanometer CMOS”, in Proceedings of 
the International Conference on Computer Design, pp. 567-573, Oct. 2005 
52. K. Flautner, N.S. Kim, S. Martin, D. Blaauw and T. Mudge, “Drowsy Caches: Simple 
Techniques for Reducing Leakage Power”, in Proceedings of International 
Symposium on Computer Architecture, pp. 148-157, Aug. 2002 
53. K. Zhang, U. Bhattacharya, Zhanping Chen, F. Hamzaoglu, D. Murray, N. Vallepalli, 
Yih Wang, B. Zheng, M. Bohr, “SRAM Design on 65-nm CMOS Technology With 
Dynamic Sleep Transistor for Leakage Reduction” in IEEE Journal of Solid-State 
Circuits, Vol. 40, Issue 4, pp. 895-901, Apr. 2005 
 EngD portfolio – Volume I, A. Goikoetxea Yanci 121 
54. K. Osada, Y. Saitoh, E. Ibe, K. Ishibashi, “16.7fA/cell Tunnel-Leakage-Suppressed 
16Mb SRAM for Handling Cosmic-Ray-Induced Multi-Errors” in IEEE Journal of Solid-
State Circuits, Vol. 38, Issue 11, pp. 1952-1957, Oct. 2003 
55. M. Powell, Se-Hyun Yang, B. Falsafi, K. Roy, N. Vijaykumar, “Reducing Leakage in a 
High-Performance Deep-Submicron Instruction Cache” in IEEE Transactions on Very 
Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems, Vol. 9, Issue 1, ppl 77-89, Aug. 2002 
56. Y. Wang, H. Ahn, U. Bhattacharya, T. Coan, F. Hamzaoglu, W. Hafez, C.-H. Jan, R. 
Kolar, S. Kulkarni, J. Lin, Y. Ng, I. Post, L. Wel, Y. Zahng, K. Zahng, M. Bohr, “A 
1.1GHz 12uA/Mb-Leakage SRAM Design in 65nm Ultra-Low-Power CMOS with 
Integrated Leakage Reduction for Mobile Applications” in IEEE International Solid-
State Circuits Conference, pp. 324-325, Feb. 2007 
57. T.H. Kim, J. Liu, J. Keane, C.H. Kim, “A High-Density Subthreshold SRAM with Data-
Independent Bitline Leakage and Virtual Ground Replica Scheme” in IEEE 
International Solid-State Circuits Conference, pp. 330-331, Feb. 2007 
58. N. Verma, A.P. Chandrakasan, “A 65nm 8T Sub-Vt SRAM Employing Sense-Amplifier 
Redundancy” in IEEE International Solid-State Circuits Conference, pp. 328-329, Feb. 
2007 
59. S. Lin, Yong-Bin Kim, F. Lombardi, “Design and analysis of a 32nm PVT tolerant 
CMOS SRAM cell for low leakage and high stability” in Integration the VLSI Journal, 
Vol. 43, Issue 2, pp. 176-187, Apr. 2010 
60. L. Benini, A. Macii and M. Poncino, “Energy-Aware Design of Embedded Memories: A 
Survey of Technologies, Architectures, and Optimization Techniques” in ACM 
Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, Vol. 2, Issue 1, pp. 5-32, Feb. 2003 
61. O. Oztruk and M. Kandemir, “Nonuniform Banking for Reducing Memory Energy 
Consumption” in Proceedings of the conference on Design, Automation and Test in 
Europe, Vol. 2, pp. 814-819, 2005 
62. O. Golubeva, M. Loghi, M. Poncino and E. Macii, “Architectural Leakage-Aware 
Management of Partitioned Scratchpad Memories” in Proceedings of the conference 
on Design, Automation and Test in Europe, pp. 1665-1670, 2007 
63. M. Kandemir, M.J. Irwin, G. Chen and I. Kolcu, “Compiler-Guided Leakage 
Optimization for Banked Scratch-Pad Memoried” in Transactions of Very Large Scale 
Integration Systems, Vol. 13, Issue 10, pp. 1136-1146, Oct. 2005 
64. A.Dominguez, S. Udayakumaran and R. Barua, “Heap Data Allocation to Scratch-Pad 
Memory in Embedded Systems” in Journal of Embedded Computing, Vol. 1, Issue 4, 
pp. 521-540, Dec. 2005 
65. V. Degalahal, L. Li, V. Narayanan, M. Kandemir and M.J. Irwin, “Soft Errors Issues in 
Low-Power Caches” in IEEE Transactions of Very Large Scale Integration Systems, 
Vol. 13, No. 10, pp. 1157-1166, Oct. 2005 
66. A. Keshavarzi, S. Ma, S. Narendra, B. Bloechel, K. Mistry, T. Ghani, S. Borkar and V. 
De, “Effectiveness of Reverse Body Bias for Leakage Control in Scaled Dual Vt 
 EngD portfolio – Volume I, A. Goikoetxea Yanci 122 
CMOS ICs” in Proceedings of International Symposium on Low Power Electronics and 
Design, pp. 207-212, 2001 
67. O. Golubeva, M. Loghi, E. Macii and M. Poncino, “Locality-Driven Architectural Cache 
Sub-banking for Leakage Energy Reduction” in Proceedings of International 
Symposium on Low Power Electronics and Design, pp. 274-279, 2007 
68. K.D. Cooper and T. J. Harvey, “Compiler-Controlled Memory” in ACM Special Interest 
Group on Operative Systems (SIGOPS) Operating Systems Review, Vol. 32, Issue 5, 
pp. 2-11, Dec. 1998 
69. S. Udayakumaran, A. Dominguez and R. Barua, “Dynamic Allocation for Scratch-Pad 
Memory Using Complie-Time Decisions” in ACM Transactions on Embedded 
Computing Systems, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 472-511, May 2006 
70. M. Verma, L. Wehmeyer and P. Marwedel, “Dynamic Overlay of Scratchpad Memory 
for Energy Minimization”, in Proceedings of the International Conference on 
Hardware/Software Codesign and System Synthesis (CODES+ISSS), pp. 104-109, 
Sep. 2004 
71. J. Turley, “Survey says: software tools more important than chips”, EETimes, [cited 
07/11/2005]; Available from 
http://www.eetimes.com/discussion/other/4025524/Survey-says-software-tools-more-
important-than-chips 
72. F.R. Cordeiro, A.G. Silva-Filho, C.C. Araujo, M. Gomes, E.N.S. Barros, M. E. Lima, 
“An Environment for Energy Consumption Analysis of Cache Memoires in SoC 
Platforms”, in Southern Programmable Logic Conference, pp. 35-40, Mar. 2010 
73. Bo Zhai, D. Blaauw, D. Sylvester, S. Hanson, “A Sub-200mV 6T SRAM in 0.13µm 
CMOS”, in IEEE International Solid-State Circuits Conference, pp. 332-333, Feb. 
2007 
74. J. Ahmed, “Re-configurable AVR Report”, Atmel Smart Card ICs Internal Report, 2005 
75. F. Barat, R. Lauwereins, “Reconfigurable Instruction Set Processors: A Survey” in 
IEEE International Workshop on Rapid System Prototyping, pp.168-173, Jun. 2000 
76. 8-bit AVR Instruction set. Atmel [cited 2006]; Available from 
http://www.atmel.com/atmel/acrobat/doc0856.pdf 
77. The Open Source Security Testing Methodology Manual. Institute for Security and 




 EngD portfolio – Volume I, A. Goikoetxea Yanci 123 
 
Appendix A  Known Attacks Against Smartcards [15] 
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Appendix B  GAPASE file: simulation.cfg 
 
 
# simulation.cfg : Configuration file for simulation. 
# This file is used by run_simulation script to simulate a design on nansim. 
#  
# Created by Asier Goikoetxea Yanci <asier.goikoetxea@ekb.atmel.com> 
# 2004 
# 
# Version 1.7: 2008-I-16 
# * Variable ROUNDS added 
# * Variable FULL_RESET added 
# * Variable FORCE_NETS added 
# * Variable LOAD_RUN_CYCLES added 
# * The example of KEY_NET and DATA_NET changed 
# 
# Version 1.6: 2007-VI-19 
# * Variable VOLTAGE_NODE added 
# * Variable TEMPERATURE added 
# * Variable MODEL_LIB added 
# * Variable MODEL_LIB_CALLS added 
# * Variable LOG_LEVEL added 
# 
# Version 1.5: 2006-VI-24 
# * Variable TARGET_KEY_BITS added to decide which bits are going to be targeted 
# 
# Version 1.4: 2006-V-24 
# * DESIGN_RC_TYPE, DETACH and CPU_NUMBER variables added 
# 
# Version 1.3: 2005-XI-16 
# * SAMPLE variable added 
# 
# Version 1.2: 2005-IX-xx 
# * Required variable OUTPUT_DIR replaced with SIMULATION_NAME 
# * Variable SIMULATION_TYPE created 
# * Optional simulation parameters grouped according to simulation type 
# * Simulation parameters reordered 
# * Power analysis simulation enabled 
# * Optional parameter R removed 
# * Forgotten Ground pulse variables added (previously it was implemented) 
# 
# Version 1.1: 2005-I-21 
# * It creates a directory in SIMVISION directory, where simulation's output 
#   and configuration are stored. 
# 
# Version 1.0: 2004-XII-16 










# This parameter defines the simulation's name and the name of a directory to be 
# created on simvision directory, where simulation's output is going to be moved 
# to and this file copied to, so simulation settings are also stored. 
SIMULATION_NAME= 
 




# Enter a value to indicate the voltage to which the design is going to be 
# powered. If POWER is not set, design would be powered with a constant source 
# (to which noise and/or a pulse could be applied by setting POWER_NOISE and 
# PULSE_* variables) 
VOLTAGE= 
 
# Enter the name of the supply node. This is the node used to power the circuit. 
# It will be powered at VOLTAGE volts and POWER, if set. 
#VOLTAGE_NODE=vdd! 
VOLTAGE_NODE= 
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# Enter name of stimulus file. Note, when running a PA simulation, the contents 
# of the file pointed by this parameter are not used during the simulation and 
# they are overwritten instead, so if you want to keep a copy of this stimulus 
# inputs, make sure that this is not the only copy you have of this file or 




# Enter an integer to indicate the simulation time. Expected required 
# simulation time will be calculated by the simulation environment when running 
# a power analysis. If the provided simulation time is shorted than the expected 
# one, the simulation environment may update it at the user's discretion. 
SIMULATION_TIME= 
 
# Enter a value to indicate the temperature in Celsius degrees to which the 
# design is going to be exercised. 
TEMPERATURE= 
 
# Enter the model library name, path inclusive. 
MODEL_LIB= 
 





# Define which kind of simulation is going to be performed. Possible values 
# are: {NORMAL,GLITCH,PA}  
# *NORMAL -> only DESIGN_RC_* optional parameters are checked too 
# *GLITCH -> DESIGN_RC_* and glitch related parameters are checked too 
# *PA     -> DESIGN_RC_* and power analysis parameters are checked too 
SIMULATION_TYPE= 
 
# Indicate whether the Nanosim simulation should be detached from the console. 
# By enabling detaching the simulation, on the event of closing the console 
# where the simulation environment is called from, on-going Nanosim simulations 
# won't be killed. Possible values are: {YES,NO} 
# NOTE: with this option, ONLY Nanosim simulations are detached. This option 



















# Enter the desired message log level for this simulation. This is an optional 
# parameter. Possible values are: {HIGH,LOW} 
LOG_LEVEL= 
 




# Enter design's RC netlist format type. Two are the valid formats for this 
# file: SPEF and HSPICE. Default format is HSPICE. If this parameter is left 
# undefined or set to HSPICE, HSPICE format will be understood. For SPEF 
# formatted files, this parameter should be defined with SPEF. This is an optional 



















# Enter name of power file which defines the power source for the design. Power 
# vector must be called vpower_waveform and nominal VOLTAGE values used. As this 
# waveform would be added to original VDD, a 1 on vpower_waveform would be 
# interpreted as 2*VOLTAGE, a 0 would be interpreted as VOLTAGE, a -1 would be 




# Enter time to start applying the power waveform. POWER_START time is 
# calculated as DELAY_FOR_PULSE. This parameter is only looked at if POWER 
# parameter is defined. If POWER is defined and this parameter is not defined, 




# Define a pulse to be applied to power line. Parameter DELAY_FOR_PULSE must be 
# defined in order to parse pulse definition parameters. If DELAY_FOR_PULSE is 
# not defined, remaining pulse definition parameters will be ignored. Use 
# absolute time values. Use nominal values of VOLTAGE. This pulse would be added 
# to VDD, therefore a nominal voltage of 1 would be interpreted as 2*VOLTAGE, a 0 
# would be interpreted as VOLTAGE, a -1 would be interpreted as 0v and so on. 
# Parameters PULSE_START_VALUE and PULSE_END_VALUE are the only optional ones, 
# all other parameters must be defined if a pulse is desired. If optional 
# parameters are not defined, they would be interpreted as 0, i.e. VOLTAGE. 
# DELAY_FOR_PULSE value can be setup to refer the pulse to a particular clock 
# edge, e.g. positive-edge of clock number 14 (it is also possible to refer to a 
# neg-edge). The formula to calculate delay value for a neg-edge is: 
# 
#  (n_clocks * period) --> to set pulse's origin at beginning of neg-edge 
#  (n_clocks * perios) + tfall/2 --> to set pulse's origin at midway of neg-edge 
# 
# The formula to calculate delay value for a pos-edge is: 
# 
#  (n_clocks * period) + period/2 --> to set pulse's origin at beginning of 
#       pos-edge 
#  (n_clocks * period) + period/2 + trise/2 --> to set the pulse's origin at midway 
#       of pos-edge 
# 
# All pulse times are relative times, i.e. an offset value to DELAY_FOR_PULSE, 
# also, all time must be positive numbers. Therefore, if applying a pulse just 
# before clock 'z' starts is desired, DELAY_FOR_PULSE should be calculated for 
# clock 'z-1'. If clock 'z' is used instead, the earliest the pulse could start 
# is DELAY_FOR_PULSE, and only on the case that PULSE_START_TIME is 0n. 
# 
# When setting a time value, use n for nanoseconds; u for microseconds; and m for 
# milliseconds. This is an optional parameter. 
# required pulse parameter 
DELAY_FOR_PULSE= 
 
# required pulse parameter 
PULSE_START_TIME= 
 
# optional pulse parameter (optional) 
PULSE_START_VALUE= 
 
# required pulse parameter 
PULSE_P1_TIME= 
 
# required pulse parameter 
PULSE_P1_VALUE= 
 
# required pulse parameter 
PULSE_P2_TIME= 
 
# required pulse parameter 
PULSE_P2_VALUE= 
 
# required pulse parameter 
PULSE_END_TIME= 
 
# optional pulse parameter (optional) 
PULSE_END_VALUE= 
 
# Enter name of file that defines GND waveform source for the design. Vector 
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# must be called vgnd_waveform and use nominal VOLTAGE values. As this waveform 
# would be added to original GND, a 1 on vpower_waveform would be interpreted as 
# VOLTAGE, a 0 would be interpreted as 0, a -1 would be interpreted as -VOLTAGE 




# Enter time to start applying the GND waveform. GND_START time is calculated 
# as GND_DELAY_FOR_PULSE. This paremeter will be looked at only if parameter GND 
# is defined. If parameter GND is defined and this one is not, it will be set to 




# Define a pulse to be applied to GND line. Parameter GND_DELAY_FOR_PULSE must 
# be defined in order to parse pulse definition parameters. If 
# GND_DELAY_FOR_PULSE is not defined, remaining pulse definition parameters will 
# be ignored. Use absolute time values. Use nominal values of VOLTAGE. This 
# pulse would be added to GND, therefore a nominal voltage of 1 would be 
# interpreted as VOLTAGE, a 0 would be interpreted as 0, a -1 would be 
# interpreted as -VOLTAGE and so on. Parameters GND_PULSE_START_VALUE and 
# GND_PULSE_END_VALUE are the only optional ones, all other parameters must be 
# defined if a pulse is desired. If optional parameters are not defined, they 
# would be interpreted as 0, i.e. 0v. GND_DELAY_FOR_PULSE value can be setup to 
# refer the pulse to a particular clock edge, e.g. positive-edge of clock number 
# 14 (it is also possible to refer to a neg-edge). The formula to calculate 
# delay value for a neg-edge is: 
# 
#  (n_clocks * period) --> to set pulse's origin at beginning of neg-edge 
#  (n_clocks * period) + tfall/2 --> to set pulse's origin at midway of neg-edge 
# 
# The formula to calculate delay value for a pos-edge is: 
# 
#  (n_clocks * period) + period/2 --> to set pulse's origin at beginning of 
#       pos-edge 
#  (n_clocks * period) + period/2 + trise/2 --> to set pulse's origin at midway 
#       of pos-edge 
# 
# All pulse times are relative times, i.e. an offset value to 
# GND_DELAY_FOR_PULSE, also, all time must be positive numbers. Therefore, if 
# applying a pulse just before clock 'n' starts is desired, GND_DELAY_FOR_PULSE 
# should be calculated for clock 'n-1'. If clock 'n' is used instead, the 
# earliest the pulse could start is GND_DELAY_FOR_PULSE, and only on the case 
# that GND_PULSE_START_TIME is 0n. 
# 
# When setting a time value, use n for nanoseconds; u for microseconds; and m 
# for milliseconds. This is an optional parameter. 
# required pulse parameter 
GND_DELAY_FOR_PULSE= 
 
# required pulse parameter (optional) 
GND_PULSE_START_TIME= 
 
# optional pulse parameter 
GND_PULSE_START_VALUE= 
 
# required pulse parameter 
GND_PULSE_P1_TIME= 
 
# required pulse parameter 
GND_PULSE_P1_VALUE= 
 
# required pulse parameter 
GND_PULSE_P2_TIME= 
 
# required pulse parameter 
GND_PULSE_P2_VALUE= 
 
# required pulse parameter 
GND_PULSE_END_TIME= 
 
# optional pulse parameter (optional) 
GND_PULSE_END_VALUE= 
 
# Enter file name of noise to be applied to stimulus. Again, use nominal values. 
# Prefixing signal name is recommended. Prefixes 'org_' and 'nom_' are forbidden 




# Enter time to start applying the noise to the stimulus. STIMULUS_START is 
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# calculated as DELAY_FOR_PULSE. This parameter will be looked at only if 
# parameter STIMULUS_NOISE is defined. If parameter STIMULUS_NOISE is defined 



















# How simulation will be performed 
# 
#          ____      ____      ____      ____      ____      ____ 





#           _____     _____     _____     _____     _____     ____ 
#run  -----/     \---/     \---/     \---/     \---/     \---/    ** 
# 
#         _______   _______   _______   _______   _______   ______ 
#key  ---<_______>-<_______>-<_______>-<_______>-<_______>-<______** 
# 





# * Note: Clock signal will be automatically generated by simulation environment 
# ** Note: Although some registers have asynchronous reset input, external reset 
#          signal will be generated considering that such input does not exist 
#          or that it is synchronous. 
# *** Note: Data, key, enable and run registers' input and outputs will be 
#           forced only after reset and before next positive clock edge, being 
#           released during positive clock cycle. 
# 
 
# Enter cryptographic block identifier. Possible values are: 
# {DES, AES-128, AES-192, AES-256} 













# Enter clock frequency at which the cryptographic block will be exercised. 
# Provide clock frequency in KHz. Note that this entry is required even when 
# cryptographic block is asynchronous. On such case, this signal will not affect 




# Enter the number of rounds to be simulated. In order to carry a normal DPA on 
# a DES module, getting the power trace of the first round is enough. For more 
# complex power analysis (e.g. second order DPA), the power trace of two rounds 
# is required. This parameter lets you configure the amount of rounds to be 
# simulated and extracted. The higher the number of rounds, the longer it will 




# Enter the desired number of times each data should be run. The more samples 
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# are taken the better. However, different crypto blocks may require different 
# amount of samples to expose their weaknesses, were very weak/unsecure block 




# Deprecated. It wont be used in future versions 
CPU_NUMBER= 
 
# Enter the name of clock input signal. This parameter is mandatory when 




# Enter the name of reset input signal. This parameter is mandatory when 




# Determine whether the cryptographic module should be fully reset or not 
# after generating power consumed by each plaintext. When fully resetting the 
# cryptographic module, all registers and nets will be force to a reset status. 
# When not fully resetting it, only registers will be forced to a reset status. 
# On this later case, KEY and DATA registers are excluded. This parameter is 
# mandatory when performing a Power Analysis. Possible values are: 




# Determine whether the KEY and DATA registers' inputs or outputs should be 
# forced at the beginning of each plaintext encryption. This parameter is 
# mandatory when performing a Power Analysis. If not defined, a warning message 
# will be generated and it will be set to INPUT. Possible values are: 




# Determine whether KEY and DATA load operation and launching the encryption 
# should happen in the same clock cycle or not. If they happen in the same 
# clock cycle, encryption simulation will be launched straight away. If they 
# happen on different clock cycles, one clock cycle will be used to load KEY 
# and DATA and the following one will launch the encryption. This parameter is 
# valid only when forcing the inputs of KEY and DATA registers (FORCE_NETS). In 
# such case, this parameter is mandatory. If not defined, a warning message 





# Enter the name of the register that triggers encryption loop/run. This 




# Enter hex key for cryptographic modules. This parameter is mandatory when 




# Enter target key bits. This parameter is mandatory when performing a Power 
# Analysis. Possible values are: 
# SBOX_1 -target bits on SBOX 1; 
# SBOX_2 -target bits on SBOX 2; 
# SBOX_3 -target bits on SBOX 3; 
# SBOX_4 -target bits on SBOX 4; 
# SBOX_5 -target bits on SBOX 5; 
# SBOX_6 -target bits on SBOX 6; 
# SBOX_7 -target bits on SBOX 7; 




# Deprecated. It wont be used in future versions 
# Enter the name of registers used to store the key. This is an optional 
# parameter. This or KEY_NET parameter must be defined. If this parameter is 
# defined, parameter KEY_NET will be ignored. If this parameter is not defined, 




# Deprecated. It wont be used in future versions 
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# Enter the name of registers used to store the data. This is an optional 
# parameter. This or DATA_NET parameter must be defined. If this parameter is 
# defined, parameter DATA_NET will be ignored. If this parameter is not defined, 




# Deprecated. It wont be used in future versions 
# Enter each key registers' input and output data net's name. These names can be 
# found in design's netlist. If left empty, run_simulation script will 
# automatically search for appropriate net names. This is an optional parameter. 
# This or KEYREG parameter must be defined. If KEYREG parameter is defined, this 
# parameter will be ignored. If KEYREG parameter is not defined, then this 
# parameter will be checked. 
#KEY_NET=    KEY0_0in  KEY0_0enn  KEY0_0out  KEY0_1in  ...  KEYn_nenn KEYn_nout 
#               |         |          |         |        |      |         | 
#KEY_NET=    NET53      NET55      NET123    NET125    ...  NET155    NET150 
KEY_NET= 
 
# Deprecated. It wont be used in future versions 
# Enter each data registers' input and output data net's name. These names can 
# be found in design's netlist. If left empty, run_simulation script will 
# automatically search for appropriate net names. This is an optional parameter. 
# This or DATAREG parameter must be defined. If DATAREG parameter is defined, 
# this parameter will be ignored. If DATAREG parameter is not defined, then this 
# parameter will be checked. 
#DATA_NET=   DATA0_0in  DATA0_0enn  DATA0_0out  DATA0_1in  ...  DATAn_nenn DATAn_nout 
#               |          |           |          |         |      |          | 














These are the different types of Single Event Effects inducible by radiation as covered in [34]: 
 
• Single Event Upset: Generally a transient condition in which the output state of a digital 
device is affected (e.g., a bit-flip in a memory cell or a change of state of an inverter). The 
state recovers after being rewritten, causing no permanent damage. 
• Single Event Latchup: Condition characterized by an anomalous high current state, 
where the current can go from picoamps (10-12) to amps. If the power is cycled before 
damage occurs, SEL may only be transient. 
• Single Event Burnout: Permanent failure due to maintaining a high current state for an 
extended period of time. 
• Single Event Gate Rupture: Permanent failure caused by dielectric breakdown in the 
semiconductor oxide layer. 
• Single Event Total Dose: Permanent failure caused by a single particle that produces 
enough ionization or displacement damage in a transistor to permanently degrade its 
performance. SETD are more significant now because technology advances have led to 
very small transistor sizes, making it possible for a particle's path to encompass much of 
an entire transistor. 
• Single Event Transient: Effects (e.g., current spikes in operational amplifiers) of short 
time duration that may lead to other effects downstream of the affected site that are longer 
in duration. 
 
 
 
 
